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 The international security environment in East Asia 
is far from stable and predictable. A variety of states in 
the region have long, troubled relationships. The People's 
Republic of China (PRC, or China in the following 
discussion) is a regional military power with a nuclear 
arsenal, and it could contend for global superpower status 
in the future. China has a number of security problems 
inside and outside of its vast territory; among which their 
greatest concern is the issue of the Republic of China (ROC 
or Taiwan). Taiwan has an advanced economy and considerable 
military forces to counter the threat from the mainland. Its 
close relationship with the United States has provided some 
power balance with China. The split of the Korean Peninsula 
is a legacy of the Cold War. The Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), under dictator Kim 
Jong Il, has posed the most imminent post-Cold War threat to 
the region with its nuclear weapons development and 
ballistic missile programs. The Republic of Korea (ROK or 
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South Korea), like Taiwan, showed impressive economic growth 
in the 1980s and has maintained a stable democratic regime 
since the late 1980s. 
 Following the defeat in World War II, Japan became 
known as a peaceful nation and mercantile state. However, 
the second largest economy in the world has gradually 
developed its role in the international security field and 
increased its military power. There exists "a complex, 
multidimensional, multilevel security agenda that has forced 
changes and has tested Japan's security policy" (Hughes 2004, 
3). Japan faces a number of issues with its neighbors: 
territorial disputes with China regarding the Senkaku 
Islands, with South Korea regarding Takeshima (Dokdo) Island, 
and with Russia regarding the Northern Territories; 
historical legacies such as Japanese prime ministers' 
worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine, reactionary revisions of 
Japanese history schoolbooks, and chemical weapons abandoned 
by the Japanese military in Chinese territory during World 
War II; and economic concerns like the development of energy 
and natural resources in the East China Sea. 
 Above all, the United States, the only global 
superpower after the Cold War, is the key actor in the 
region. George W. Bush's administration has been engaging in 
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an unprecedented "war against terrorism," adopting an 
approach to policy which critics condemn as "unilateralism." 
The United States has played an irreplaceable role in East 
Asia, adopting a hub and spokes type of alliance with Japan, 
South Korea, and (informally) Taiwan, unlike the collective 
defense organization of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in Europe. In this complex environment, 
Japan's defense and security policies have a significant 
impact on international relations. 
 Meanwhile, the development of military technology 
through history has been remarkable. In order to fight and 
win wars, humans have invented such offensive weapons as 
bows and arrows, cannons, gunpowder, tanks, airplanes, and 
missiles. The history of war consists of battles between 
offense and defense, and we have tried to counter offensive 
weapons with shields, fortifications, trenches, anti-tank 
weapons and anti-aircraft missiles. Such battles and the 
need to win wars have encouraged further advancement of 
military technology. Recent developments in information and 
communication technology (ICT) have brought about the so-
called "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). Some believe 
that we can finally "hit a bullet with a bullet" and shoot 
down nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles before they hit a 
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target. The United States has aggressively pursued the 
development of a missile shield for the sake of its own 
national security, but there remain many issues to be solved. 
Japan has been involved in the US missile defense program 
since 1993, and recently announced that it would build its 
own missile defense system. However, the development and 
deployment of Japan's missile defense could have grave 
implications for regional and global security. 
 This study will focus on Japan's missile defense 
program. This issue has been little discussed in public 
until recently, compared with the debate on ballistic 
missile defense in the United States. This is true even in 
the Japanese international security literature. This can 
partly be attributed to the fact that Japan has only been 
cooperating with the United States on missile defense 
research and had not made a decision to deploy its own 
missile defense system until recently. But the substantive 
shift in Japan's defense strategy should be of great concern. 
There have been few scholarly works on the development of 
strategic thinking in Japan's policy on defense against 
ballistic missile threats. Considering the growing 
importance of strategic views on emerging ballistic missile 
threats, it is worth exploring the defense and security 
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policy of the second largest economy in the world, a major 
actor in the regional and world security arena, and the 
holder of one of the world's largest and most sophisticated 
armed forces. 
 This is a case study based on qualitative rather than 
quantitative analysis. While it refers to theories of 
international relations, its basic approach is inductive, 
descriptive and discovery oriented. This is a historical and 
narrative study of Japan's defense and security policy, 
mainly focusing on the modern period following 1945, the 
year that Japan was defeated in World War II and began 
reconstructing its foreign and defense policy from scratch. 
The data sources primarily consist of the following three. 
First, this research used official documents from records of 
the Kokkai (Diet; Japanese congress), Defense White Papers, 
and other official publications by the Self Defense Forces 
(SDF), Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), and so forth. Second, the author updated 
readings from the wealth of materials continually coming out 
on the missile defense issue, including relevant books and 
academic journals articles, as well as documents, data, and 
other materials available through the Internet. Third, this 
research made use of media sources, including editorials, 
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op-eds, and reports from leading newspapers in the United 
States and Japan. 
 This research is conducted at three levels of 
analysis: systemic, state, and individual. The systemic 
level includes international structures, state power 
polarity (unipolar or multipolar), international economic 
conditions, and the Cold War and post-Cold War environments. 
It also involves regional analysis, referring to Japan's 
political relations with China, Taiwan, North Korea, South 
Korea, and the United States, as well as their economic ties 
and interdependence. The state level of analysis examines 
institutions (e.g., the government, Diet, constitution), 
bureaucratic politics (JDA and MOFA), partisanship (e.g., 
Liberal Democratic Party, Socialist Party), civil-military 
relations (SDF), the military-industry complex (e.g., 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), mass media (newspaper, 
television, and journals), public opinion, domestic economy 
(economic development, recession, and financial resources), 
security culture (World War II experiences, anti-nuclear 
sentiments, historical legacies, and other philosophical 
bases), and national identities. Finally, the individual 
level of analysis comprises perceptions of leaders and 
elites such as prime ministers, LDP leaders, and JDA 
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officers. 
 The objectives of this study are threefold. First, it 
provides an original case study for the international 
security field. A number of historical case studies on 
Japan's diplomacy and foreign policy can be found; however, 
there has been no specific work on the relationships between 
missile defense and Japan's grand strategy of national 
security, the field to which this study contributes. Second, 
this study offers empirical evidence testing theories of 
international relations. Realism is a dominant school of 
thought in the field of international security, but it has 
constantly been attacked from other theoretical perspectives. 
While neither supporting nor opposing realism, this study 
provides evidence that should contribute to the development 
of the field by analyzing an important specific case of 
Japan's national security policymaking. Third, this study 
presents implications for future defense and security 
policies of Japan and the United States, with regard to 
long-term grand strategies regarding ballistic missile 
threats to both states. 
 This study is presented in the following four parts: 
Chapter two defines strategic concepts and discusses 
theoretical perspectives on Japan's national identity. 
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Chapter three reviews Japanese security policies after World 
War II and illustrates shifts and changes that have occurred. 
Chapter four analyzes the missile defense program pursued by 
Japan and assesses the goals of its national and 
international security policies. Finally, chapter five 









 This chapter provides theoretical frameworks for the 
following discussion on Japan's missile defense. First, 
several key strategic concepts are defined. Here, debates on 
the distinction between offense and defense are reviewed, 
and a clue to examine the question of whether missile 
defense is truly "defensive" or not is provided. Second, the 
sense of Japanese identity underlying Japan's defense and 
security policy is analyzed from perspectives drawn from 
international political theory. 
 
A. Basic Concepts 
 
 "Grand strategy" is the broadest and most basic 
concept of international security used here. It is generally 
defined as "a plan of action that is based on the calculated 
relation of means to a larger ends" (International Security 
Studies at Yale University). Grand Strategy is usually 
thought of as drawing on all the instruments of statecraft 
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(military, economic, diplomatic, and so on) for the 
advancement of the interests of the state. In other words, 
grand strategy is equivalent to a state's overall national 
security policy. This study particularly focuses on "the 
politico-military and governmental realms" (ibid.), using a 
broader concept than a common definition of "military grand 
strategy" at the level of movement and use of an entire 
nation state at war, which includes calculations of economic 
resources, manpower and moral resources, and what is 
sometimes called national will. 
 "Strategy," "disarmament" and "arms control" are the 
main components of a grand strategy. In forming a grand 
strategy a state defines its interests and formulates 
appropriate policies to protect or maximize such interests, 
not only in warfare but also in peacetime. It can be said 
that this concept is equivalent to policymaking in the 
national security field. "Strategy" includes "war-fighting" 
and "deterrence." And for the sake of the discussion on 
missile defense, this study makes a distinction between 
"deterrence by punishment" and "deterrence by denial." 
Finally, arms control components, "mutual assured 




1. Strategy, Arms Control, and Disarmament 
 Military strategy is generally defined as the art of 
a commander-in-chief in warfare; that is, the art of 
projecting and directing overall military movements and 
operations of a war or battle. It is usually distinguished 
from the narrower concept, tactics, which is the art of 
handling forces in battle or in the immediate presence of 
the enemy. Strategy involves looking at the war as a whole 
and supervising each tactic employed. Moreover, strategy 
involves unilateral pursuit of a state's national interest, 
including, in many cases, actual military action, and it 
does not require negotiation or collaboration with other 
states. 
 Disarmament is a traditional term meaning agreements 
and negotiations for reduction or removal of armament. 
According to Dictionary of World History, disarmament 
"envisages a dramatic reduction in arms in order to achieve 
peace" (Larsen and Smith 2005, 1). Disarmament can occur 
both on a tactical level and/or on a strategic level. Its 
early practices were "largely postconflict impositions of 
limitations on military force by the victor upon the 
vanquished"; however, "efforts to avoid conflict by 
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cooperating to demilitarize likely regions of contact and to 
restrict the use of new and destructive technologies" can be 
seen as early as the 448 B.C. Athens-Persia Accord (ibid.). 
Disarmament can be a voluntary action by a state motivated 
by its own strategic interests, financial constraints, or 
foreign pressure. But such a unilateral act is a state's own 
choice based on self- rather than mutual-interest. Therefore 
such unilateral actions belong more to the area of strategy 
than disarmament. Disarmament can also take the form of a 
cooperative multilateral action among states aimed at easing 
international political and military tensions. This study 
considers this form of disarmament, as a cooperative 
endeavor between states to reduce military forces, with the 
alternate objective of eliminating entire categories of 
weapons or forces. 
 Arms control emerged to replace the concept of 
disarmament early in the nuclear age. It is defined as any 
international limitation of the development, testing, 
production, deployment, or use of weapons, usually applying 
to specific types of arms or geographic areas. At the same 
time, in contrast to disarmament, the goal is the limitation 
rather than the complete elimination of particular types of 
weapons or forces (Ogawa 1996, 22-27). This approach is 
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based on the recognition that in the nuclear age the 
abolition of nuclear weapons is unobtainable in the near 
term. In terms of nuclear weapons, then, an important 
difference between disarmament and arms control is that the 
latter gives priority not to reducing or eliminating 
military capabilities but to minimizing the likelihood of 
war. According to the classic differentiation of Hedley Bull, 
"disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments, 
while arms control is restraint internationally exercised 
upon armaments policy - not only the number of weapons, but 
also their character, development, and use" (Larsen and 
Smith 2005, 3). Arms control implies some form of 
collaboration between generally antagonistic states in areas 
of military policy. Moreover, arms control emphasizes not 
only reducing the risk of the outbreak of war but also 
limiting the destruction in case of war. 
 
2. War-Fighting, Deterrence, and Alliance 
 These three concepts belong to the larger notion of 
strategy. "War-fighting" is distinguished from "deterrence" 
in that the former is a wartime value, while the latter is a 
peacetime objective. War-fighting is a policy based on 
pursuit of a military strategy for the purpose of prevailing 
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against the enemy in war. War-fighters "see aggression as a 
constant threat" and "are drawn toward a policy based on 
unilateral pursuit of a military (war-fighting) strategy" 
(Goldfischer 1993, 22). They "claim that all forms of arms 
control are unnecessary" because a strong state can "defend 
itself through unilateral efforts" (ibid., 4). 
 According to Glenn Snyder's classic definition, 
"Deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking 
military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and 
risk outweighing his prospective gain" (Snyder in Adams 2004, 
404). Deterrence in essence is a coercive strategy, but it 
is a "means" to achieve the desirable "end" of peace (Walzer 
1977). Deterrence in this study of the nuclear age mainly 
refers to nuclear rather than conventional deterrence. It is 
logical to see nuclear deterrence as far more powerful than 
conventional deterrence, thanks to the "crystal ball 
effect," in which the destructive power of nuclear weapons 
is so frightful that decision-makers easily understand the 
consequences of nuclear war and would never initiate such a 
war. 
 The crucial difference between war-fighting and 
deterrence is that the war-fighting approach regards nuclear 
weapons as "usable," while nuclear deterrence is based on 
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the assumption that they are "unusable." Bernard Brodie is 
said to have first put forward the idea of nuclear 
deterrence (Iwata 1996, 24). In 1946 Brodie stated, "Thus 
far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has 
been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to 
avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose" 
(Brodie in Schell 1982, 197). Deterrence is seen as working 
"through the punitive threat of irresistible hurt to the 
enemy's social and economic structure, rather than through 
the prospect of victory in combat" (Freedman 1981, 192-193). 
Therefore, "[w]hat is important are the political effects 
that nuclear weapons produce, not the physics and chemistry 
of the explosion" (Jervis 1988, 83). During the Cold War, 
Robert Jervis argued that nuclear deterrence theory "is 
probably the most influential school of thought in the 
American study of international relations" (Jervis 1979, 
289). 
 Another important definition here is the distinction 
between "deterrence by punishment" and "deterrence by 
denial." Deterrence by punishment means dissuading the enemy 
from initiating attack by threatening it with massive 
nuclear retaliation. Deterrence by denial is discouraging 
the enemy from attacking through the ability to defend 
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against an attack. These two concepts work quite differently 
when applied to conventional forces versus nuclear forces. 
 Hard-nosed nuclear war-fighters may not believe in 
the efficacy of any deterrent posture, since they see war as 
inevitable. Still, war-fighters generally believe in nuclear 
deterrence. A state may deter some range of aggressive 
action by an adversary through the credible threat to wage 
and prevail in a nuclear war. 
 Finally, an "alliance" is a military agreement 
between two or more countries related to wartime planning, 
commitments, or contingencies. This is a bilateral or 
multilateral action of states. Military alliances should be 
considered an aspect of strategy, because they are largely 
an outcome of unilateral quests for fulfilling self-interest 
rather than a result of a belief in cooperation as an end in 
itself. "Alliances are temporary coalitions of self-
interested states who come together for instrumental reasons 
in response to a specific threat" (Wendt 1996, 53). 
 
3. MAD Versus MDE 
 MAD and MDE are defined within the concept of arms 
control. The MAD situation during the Cold War may have been 
a mere consequence of power balancing by the superpowers, 
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which were unilaterally pursuing both quantitative and 
qualitative buildup of their nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, 
once the United States and the Soviet Union perceived the 
equilibrium of offensive nuclear forces, however illogical 
the ultimate number of those weapons was during the 1960s 
and 70s, it was based on bilateral or multilateral agreement, 
or at least understanding, of a reality. The superpowers 
were mutually deterring a deliberate nuclear attack upon 
each other by maintaining a clear and unmistakable ability 
to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any 
aggressor, even after absorbing a surprise first strike. MAD 
emphasizes offensive nuclear forces and opposes deployment 
of defensive weapons. Its advocates held that allowing a 
defensive weapon buildup could lead to a spiraling offense-
defense arms race and might even destabilize the superpower 
nuclear stalemate. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty, which prohibited developing and deploying shields 
against offensive ballistic missiles, was the most important 
product of a MAD arms control approach. The arms race in 
offensive nuclear forces continued after that, but at least 
this treaty played a significant role in preventing an arms 
race in strategic defensive weapons, which might well have 
further accelerated the offensive arms race. MAD advocates 
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argue, "defense is unnecessary because bilateral 'offense-
only' deterrent forces can provide a safe and durable arms 
control framework" (Goldfischer 1993, 4). Therefore, MAD is 
defined as a school of nuclear arms control because it is 
based on bilateral or multilateral agreement or at least 
mutual understanding (Ishikawa 2002, 222-223). 
 In order to pursue their national interests, states 
have built up their military capabilities. Defensive weapons, 
as well as offensive weapons, may well be developed for the 
purpose of war-fighting and deterrence. Nevertheless, 
pursuing missile defense shields is not necessarily 
unilateral and strategic. If states agree on and cooperate 
in building defensive weapons while reducing offensive ones, 
tensions among them might be eased, and defenses might help 
stabilize strategic relations between states. This approach 
has been called mutual defense emphasis (MDE). From this 
perspective, "an agreement on limited defense would be seen 
as a useful first step toward a more far-reaching defense 
transition" (Goldfischer 1993, 4). In the case of the 
nuclear age, MDE places emphasis on defensive weapons to 
reduce societal damage in an actual nuclear war. It 
renounces reliance on offense-dominant nuclear policies, 
which are based permanently on threats of mutual 
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annihilation in case deterrence should fail. "Mutual defense 
emphasis advocates have claimed that their approach can 
satisfy the arms control requirements of nuclear parity and 
deterrence stability and provide a means to limit damage if 
deterrence somehow fails" (ibid., 5; original emphasis). 
 Both MAD and MDE affirm the importance of deterrence. 
On the one hand, MAD obviously bases its logic upon massive 
retaliatory nuclear forces, which would be launched in case 
of a first strike by the enemy. This is an arms control 
policy of "deterrence by punishment." On the other hand, a 
missile defense system may dissuade the enemy from attacking 
by offering the prospect that the attack will be rendered 
ineffective. This is a policy of "deterrence by denial." 
These two concepts in a nuclear world connote a striking 
difference. The former indicates that in case of deterrence 
failure, a massive retaliatory nuclear assault would result. 
Disastrous nuclear annihilation would occur even if the 
enemy had only a small number of nuclear weapons. The latter 
leaves the possibility that a state could defend itself even 
if deterrence should fail and the enemy initiate a first 
strike with or without nuclear weapons. This is the exact 
point on which MDE advocates criticize MAD as a form of 
"madness" which has forced us to live with tens of thousands 
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of nuclear weapons that could destroy the whole world many 
times over. 
 
4. Offense versus Defense  
 The issue of the offense-defense distinction has been 
debated for many years. Some scholars and politicians 
contend that the differentiation does not matter in 
international politics, while others argue that it is of 
critical importance. The author considers the distinction 
important and believes it should have a crucial impact on 
missile defense debates. The so-called "offense-defense 
theory" is that "the character of international politics is 
influenced by whether offensive military operations are easy 
or difficult" (Lynn-Jones 2004, xi). When offense has the 
advantage over defense, war and conflict will become more 
likely; when defense has the advantage, peace and 
cooperation will be more probable. 
 Offense involves breaking into the enemy's territory, 
and offensive forces are those that enable invasion from the 
land, air or sea. Karen Ruth Adams defines offense as 
follows: "a state uses force to attack another state's 
military or nonmilitary assets to conquer its territory or 
compel compliance with policy directives (impose its will on 
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the other state)" (Adams 2004, 408). Looking at the other 
side of the coin, according to Jervis' classic definition, 
"the essence of defense is keeping the other side out of 
your territory. A purely defensive weapon is one that can do 
this without being able to penetrate the enemy's land" 
(Jervis 1978, 39). 
 However, the distinction between offense and defense 
is complex, particularly because many scholars argue from 
not only technological but also political points of view. 
Some weapons are easy to distinguish: strategic bombers, 
ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers that facilitate 
invasion of distant territories are clearly offensive; 
fortifications, trenches and landmines that have no mobility 
are purely defensive (Lieber 2000, 78-79). Nevertheless, 
many weapons are in the gray zone. Particular weapons can be 
both offensive and defensive on the battlefield, as well as 
in larger strategic environments. Tanks are usually regarded 
as offensive, but in Japan this is not the case. It 
possesses a sizable number of sophisticated tanks for the 
purpose of defense, since the country is surrounded by the 
sea and cannot invade other states with tanks. On the 
contrary, landmines and machine guns are often called 
defensive, but when used in the enemy's territory for a 
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strategic purpose, they become offensive. An ostensibly 
defensive missile shield can be regarded as offensive when 
the missile defense capability is considered in combination 
with an offensive nuclear first-strike capability. If the 
United States develops a reliable missile defense system, it 
will pose a tremendous threat to other nuclear states 
because the United States will be able to launch a first 
nuclear strike without fear of retaliatory nuclear attack. 
In the case of possible conflict in East Asia, even the 
missile defense capability of Japan, the country with no 
offensive capability, can be viewed as offensive, when 
combined with the massive offensive forces of the United 
States, Japan's most powerful and reliable ally. 
 A majority of scholars in the offense-defense debate 
argue that nuclear weapons favor defense. Considering the 
vast power of nuclear weapons, building and maintaining a 
second-strike capability can be attained at relatively 
little cost for states, and conflict among nuclear states 
becomes "virtually impossible" (Van Evera 1998, 255). 
"Defense is impossible - a triumph not of offense, but of 
deterrence" (Jervis 1978, 34). However, the author disagrees. 
Nuclear deterrence should be distinguished from the 
conventional offense-defense debate, since it is a situation 
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of stalemate in which states faces each other with massively 
destructive and "offensive" bombers and ballistic missiles 
with nuclear warheads. Besides, the argument that includes 
deterrence as a special form of defense is dangerous and 
misleading, because it could promote proliferation of 
nuclear weapons among states claiming their pursuit of 
nuclear capability is for "defensive" purposes. 
 The distinction between offense and defense can also 
be characterized in terms of perception: "the real state of 
offensive or defensive bias may be less important than the 
perceived bias" (Quester 2003, ix-x; original emphasis). As 
Jervis argues, when the distinction is possible and defense 
has the advantage, the perceived threat is minimal and 
relations between states should be stable. However, when 
offense has the advantage and the distinction is not clear, 
the perceived threat can be grave and that may lead to a 
preemptive or preventive first strike by a state (Jervis 
1978). 
 Strategists tend to reject the distinction between 
offense and defense. The only thing that matters is whether 
or not particular weapons systems favor unilateral advantage 
for their country. It does not matter if such systems are 
offensive or defensive. Arms controllers and disarmament 
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advocates are inclined to embrace the distinction in order 
to diminish risks and costs for all states concerned 
(Goldfischer 1993, 26). As discussed earlier, emphasis on 
offense or defense separates MAD advocates from MDE 
supporters. Disarmament proponents in general believe that 
both offensive and defensive weapons must be reduced, though 
some may emphasize more on disarmament of offensive weapons 
than defensive. The 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference 
sought such a ban on arms specifically for offensive 
operations. On balance, the distinction is possible and 
essential, when we carefully look at various factors such as 
military technology and doctrine, geography, national social 
structure, and diplomatic arrangements. The author will 
adopt this perspective and make a clear distinction between 
offense and defense. Chapter four will discuss whether and 
how missile defense issues fall within this argument. 
 The preceding discussion of strategic terms is 
summarized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. International Security Study Concepts 
Grand Strategy 
Unilateral Approach Bilateral or Multilateral Approach 
Strategy Arms Control 
































B. Realism and Pacifism in the Japanese Identity 
 
 "Identity" refers to how people define themselves "in 
terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, 
customs, institutions. They identify with cultural groups: 
tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations and, 
at the broadest level, civilizations" (Huntington 2001, 131). 
Identity "is a central aspect of the human experience" and 
"should be of vital concern to those interested in security 
issues" (Wyn Jones 1999, 114). Before August 15, 1945, the 
Japanese homeland had never been invaded, or occupied by 
another country. Therefore, for Japan, the defeat in the 
Pacific War and the following occupation by the United 
26 
States brought not only the total disruption of the 
fundamental character of the state but also the loss of the 
nation's sense of identity as the leader of Eastern 
civilization (Kato 2002). Under the occupation, the United 
States eliminated Japanese militarism completely. With 
various democratization measures, it forced the Japanese to 
Americanize as well as to distance themselves from other 
Asian states, while establishing stronger ties with Western 
civilization. This was the Japanese people's first 
experience with drastic and direct influence from the 
outside world. 
 After the war, two different national identities with 
regard to national and international security emerged in 
Japan: a "realist identity" and a "pacifist identity." 
Clashes between these "dual identities" (Soeya 1998) have 
played a role in various behind-the-scene debates in Japan's 
postwar political history. These will be described in detail 
in chapter three. It would not be accurate to describe these 
debates as clashes of ideologies (e.g., conservative versus 
radical, liberal versus communist, or right wing versus left 
wing), since at bottom, there has clearly been a common 
perception that the most important thing is to secure the 
country and its people. The issue that emerges from this 
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perception, namely, "what should be done to secure the 
country and how should it be achieved," fundamentally 
separates these two identities. Competition between the dual 
identities has swung Japanese minds from one identity to the 
other at a national level as well as at regional, local and 
individual levels. 
 
1. The Realist Identity 
 a. Basic Features 
 The realist identity considers the balance of 
material forces as critical to national security, including 
the military balance among states, and economic strength as 
the basis of military power. Soon after the end of the 
Second World War, the Cold War between the United States and 
the Soviet Union emerged and fated the Asia-Pacific region 
to further conflicts. Japan, under occupation by the United 
States, became a part of the western alliance, even after 
its independence was restored. Facing threats from Communist 
China and North Korea, as well as from Soviet forces in the 
Far East, calls for rearmament, from a strategic point of 
view, grew louder in Japan. Recognizing the reality of the 
Cold War, the realist camp concluded that Japan's security 
and prosperity should be achieved based on a military 
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alliance with the United States. After the end of the Cold 
War, the realist identity retained its focus on military, 
political and economic ties with the United States, and it 
aimed at international contribution only within the 
framework of this relationship, while promoting 
modernization of Japan's defense capability. 
 
 b. Theoretical Background 
 The basis of the realist identity is the 
international political theory of "realism," the mainstream 
school of thought in the field of international security. 
Realists consider the world to be in a state of anarchy, 
where there is no governing body above the sovereignty of 
individual states. In the international environment, unlike 
within the state, there are neither legislative functions 
that create order, nor administrative mechanisms that 
maintain order. In addition, traditional international laws 
have no actual authority over sovereign states, and the 
exercise of international law depends heavily on the will of 
each state. Given the absence of a world government, a state 
is able to act as it wishes in pursuit of its national 
interests; therefore, clashes of interest among states are 
inevitable. From a realist viewpoint, relations among states 
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are essentially conflictual. Realists focus on power 
relations among states, and they take a pessimistic view of 
international cooperation. A state seeks to maximize its 
national power to ensure survival, or may regard the 
maximization of national power itself as a goal. The state 
may thus do whatever it takes to achieve this goal. In 
history, states have invaded other states and fought wars in 
pursuit of national power goals. 
 Nevertheless, "realism" is not a monolithic view. 
Depending on theoretical assumptions and policy implications, 
one can classify a variety of "realisms," such as classical 
realism, neo-realism, neo-classical realism, and so on 
(Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Among these, the most 
influential theory of realism in the United States over the 
past three decades has been that of Kenneth Waltz, whose 
perspective has been labeled "neorealism." Neorealism is 
based on four important assumptions. First, the state is the 
principal actor and the most important unit to analyze. 
Actors other than states, such as international 
organizations, groups or individuals, which would include 
even the United Nations and international terrorist groups, 
are considered far less significant. Second, the state is 
looked on as a unitary actor. In the domestic decision-
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making process there are various perspectives among actors 
such as political leaders, bureaucrats, public opinion, 
media, and so on. Nonetheless, by means of reconciliation, 
coordination, and compromise, a government provides one 
unified voice in the end. The state is assumed to act as if 
it were an individual, independent actor. Third, the state 
is regarded as essentially a rational actor. That is, the 
state logically assesses its goal, considers all the means 
and options to achieve it, analyzes every possibility to 
attain the goal with that selected means, and calculates 
cost-effect ratio. And then the state makes policy decisions 
to maximize its national interests. Fourth, realists regard 
national security as the most important issue in the 
international arena. Hans Morgenthau, the most influential 
realist scholar during much of the Cold War era, argued that 
issues such as defense of a state, international conflict 
and war were a matter of "high politics," while economic and 
social issues such as trade and finance were in the less 
important realm of "low politics" (Morgenthau 1985). 
 Based on the above assumptions, from the realist 
point of view the world is often compared to a "billiard" 
table. On the table (the globe), hard balls (the sovereign 
states) keep hitting one another. But the sizes of the balls 
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are not equal, and a larger ball (a state with more power) 
will smash and crush smaller ones. This relation among 
states is Thomas Hobbs's well-known "war of all against all" 
in international relations. In this "state of nature," wars 
among states are inescapable. Human history repeats itself, 
and therefore it is a history of war. Furthermore, out of 
this theory arises "alliance theory." According to one 
strand of alliance theory, when one state or a group of 
states holds superior power and poses a threat of invasion 
to others, the weaker states may unite to confront the 
threat. A frequently cited example is the situation in 
Europe before the First World War. The confrontation between 
the east and west blocs during the Cold War is another 
instance. Balance of power theory and alliance theory are 
two core theories of the realist school of thought; however, 
some realists deny the "balancing" theory, and prefer the 
"bandwagoning" argument that weaker states go along with a 
strong state or a group of states led by a strong one. They 
observe this "bandwagoning" of weaker states with great 
powers as particularly prevalent in recent international 
politics (Walt 1992). For instance, in 1990, when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, the neighboring Arab states took sides with 
the United States, instead of balancing against the US. 
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 c. Realism and International Security 
 The concept of national security is, in the narrowest 
sense, focused on maintaining a nation's territory and 
society (Nagahisa 1998). To put it more concretely, national 
security is how "militarily a state protects its own 
territory, independence, lives of the population, and 
property from military invasion from outside enemies" 
(Kamiya 1998, 4). A state must defend its material resources 
by physical means. This perspective is consistent with the 
realists' worldview in which only material and military 
factors matter to national security. For realists, the 
international arena is a world filled with suspicion and 
unpredictability, in which other states' intentions and 
actions are uncertain (Waltz 1979). There is no trust among 
states, and it is dangerous to let one's national security 
depend on others. A state cannot expect others to help in a 
crisis of survival. It is a system of self-help. Realism is 
based on the zero-sum assumption in which a gain for one 
state means a loss for others, and the national interest is 
considered in such relative terms. Gains in the national 
interest are a competitive victory, and states tend to take 
advantage by deceiving others. Under the self-help system, 
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states have to prepare for the worst-case scenario in which 
the enemy's intention is to attack. Therefore, states fall 
into a spiraling competition in military build-up. This 
situation is the so-called "security dilemma." 
 Increasing the power of one state means decreasing 
power of another in relative terms. Therefore, international 
relations are necessarily based on confrontation and 
competition over power among states. A state tries to 
achieve its security through expanding war-fighting 
capabilities and developing the economic strength to build 
them up. Naturally, the possession of nuclear weapons, the 
weapon of ultimate mass destruction, makes sense from this 
perspective. Even regarding Japan, realists have been 
clearly predicting its nuclear armament since the early 
1970s, when Japan's miraculous economic growth thrust it 
onto the stage as one of the world's leading economic powers 
(Khan 1970; Waltz 1993; Waltz 2000). Even now the smoldering 
argument regarding Japan's nuclear armament is rooted in the 
realist perspective. 
 
 d. Realism and International Cooperation 
 Some realists are more conscious of international 
organizations or institutions than others; however, for them 
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the roles of such actors are limited by states' national 
interests and their efforts to survive and maximize their 
power. Realists do not see global interdependence as 
necessarily favorable, for relationships between dependent 
states based not on equality but on dominance and obedience. 
 From a realist position, Joseph Grieco emphasizes 
that international institutions and regimes affect the 
prospects of cooperation only marginally, because of two 
significant barriers to state cooperation: concerns about 
"cheating" and "relative gains" (Grieco 1988). Grieco 
contends that realists provide a more comprehensive theory 
of the issue of cooperation than liberalists. He points out 
that liberalists consider only "absolute gains" from 
cooperation and the worst possible outcome is simply a lost 
opportunity. Realist theory explores how cooperation might 
result in lost security. As Jack Donnelly points out, a 
regime requires limited renunciation of sovereign national 
authority in an issue-area in order to achieve mutual 
benefits from cooperation (Donnelly 1986). From the realist 
perspective, it is very difficult for a state to give up its 
own rights, even partially, in a self-help system. 
 Realists also argue that international regimes matter 
to the extent that they benefit the national interest of 
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states. The theory of hegemonic stability links regime 
creation and maintenance with the existence of a dominant 
power, and the weakening of regimes with a waning hegemony. 
John Mearsheimer contends that the most powerful states in 
the system create and shape institutions so that they can 
maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. 
Institutions are mere "arenas" for acting out power 
relationships (Mearsheimer 1995). For realists, as Stephen 
Haggard and Beth Simmons maintain, regimes require no formal 
international commitments or institutional machinery to 
function (Haggard and Simmons 1987). Some examples have been 
cited. In the nineteenth century Britain controlled 
international finance with the gold standard system, and it 
formed the international order, the so-called "Pax 
Britanica." In the twentieth century, particularly after the 
Second World War under the Bretton Woods system, the United 
States took over Britain's position and dominated the world 
economy (at least the western hemisphere), the so-called 
"Pax Americana." As a regional case, the United States has 
dominated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A 
strong argument can be made that the current phenomenon of 
globalization is fundamentally based on the power of the US 
to sustain a system based on US-style capitalism and free 
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market economy. For realists, international organizations 
and regimes are only "dependent variables," which are 
subordinate to the primary and independent variable of 
national interest. 
 
 e. Offensive Realism versus Defensive Realism 
 Naturally, the realist strand within the Japanese 
national identity would be inclined to adopt a "strategy" 
rather than "arms control" or "disarmament." In a world of 
anarchy and self-help, a state can rely only on its own 
material power. States act unilaterally and only form 
alliances and/or cooperate with other states so far as the 
cooperation serves their national interests. 
 Nonetheless, in terms of "strategy" versus "arms 
control," one can find serious differences among realists 
that can gravely affect the debate on missile defense. 
Although both assume the anarchical nature of the world, the 
two schools of realism - offensive realism and defensive 
realism - diverge in explaining states' behavior. This 
division "represents a fundamental divergence on the 
implications of anarchy" (Taliaferro 2001, 134). Offensive 
realists, such as John Mearsheimer, see the world of anarchy 
as a strong incentive for state expansion. The goal of the 
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state is to increase its power and security, which is prone 
to provoke conflict among states. Glenn Snyder calls such 
states "maximizers," which seek power and security 
maximization through struggle to become a hegemon (Snyder 
2002, 154). Offensive realists recognize little security 
dilemma among states, nor the difference between offense and 
defense. As Snyder quoted Mearsheimer in his book, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), "The best defense is 
a good offense" (ibid., 156). 
 Defensive realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, regard 
anarchy as an incentive for state expansion, but under 
certain conditions. That is, a state will seek expansion and 
wage war when it feels threatened and insecure. Basically, 
the state will try to maintain the existing order and 
balance of power. According to Snyder, such states are 
"satisfiers," which seek to preserve power and status quo, 
so long as they can maintain security and survival (ibid.). 
One of the leading defensive realists, Robert Jervis, sees 
good chances here for arms control and even disarmament. As 
discussed earlier, Jervis argues that when the distinction 
between offense and defense is possible, and when defense 
has the advantage, the perceived threat is minimal and 
relations between states can be stable (Jervis 1978). 
38 
 To put it differently, while offensive realists 
exclusively consider states' capabilities, defensive 
realists take perceptions of state leaders into account. 
Offensive realists would see little room for diplomacy and 
negotiation, and their policy for the state is likely a 
unilateral "strategy." But defensive realists differentiate 
offensive and defensive weapons and postures and look upon 
"arms control" approaches as a useful alternative. Missile 
defense systems can play a role in arms control approaches 
from defensive realist perspectives. 
 
2. The Pacifist Identity 
 Pacifism in the Japanese national identity contrasts 
with realism. Pacifists seek peace by nonviolent and 
diplomatic approaches instead of military capability and 
coercion. They highly regard ideational factors such as laws, 
institutions, norms, culture, history, national character, 
domestic politics, ideas, preferences and values. This type 
of national identity emerged from the self-questioning 
resulting from the destructive war and from the pacifist 
ideal of making postwar Japan a model peaceful state. With 
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan as its core, the 
Japanese pledged never again to cause the horrors of war. 
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They renounced war and military capability and sought to 
construct a non-nuclear, peaceful country. This led to the 
idea of entrusting national security to the United Nations. 
During the Cold War era, the pacifist identity was seen in 
Japan's omni-directional diplomacy that aimed for 
international security based on broad international 
cooperation, as well as on people's desire for unarmed 
neutrality, protection of the Constitution, and opposition 
to the US-Japan Security Treaty as a military alliance. 
After the end of the Cold War, the pacifist identity has 
been seen through non-military contributions to 
international society within pluralistic frameworks such as 
the United Nations. 
 The pacifist identity of the Japanese is easily 
linked with the multilateral approaches of "arms control" 
and "disarmament" in contrast with a unilateral "strategy," 
toward which the realist identity should tend to orient 
itself. 
 
3. Cognitive Approach to Explaining the Japanese Identity 
 In the field of international security studies, 
realism has been the mainstream approach. As mentioned above, 
realists adopt a state-centric approach. They assume 
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rationality of a state and primarily analyze observable 
material factors. As a result, strictly speaking, realism 
theoretically lacks analyses of any ideational factors such 
as identity. The state's rational decisions issue from a 
"black box," and realists deal with national interests and 
identities as "given." However, this study defines the 
Japanese realist identity as the will or self-image of 
people who "intend" to secure the country based on the 
realist worldview. The Japanese people define themselves 
through the realist and the pacifist identities in 
considering national security issues. The existence of the 
dual identity in Japan is an ontological observation. The 
next question is where these identities come from, and 
whether or not, or when and how, these identities have been 
formed and have changed in the course of history. This issue 
can be explored through a school of thought, called 
cognitivism. 
 In the 1980s both realism and liberalism pointed to a 
new stage in rationalist approaches. In realism Kenneth 
Waltz rigidly excluded human and domestic elements and 
established "neorealism," which analyzes international 
relations from deductive theory building, referring to 
microeconomics (Waltz 1979; 1986). A sovereign state, like 
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an enterprise, is regarded as a unitary rational actor, 
which pursues the maximizing of its own interests. State 
activities are constrained by the structure of the anarchic 
international political "system," just as enterprise 
activities are constrained by the structure of the market. 
Hence neorealism is also called "structural realism," which 
has a deterministic view unconcerned with any individual 
human factor. In liberalism, the so-called "neoliberalism" 
or "liberal institutionalism" made a significant theoretical 
compromise with realism. While emphasizing absolute gain 
from cooperation among states and the importance of 
international organizations and regimes, Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye admitted and even stressed the value of power 
relations among states based on the coercive force of 
military capability (Keohane and Nye 1977). Most essential 
was their acknowledgement that a state is a rational actor, 
and the principal actor in international politics. 
Consequently, neorealism and neoliberalism came to largely 
converge as a rationalist approach, sharing a similar view 
on the following three points: International relations are 
in a state of anarchy. A sovereign state is the principal 
actor in international politics. And a state is a unitary 
rational actor that egoistically maximizes its national 
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interest. What separates them is the difference in 
"relative" versus "absolute" gains of a state through 
international cooperation. 
 Cognitivism is a reflective approach to international 
issues, which opposes rationalist approaches. Cognitivism is 
a broad concept framed by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 
which includes social constructivism, critical theory, and 
postmodernism. It emerged in the latter half of 1980s and 
has significantly influenced international political studies, 
including the field of international security. Various 
schools of thought, with critical differences, constitute 
cognitivism, but they share a central feature: an 
epistemological view on international affairs. This approach 
is radically different from standard scientific approaches 
such as behaviorism and positivism, in that moral judgments 
are given power to explain events, facts, and figures. 
Cognitivists see epistemic and perceptive limitations of 
material structures and regard international order as a 
construction of various actors. Cognitivist analyses are 
aimed at finding truth by decomposing, dismantling and 
deconstructing concepts that constitute the order 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997). 
 Cognitivists, like classic idealists and liberalists, 
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make a point of analyzing not only nation states but also 
actors like bureaucrats, political parties and individual 
decision-makers. They also emphasize the importance of 
ideational factors such as personalities, perceptions of 
national leaders, ideologies, norms, cultures, values, 
beliefs, ideas, knowledge, and identities. Moreover, they 
argue that foreign policies of a state result from domestic 
politics, and domestic political movements often echo 
international relations; hence dynamic aspects are 
significant. 
 Analytical factors prioritized by a cognitivist 
approach are dynamic knowledge building, communication and 
cooperation among actors, and roots and processes of 
national interest formation. They focus on the origins of 
interests as perceived by states and on the role of causal 
and normative ideas. Ideational factors can alter actor 
interests. National interests are not a given, as realists 
argue, and interests cannot be completely deduced from power 
and situational constraints. Interests are socially formed 
and constructed. Cognition of the national interest and even 
apparently tangible military and political power depends on 
individual and societal knowledge, upon which these 
interests and forms of power are based. Both structures and 
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ideas are important and influence one another in 
construction and transformation of the national interest. 
The international and domestic political structures restrict 
actors through subjective apprehension of the actors, and 
the formation, reconstruction, and change of these 
structures are influenced by the practices of the actors. 
Linking the structures and actors is the so-called 
intersubjective meaning, a structure or framework that 
formulates the meaning that the actors interpret and through 
which they understand one another (Wendt 1992). 
 Cognitivists argue that states are not utility 
maximizers but role-players in international relations. 
Growing interdependence means that groups at the domestic 
level increasingly have "regime interests" and continually 
reconsider their self-interests and priorities. Likewise, 
national interests are conditioned by historical limitations, 
ideologies of actors, interpretative frameworks, and agreed 
and shared knowledge. The learning processes of actors also 
further shape national interests. Then cognition, 
misconception and information building processes reveal 
merits and demerits of particular behaviors of states and 
influence cooperative relationships among and within states. 
For cognitivists, international organizations and regimes 
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are key factors in international politics. Once they are 
established, international regimes acquire their own will, 
independent of the international structure or national 
interests and may possess enough power to change states' 
self-interests and power relations. Therefore, international 
cooperation and regimes, for cognitivists, are "independent 
variables" that can impact international politics. 
 Among cognitivists, the most explicit on identity 
issues in the international security field are scholars of 
social constructivism. Peter Katzenstein argues that 
international and domestic environments shape state 
identities. The international society of states shapes 
varying state identities by virtue of recognizing their 
legitimacy and admitting them to international organizations 
whose membership is often restricted. And the state is a 
social actor, embedded in the social rules and conventions 
that constitute its identity and the reasons for the 
interests that motivate actors (Katzenstein 1996). Alexander 
Wendt contends that states act differently toward friends 
and enemies because enemies are threatening and friends are 
not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient 
to tell us who is a friend and who is an enemy. The 
distribution of power always affects states' calculations, 
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but how it does so depends on intersubjective understandings 
and expectations, and on the "distribution of knowledge," 
which constitutes their conceptions of self and others. 
According to Wendt, there are three types of international 
security system: competitive, individualistic, and 
cooperative, depending on states' negative, indifferent or 
positive stance toward each other's security (Wendt 1992). 
 One example of social constructivism applied to the 
field of international security is a critique of nuclear 
deterrence theory, one of the core theories in traditional 
international security studies. Nuclear weapons have not 
been used in warfare since the United States dropped atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The realist 
account of the so-called principle of no-first use of 
nuclear weapons, which we can call a sort of international 
regime, is the following: The United States and the Soviet 
Union possessed enough second-strike nuclear capability that 
they could survive a first strike and retaliate. The reason 
why all-out nuclear war has not happened is that a first 
strike with nuclear weapons would mean immediate national 
suicide. The overwhelming destructive capability of massive 
nuclear forces compelled them to eliminate a nuclear first 
strike from their rational options and created a situation 
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in which the superpowers deter each other. This is the logic 
of MAD. However, constructivists point out that a 
significant normative element must be taken into account in 
explaining why these weapons have remained unused. Even 
before the nuclear balance between the superpowers emerged, 
when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, 
the norm of no-first use already existed. The reason why 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the first and the last places 
where bombs were actually dropped comes from the "taboo" of 
using nuclear weapons, which is an ideational factor caused 
by our recognition of and our will against the 
indiscriminate and inhumane nature of weapons of massive 
destruction (WMD) (Price and Tannenwald 1996). Years have 
passed since the Cold War ended, and the nuclear balance 
between the United States and other states has gone. From a 
constructivist point of view, nuclear weapons will never be 
used, even without a MAD situation, as long as we are 
conscious that nuclear weapons must not be used, and as long 
as the "taboo" persists. 
 The author takes the position that identity is 
critically important in international politics. This is 
particularly true in analyzing Japan's defense policymaking 
and debates on missile defense. The struggle between the 
48 
"realist" and "pacifist" national identities has shaped 
defense and security policy in postwar Japan. The two 
identities have developed through political processes in 
legislation, administration and judicature, claims of 
political parties, voices of political leaders, journalists 
and critics, and public opinion, and have been repeatedly 
expressed in the mass media. The dual identity of the 
Japanese is subject to change. The people in fact have 
shifted from one to the other in the course of history. They 
will certainly change in the future also. From this point of 
view, postwar Japanese national security policy will be 





JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY 
 
 This chapter will review Japan's post World War II 
defense and security policy, based on the Japanese dual 
national identity argument defined and discussed in the 
previous chapter. This chapter will be divided into four 
periods: from 1945 to 1960, from 1961 to 1980, from 1981 to 
1990, and from 1991 to the present. 
 
A. From Defeat to Re-Armament (1945-60) 
 
 The total defeat in the Pacific War, following the 
two atomic bomb attacks and the Soviet invasion, represented 
the first complete wartime defeat in Japanese history. It 
also represented the loss of Japanese national identity as 
the agent of hegemony in Asia, an identity built around 
Japanese militarism and imperialism. Under occupation by the 
United States, Japan confronted drastic changes in every 
respect. Its labor system was democratized, zaibatsu 
(financial cliques) were dismantled, and farmlands were 
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redistributed. Most importantly, the United States 
eliminated Japanese militarism completely. It is pointed out 
that the most significant gift that the United States 
provided Japan was "neither democracy nor economic 
assistance, but the American willingness to take over the 
costs and risks of Japanese security" (Scalapino 1992, 214). 
At the time, Japan's rearmament was not necessary for the 
western alliance, because US nuclear capability was 
considered far beyond that of its Eastern counterpart. 
Therefore, the United States did not have to strengthen 
regional conventional forces in the Far East. And in Japan, 
reflection on their experience during World War II led 
people to embrace pacifism. 
 
1. The Defeat and the Constitution 
 To begin with, the core of postwar Japanese national 
identity was the Constitution of Japan, taking effect in May 
1947. Article 9 of the Constitution renounced war and 
military capability, and this became a central value of the 
Japanese, who had just made a fresh start as a peace-loving 
nation. Article 9 states as follows: 
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international 
peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of 
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settling international disputes. 
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized. 
 
A pacifist identity grew out of this and developed into 
demands for Japan's diplomatic neutralism or a position 
based on unarmed neutrality. The Japanese people realized 
that "military capability was not at all useful for its 
national security and had even ruined the nation" through 
the devastating defeat (Tanaka 1997, 16). In reality, Japan, 
under occupation, was forced to put its own national 
security into American hands, but at the same time, most 
Japanese people tended to shy away from discussing national 
security issues. All they could do was try to survive the 
time of postwar poverty and ruin. 
 As for Article 9, the final draft, written by the 
General Headquarters (GHQ), was a relaxation of the first 
draft's "Macarthur Principles" that directed Japan to 
completely renounce any kind of war. Its purpose was to give 
Japan the right of self-defense. That is to say, Japan 
should renounce "war as a means for conflict resolution," 
but it should permit "war as a means for self-defense." 
However, Shigeru Yoshida, then prime minister of Japan, 
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noting that most recent wars had been started in the name of 
self-defense, had a different idea. His interpretation of 
Article 9 was that "by prohibiting all armaments and the 
right of belligerency, it renounced war even as an exercise 
of the right of self-defense" (ibid., 28). The overwhelming 
majority of the Japanese accepted his interpretation, though 
there existed some arguments for the right of self-defense. 
 Yoshida envisioned postwar international security 
being maintained through peacekeeping activities under the 
leadership of the United Nations. He thought that this was 
the best way to maintain Japan's security without its own 
armament. Nevertheless, the Cold War between the United 
States and the Soviet Union that emerged soon after the end 
of World War II forced the United States to shift its policy 
toward Japan largely from constructing a de-militarized 
country to making it a bulwark of democracy against the 
communist bloc in the Far East. World-shaking events in 
1948-49, such as the Berlin Crisis, the Soviets' successful 
nuclear test, and the victory of communism in China and 
subsequent establishment of the People's Republic changed 
the whole situation in the region. The United Nations 
Security Council became a battleground between the two 
superpowers, and the security system that Japan envisioned 
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was paralyzed. As with NATO in Europe, Japanese military 
forces needed to be re-established by the United States in 
order to contain communist power. The US interpretation of 
the Japanese Constitution changed as well. On the issue of 
the right of self-defense, General Macarthur's statement on 
1 January 1950 said: "It is absolutely impossible to 
interpret Article 9 as completely denying the inviolable 
right of self-defense against attacks from opponents." 
Yoshida stated in response: "Renouncing a war does not 
necessarily require us renouncing the right of self-defense 
all together." However, most Japanese people believed that 
the United States expected Japan to be neutral, and they 
still strongly supported Macarthur's comment in March 1949: 
"The role of Japan is to become a Switzerland in the 
Pacific" (ibid., 92). 
 
2. The Korean War and the Restoration of Independence 
 The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was 
particularly important in Japan's break from the policy of 
unarmed neutrality and the rise of a realist identity. The 
United States "used Japan as a large workshop to produce 
supplies for U.S. troops in Korea" (Drifte 1986, 9). In July 
1950, while US military stationed in Japan were deployed to 
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the Korean Peninsula, the GHQ reached critical decisions 
that directed Japan's rearmament: the establishment of the 
Keisatsu Yobitai (National Police Reserve; NPR) with 75,000 
personnel, which was the predecessor of the present Ground 
Self Defense Forces, and increasing by 8,000 the number of 
personnel in the Maritime Safety Agency, which was to be the 
foundation of the current Maritime Self Defense Forces. At 
the time, the Japanese public generally believed Prime 
Minister Yoshida's explanation to the Diet that these 
decisions were made for the genuine purpose of increasing 
police capability to maintain domestic order, making up for 
the loss of US occupation forces which had been shipped to 
Korea. 
 The ideological confrontation between capitalism and 
communism had a significant effect on Japan's domestic 
politics. The authorities in Japan were very concerned about 
the rise of the Communist Party, which, backed by labor 
movements, had been increasing its influence emerging from 
food crises. In August 1952, the new section in the Maritime 
Safety Agency was cut loose and renamed as Keibitai 
(Maritime Guards), and the NPR was strengthened and 
transformed into Hoantai (National Security Forces). These 
gradually increased "capabilities" were discussed 
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intensively, and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau finally 
issued the government's unified view in November 1952. It 
read: "While Section 2 of Article 9 in the Constitution 
prohibits maintaining 'land, sea, and air forces', it is 
constitutional to maintain and use force that is less than 
the 'forces' required to defend Japan from invasion. Since 
the Maritime Guards and the National Security Forces are 
part of the police force, not military, they are 
constitutional" (Shugiin Kenpo Chosakai 2004, 25). 
 As the end of occupation and the restoration of 
independence approached, public opinion in Japan was divided 
along the lines of this dual national identity. Those on one 
side argued that Japan should seek an overall peace with all 
of the belligerent states, both capitalist and communist. At 
the other end the argument was that Japan should give a 
higher priority to peace treaties with states in the western 
camp led by the occupying United States. In the sphere of 
academics and journalism, those who had been forced into 
silence during the war started to make strong appeals for an 
overall peace in such opinion magazines as Sekai (World). 
This pacifist argument was widely supported and was dominant 
in academics and journalism for a long period (Kato 1998). 
The debates on this issue resembled a kind of domestic Cold 
56 
War between "rightists" (conservatives) and "leftists" 
(radicals). The former, backed up the US-Japan Security 
Treaty, supported pro-American policies, promoted a 
constitutional amendment for the sake of rearmament, and 
demanded an autonomous defense for Japan. The latter opposed 
the US-Japan Security Treaty, supported pro-Soviet policies, 
asserted the preservation of the Constitution, particularly 
Article 9, and demanded Japan's unarmed neutrality. This 
contrast can be explained in terms of realist versus 
pacifist identities when viewed from a broader perspective. 
 In September 1951, the Japanese government signed the 
"Treaty for Peace with Japan" at the Peace Conference in San 
Francisco, California. Out of the fifty-five nations 
belonging to the United Nations, forty-eight appeared and 
signed the treaty. As an ambassador plenipotentiary, Yoshida 
initially aimed at pursuing international cooperation based 
on mutual economic interests; however, in the end he 
abrogated an overall peace. Several states including the 
Soviet Union, China, and India did not sign the treaty. 
Japan at the same time signed the "Security Treaty between 
Japan and the United States." With this, Japan chose to 
continue leaving its own national security in the hands of 
the United States and to become a part of the western 
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alliance. This choice led to the situation in which the 
pacifist constitution and realist military alliance with the 
United States co-existed, and an institutional framework was 
thus established for the two, in a sense, contradictory 
national identities. With the Japanese policy regenerating 
itself as an economic power and contributing to the realist 
alliance economically, Japan began to seek national 
development consistent with its pacifist identity (Iokibe 
2001). 
 In the early 1950s, political parties confronted one 
another on the issue of the rearmament of Japan, and heated 
debate went on in the Diet. As for the government party 
Jiyuto (Liberal Party) led by Yoshida, there was some 
opposition to Yoshida's security policy within the party. 
For example, Ichiro Hatoyama, returning to public service in 
the summer 1951, argued for rearmament. However, there was 
fundamental agreement that Japan should "seek a gradual 
increase of self-defense capability according to the growth 
of its national strength" (Kusunoki 1998, 154). Yoshida 
himself intended to establish "a respectable military" when 
the time should come to rearm. The reasons why Yoshida 
opposed immediate substantial rearmament were these: to 
place a high priority on rebuilding its economy, to contain 
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the threat of reemerging militarism, and no less importantly, 
to echo the lack of public support for rearmament (Tanaka 
1997, 52). The conservative Kaishinto (Reformist Party), 
which was formed in February 1952 under Hitoshi Ashida's 
leadership, insisted on amending the Constitution and 
rearming by the establishment of a "self-defense military." 
However, not all party members shared this opinion. Shakaito 
(the Socialist Party) declared the Four Principles for Peace, 
consisting of the following positions: overall peace with 
every state; strict maintenance of neutrality; opposition to 
US military bases; and opposition to rearmament. Nonetheless, 
after independence, confrontation between right and left 
wings within the party over the issues of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty became serious, 
and the party ended up splitting. Kyosanto (the Communist 
Party), which supported worldwide communist revolution, 
declared its opposition to the United States, thus becoming, 
to the government, a direct threat to Japan's security. 
Still, it earned substantial public support that could not 
be ignored. 
 Japan's rearmament was the most crucial issue in the 
general election in October 1952. In contrast with academics 
and journalists, right-wing politicians and veterans, who 
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had been purged until the previous summer, publicly demanded 
rearmament. However, the argument for rearmament lost 
momentum owing to strong opposition from youth and female 
voters. Neither Kaishinto nor the Hatoyama faction in Jiyuto 
could increase their seats in the Diet; thus they did not 
gain public support for rearmament. In the following general 
election in April 1953, rearmament was once again a central 
issue, and the rearmament schools lost seats while both the 
right and left wings of Shakaito increased their 
representation considerably. After all, neither pro- nor 
anti-rearmament schools could win an absolute majority, and 
the issue of rearmament through a constitutional amendment 
was pigeonholed for the time. 
 
3. The Self Defense Forces 
 In July 1954, the Defense Agency Act and the Self 
Defense Forces Law, the so-called Dual Defense Laws, were 
put into effect. Developing the then National Security 
Forces and the Maritime Guard, and adding an air force 
branch, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) was established. The 
SDF consists of Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces. 
In the process of congressional debate, the Three Conditions 
for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense were developed and 
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have become a fundamental principle of Japan's defense 
policy and a guideline for the government's interpretation 
of the Constitution. These three conditions are as follows: 
there should exist a threat of urgent and unjustified 
invasion; there should be no other means to eliminate the 
threat; and Japan should employ the minimum capability 
necessary to defend against it. In the same month, a 
resolution that prohibits sending the SDF abroad was passed 
in the Diet. This resolution emerged from the idea that 
"self-defense" should be a justified action against an 
unjustified invasion, so it should be strictly limited to 
tangible cases of defending Japan's own territory. This was 
in line with Japanese public opinion and their deep regret 
that the Japanese military had invaded foreign countries in 
the name of self-defense. As a whole, while making steady 
progress in realist rearmament, the Japanese put a clear 
pacifist brake on the exercise of its forces. The Japanese 
concept of self-defense has remained along these lines. 
 After the birth of the SDF, voices questioning the 
official interpretation of "forces" in the Constitution 
became louder within the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. They 
recognized a need to determine whether or not the 
Constitution could justify an SDF whose mission was to deal 
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with direct invasion from foreign enemies. According to the 
government's unified view issued in December 1954, the 
Constitution does not deny the right of self-defense. Japan 
is naturally entitled to possess the right of self-defense 
as an independent sovereign state. Also, the Constitution 
does not prohibit combat for the purpose of self-defense. 
Article 9 renounces a war "as means of settling 
international disputes," thus in case of an attack by other 
states, its forces should be employed only in clear self-
defense, a case essentially different from resolving 
international conflict. And finally, maintaining a 
capability just sufficient to defend Japan, like the SDF, is 
constitutional, because the Constitution recognizes the 
right of self-defense. Therefore, the SDF does not 
constitute the "land, sea, and air forces" prohibited by 
section two of Article 9. This is the official 
interpretation of the Constitution by the government that 
has been consistently held to this day. 
 In September 1955, the right and left wings were 
united, and the newly unified Shakaito (Socialist Party) was 
founded. Sensing a threat from this merger of the government 
being overthrown by radicals, in November Jiyuto (Liberal 
Party) and Minshuto (Democratic Party) also merged and 
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established Jiyu Minshuto (Liberal Democratic Party; LDP). 
Representatives from the two parties dominated the Diet. 
Thus a two-power structure of LDP conservatives and 
Socialist Party leftists came into existence, and this so-
called 1955-system continued for the next thirty-eight years. 
As for national defense policy, the Socialist Party was 
rather flexible in the beginning, but gradually became 
increasingly insistent on the unconstitutionality of the SDF 
and rigidly adhered to an unarmed neutrality policy. In the 
meantime, there was no unified opinion among members in the 
LDP. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that "it is possible to 
maintain a military capability for self-defense," and some 
defense experts in the party kept demanding rearmament. 
However, the LDP could not construct and rearm a self-
defense system by specifying the Self Defense Forces as 
"military forces." Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who led 
the following administration, was a class "A" war criminal 
and known for his right wing discourse. Kishi nonetheless 
did not pursue drastic rearmament, but took the Yoshida line, 
which had aimed to gradually strengthen defense capabilities 
based on the US-Japan Security Treaty. The Yoshida line was 
firmly established down the road as a national defense 
policy (Tanaka 1997). 
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 When the US-Japan Security Treaty was concluded, 
there was no need to debate limitations on the exercise of 
self-defense. However, as Japan's defense capabilities were 
strengthened with the establishment of the SDF, the issue of 
limitation on self-defense, individual and collective, was 
laid on the table. The right of individual self-defense is a 
right of a state to defend itself by force against military 
assault by other states. The right of collective self-
defense is a right of a state to defend its ally or 
affinitive state in case of military attack by a third state. 
In the case of Japan, the latter has been much more 
debatable than the former. While the Constitution of Japan 
declares its pacifism, it is widely believed that Japan 
possesses the right of individual self-defense, namely, to 
use force to defend itself, since it is hardly possible to 
consider that the Constitution should allow immediate 
surrender to military invasion by other states, and such 
logic would eventually lead to denial of Japan's very 
existence. The right of collective self-defense is a far 
more complex issue for the Japanese. If Japan is invaded, 
the SDF and US troops stationed in Japan will jointly meet 
the aggression. It will naturally be a case of individual 
self-defense. Meanwhile, it will become controversial 
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whether Japan could use force or not, if the United States 
should be invaded by a third state. 
 Although Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
approves the exercise of individual and collective self-
defense by its member states, the government's 
interpretation since May 1955 has been following: It is 
natural for Japan as a sovereign state to hold the right of 
collective self-defense from an international legal 
perspective; however, the Constitution of Japan restricts 
the exercise of the right of self-defense to a minimum, and 
the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is 
considered to be beyond this limitation and thus 
unconstitutional. In short, exercising individual self-
defense and possessing military capabilities for this 
purpose are constitutional, while exercising collective 
self-defense is not. The unconstitutionality of collective 
self-defense had been debated over time, but the 
government's first formal publication of this interpretation 
in the Diet was far later, in May 1981. As mentioned earlier, 
this quite moderate interpretation resulted from Japanese 
sensitivity toward the prewar foreign deployment of their 
military and their expansionist policy in the name of self-
defense, and from the recognition of a danger of possible 
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broader re-interpretation of self-defense in the future. 
 The Diplomacy Blue Book issued for the first time in 
1957 held up "UN-centrism" as the first of the Three 
Principles of Diplomacy of Japan, along with "cooperation 
with democratic countries" and "firm maintenance of the 
position as a member of the Asian nations." This "UN-
centrism" earned public support; however, Japan was unable 
to participate in UN Forces activities since the government 
had clearly declared that the Constitution prohibits 
deployment of the SDF abroad. When a conflict broke out in 
Lebanon in July 1958, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld 
asked the government of Japan to send an SDF contingent to 
participate in the United Nations Observation Group in 
Lebanon (UNOGIL). The Japanese government rejected this 
request for the reason of possible infringement on domestic 
laws, even though it was possible for the government to 
interpret a dispatch of the SDF as constitutional. To say 
nothing of the Socialist Party's opposition, general public 
opinion was very negative toward sending the SDF to other 
countries. Practically, one scholar pointed out, the Three 
Principles of Diplomacy of Japan in reality were: first 
"cooperation with the United States," then "international 
cooperation" within the limits of the first principle, and 
66 
lastly "economism" (Iokibe 1999). As the nuclear arms race 
between the US and the USSR heated up and the situation came 
to a deadlock, the United Nations turned into an arena of 
the Cold War. The UN Security Council that was supposed to 
deal with international security issues ceased to function 
due to repeated exercises of veto by the two superpowers. 
Japan's "UN-centrism" gradually faded away as its bond with 
the "West" became clear. 
 
4. The Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty 
 From the mid-1950s, when Japan's economy, triggered 
by so-called special procurements for the Korean War, 
started back on track calls for revision of the US-Japan 
Security Treaty grew louder. Several problems were behind 
this growing demand. The first was the "clause on internal 
disturbances," in which the treaty permitted the US military 
to quell domestic riots within Japan. Japanese political 
leaders asserted that this clause was unsuitable for Japan 
as an independent state, and eventually the clause was 
deleted in the newly revised treaty. Second, the existing 
treaty did not clearly mention the obligation of the United 
States to militarily defend Japan while it did specifically 
state the duty of Japan to provide military bases to the 
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United States. This point made the treaty appear "one-
sided." This was also addressed in the new treaty by 
describing the US responsibility to defend Japan. 
 Third, there was a fear, mainly on the pacifist side, 
that Japan might be automatically dragged into an American 
war against its will in the name of "maintaining peace and 
security in the Far East." As previously mentioned, 
collective self-defense was, and still is, considered 
unconstitutional in Japan. Thus, in the revised treaty this 
issue was taken into consideration, stating that Japan-US 
military cooperation should not deviate from the limit of 
the right of individual self-defense. Then, as requested by 
Japan, the revised treaty prescribed its coverage of defense 
as "the sphere under the administrative right of the 
Japanese government" including US military bases in Japan. 
Therefore the Japanese government could avoid changing its 
constitutional interpretation to finalize revision of the 
treaty. Fourth, Japan was concerned with the possibility 
that the United States might bring nuclear weapons onto 
Japanese soil against Japan's will. To deal with this issue, 
the treaty included a new clause on "prior consultation," 
which required the US government to consult with Japanese 
counterparts if it planned major changes in weapon systems 
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of the US military in Japan, such as bringing nuclear 
weapons onto a US military base in Japan or having its 
nuclear armed vessels enter a Japanese harbor. The United 
States kept pressuring Japan to rearm itself; however, 
seeing the Hatoyama and following Ishibashi administrations' 
attempts to normalize relationships with the Soviet Union 
and China, the US government feared that Japan might pull 
away from the US and declare neutrality. So after all, it 
yielded and gave up on rearming Japan for the sake of 
strengthening the alliance. Consequently, the newly revised 
treaty was adopted largely in line with Japan's wishes (Wada 
1998). 
 Following the Sunagawa Incident, involving an anti-US 
base movement by local residents in 1955 and the Gerard 
Incident of 1957, in which a US soldier shot and killed a 
Japanese housewife who was collecting spent ammo cartridges 
from military exercises, Han-bei (anti-American) and Han-
Anpo (anti-US-Japan Security Treaty) sentiments grew among 
the general public in Japan. Revision of the treaty was 
partly an attempt to contain public opposition to the 
alliance. However, people thought, on the contrary, that the 
revised treaty might drag Japan into another war. Prime 
Minister Kishi's strong reactionary image fueled the 
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opposition and led to massive, organized anti-treaty 
movements (Inoki 2000). In January 1960, after agreeing with 
the US government on the new treaty, the Kishi 
administration presented it to the House of Representatives. 
But the majority LDP suddenly called off interpellation and 
stopped the debate in May. Prime Minister Kishi then pushed 
through passage of the bill with the votes of LDP members 
alone, while bringing police forces into the House to 
contain the opposition. The other parties rejected the 
result and the Diet ceased to function. Kishi's anti-
democratic moves shocked the Japanese public. A number of 
intense protests were held every day, with repeated clashes 
between demonstrators and police. The situation grew worse, 
and finally a college student was killed in the chaos as 
demonstrators rushed into the Diet in a failed attempt to 
stop automatic approval of the treaty. The Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States 
of America went into effect on June 23, 1960, and on the 
same day Kishi declared his intent to step down as prime 
minister. 
 
5. Early Debates on Missile Threats 
 According to Frances Fitzgerald, the quest for anti-
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ballistic missile systems started shortly after World War II, 
with a recognition that "the development of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile was only a matter of 
time" (Fitzgerald 2000, 114). Following the technological 
advance of rocket science in the early twentieth century, 
Nazi Germany developed "vengeance weapons" during World War 
II (Ford 1971). They caused serious damage, both physically 
and psychologically, terrorizing citizens in London and 
Paris. The Vergeltungswaffe-1 (V-1) looked like a small, 
unmanned airplane, and was the prototype for cruise missiles 
developed after the war. Powered by jet engines, it created 
a loud noise, and was called a "buzz bomb." The incoming 
noise and subsequent explosions added to its psychological 
impact. About 5,500 people were killed, and 16,000 injured 
in V-1 attacks (Hogg 1957, 145). 
 The Vergeltungswaffe-2 (V-2) was a radical innovation 
in that it was powered by liquid fuel. The development of 
the liquid fueled rocket and guidance systems led to the 
development of launch vehicles that could escape the earth's 
atmosphere and eventually put satellites into orbit, and the 
V-2 was the predecessor of the intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM). The V-2 rockets had a range of 220 miles and 
it reached four times the speed of sound. Since V-1 rockets 
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were relatively slow and flew low in the air, it was 
possible for jet fighters and antiaircraft guns to shoot 
them down, or to defend against them with balloon barrages. 
Out of 9,017 V-1 missiles launched by the Germans in August 
and September 1944, 3,461 (38 percent) were shot down and 
2,340 (26 percent) reached the London area (ibid., 141). 
However, it was impossible to defend against V-2 rockets 
which overwhelmed existing radar and interception 
capabilities (Nogi 2000, 295). "[T]he missiles' inaccuracy 
and flight failure rate helped reduce their military 
potential dramatically" (Handberg 2002, 40), but they posed 
serious threats to defenseless citizens of the UK and France. 
Germany launched 1,359 V-2 missiles toward London, with 517 
hits, about 2,400 citizens killed and 5,850 injured (Hogg 
1957, 144). This new weapon "fundamentally altered the 
nature of strategic warfare" (Mitchell 2000, 5). 
 During the first decade of the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union began to develop a series of long-range bomber 
aircraft capable of reaching targets within the continental 
United States. The potential threat posed by such aircraft 
became much more serious when the Soviets exploded their 
first atomic bomb in 1949. In response, the United States 
developed generations of surface-to-air Nike guided missile 
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systems. The first generation Nike system, Nike-Ajax, was a 
two-stage missile with a range of 25-30 miles. Nike-Ajax 
batteries became fully operational in 1953. The initial 
mission of the Nike system was to defend against such 
aircraft, but a later variant of the system provided a 
limited capability to defend against ballistic missiles. 
However, the threat of intercontinental ballistic missile 
was initially remote for the United States. Ernest Yanarella 
points out that the first serious attempt to develop an 
anti-ballistic missile system began in 1955, with the US 
army's "decision to undertake feasibility studies into the 
technical problems and practical possibilities of missile 
defense" (Yanarella 2002, 6). 
 In Japan, missile threats were perceived and publicly 
discussed as early as February 1954. The earliest debates 
were on how Japan should defend itself against air-launched 
guided missiles (GM), but the clear conclusion was that the 
just recently started SDF had no such capability. Japan had 
no choice but to leave this issue to US air defense 
capability. To cope with ballistic missile threats, through 
the Cold War period and thereafter, Japan's national 
security has depended on the US extended nuclear deterrence 
strategy, the so-called "nuclear umbrella." The Japanese 
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government nonetheless began studying GMs for defensive 
purposes. It was later revealed that a study on missiles had 
begun within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1955 
(Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 1966a). The JDA asked 
the US government to provide seven types of missiles, 
including the Nike. The second generation Nike system, Nike-
Hercules, was a nuclear-armed missile and became operational 
in 1958. The mission of Nike-Hercules was to defend against 
Soviet bombers and primitive cruise missiles with nuclear 
explosions. It was truly unthinkable for the Japanese people 
to admit possessing such a nuclear weapon, and naturally the 
constitutionality of its introduction into the SDF defense 
posture was intensely discussed in the Diet. In May 1957 the 
Kishi administration denied the possibility of deploying 
nuclear-armed GMs and even expressed its intent to reject a 
likely request from the United States to employ such nuclear 
missiles on US bases in Japan. 
 The "Sputnik Shock" in October 1957 propelled debate 
on missile threats and popularized the term misairu 
(missile) among the Japanese public. But the development of 
missile technology did not have a direct influence on the 
SDF arsenal. Kishi persisted in maintaining that the SDF 
should only have the "necessary minimum" capability to face 
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a direct invasion with conventional weapons. An attack with 
nuclear weapons was not expected since it would immediately 
lead to all-out nuclear war between the superpowers, and 
would thus be out of the hands of the Japanese. In general, 
there was a domestic consensus that Japan should deal with 
nuclear missile threats through the deterrence provided by 
the Japan-US security arrangement, not by Japan's own 
military means. There was also the alarming fear that Japan 
could be made into a US nuclear missile base against the 
Soviet Union. Realist political elites believed that Japan 
needed an anti-missile missile system to face ballistic 
missile threats. They did not see the illegality of such 
missiles as long as anti-missile missiles were non-nuclear. 
In reality, however, technology had not yet reached the 
level of practical deployment. In addition, pacifists in the 
Japanese public were so sensitive about the offensive 
capability of guided missiles that even introducing the US 
Sidewinder for a "study" was subject to a debate on 
constitutionality. (The Sidewinder was a heat-seeking, 





B. The Cold War and Japanese Security (1961-80) 
 
1. Economic Security 
 The anti-US-Japan Security Treaty movement, which 
shook the nation like "the eve of a revolution," died out 
quickly after the revised Japan-US security treaty went 
through and Prime Minister Kishi stepped down. Despite the 
chaos, revision of the treaty did not, in essence, affect 
Japanese security policies, since the basic structure, of US 
forces defending Japan and Japan providing bases in return, 
was left intact. Nonetheless, the anti-treaty movement 
greatly influenced the future security policy of Japan, in 
that both Ikeda and Sato, the successors of Kishi, kept a 
"low profile," passive stand on national security issues. 
The lesson of avoiding any more chaos like the anti-treaty 
struggle, resulted in an informal policy of avoiding frank, 
open debate on security matters in Japan, and revision of 
the Constitution of Japan did not become a key issue in 
politics again for the next thirty-four years. 
 During the 1960s, the Cold War drastically shifted 
from a mood of impending total nuclear war to a stabilized 
relationship between superpowers. After the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came 
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to acknowledge their mutual superpower capabilities, and 
endeavored to institutionalize their relations to avert 
nuclear catastrophe. They established a series of agreements 
on arms control such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty 
(PTBT) and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The overwhelming nuclear capabilities 
of the US and the USSR led to a situation of mutual assured 
destruction (MAD), in which the superpowers mutually 
deterred a preemptive nuclear strike with retaliatory second 
nuclear attack capability sufficient to completely destroy 
the first attacker. MAD broadly provided strategic stability 
in the international political circumstances. 
 At the same time, however, both superpowers offered 
"nuclear umbrellas" to their allies. For example, if Japan 
were attacked by the Soviet Union, the United States would 
retaliate with its nuclear forces. This was also called 
"extended deterrence." Thus there was a widespread fear that 
a regional conflict could lead to a major confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. This meant 
that the defense capability of Japan had no definitive 
significance in the world military balance no matter its 
size; for once a "hot war" between the nuclear superpowers 
broke out, this would immediately mean a full-scale nuclear 
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war and total annihilation. It was far more important for 
Japan to maintain its tight alliance with the United States 
than to build up its small-scale defense capability. What 
was required of Japan was to participate in international 
society as an economic power with a moderate military 
capability within the framework of the US-Japan alliance 
(Tadokoro 1999). 
 It was obvious that the Japanese government based its 
national security policy upon a realist identity, but it was 
also true that the pacifist identity of the general public 
put firm brakes on the government's realist approach. On the 
issue of the stalemate in the Vietnam War the government 
took a pro-American position, while most Japanese were 
against the war, seeing the government's mistake in 
identifying the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation 
as a falling domino in the spreading worldwide communist 
movement. When the United States began bombing North Vietnam 
in February 1965, Japanese media and peace activists 
considered it an invasion, and movements to help people in 
Vietnam arose among the people (Inoki 2000). The Vietnam War 
symbolized the dilemma, in which Japan was caught between 
its two identities: pacifism that would restrain Japan's 
involvement in an American war and realism of 
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"cooperationist line with the United States." As a result, 
Japan managed to take a centrist stand, but this also 
reflected the lack of clear definition in its security 
policymaking (Tadokoro 1999). 
 Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda pledged a "national 
income doubling program" and built a national consensus to 
focus on "economics rather than politics" with the aim of 
becoming an economic power in the region. Ikeda succeeded in 
healing the nation's wounds from Kishi era division over 
security issues by shifting attention from political 
conflicts to economic development. Kishi was a symbol of 
reactionism harking back to prewar Japan, and when he 
stepped down, the anti-treaty movements lost its target and 
dissolved, with opponents suffering from a sense of defeat 
and powerlessness against the steamrolling approval of the 
treaty by the LDP. Most Japanese regarded economic 
prosperity as the center of Japan's national interest, and 
this recognition later developed into the idea of "economic 
security" (Katzenstein 1996). The economic security concept 
focused on reducing Japan's dependence on natural resources 
from abroad, and on technological development as a tool for 
expanding its share of the world market. During the 1960s, 
Japan demonstrated impressive economic development by 
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importing raw materials while exporting value added 
manufactured goods. Meanwhile, its rising economic power 
pushed Japan toward a position of responsibility. Japan 
joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1952, and 
acceded to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 
in 1955. It became an "Article 11 member" of GATT in 
February 1963, under which Japan could no longer place 
quantitative restrictions on imports, and became an "Article 
8 member" of IMF in 1964. Japan was thus required to 
abrogate any limitations on monetary exchange. As a state 
living on foreign trade, Japan expanded interdependent 
relationships with other countries through liberalization of 
trade and deregulation of industry. Truly, "economics is 
national security for the Japanese" (Samuels 1989; original 
emphasis). 
 "The Study of Integrated Defense War Games in 
FY1963," code-named the "Mitsuya Study," secretly simulated 
security scenarios such as deployment of the Self Defense 
Forces in case of an emergency situation in the Korean 
Peninsula, in which the conflict might severely influence 
Japan. This secret study by the Defense Agency was revealed 
in the Diet in February 1965 and caused a huge controversy. 
The section on "wartime defense legislation" in the study, 
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discussing needs in crises, attracted particular attention. 
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was deeply unsettled and critical, 
saying that conducting such a secret study behind the 
government's back was "never acceptable." The public also 
reacted negatively and considered it a conspiracy by the 
Self Defense Forces, similar to the Imperial Army's 
activities before World War II. Later, Sato backtracked 
somewhat and commented that the study itself was legitimate, 
even stating, "It is natural to study a case of military 
penetration." But he added, "Issues such as a national 
mobilization plan were not a matter for uniformed personnel 
to discuss" (Tanaka 1997). As a result, the Defense Agency 
came to avoid study of yuji (emergency situations) and 
discussions on emergency defense legislation. 
 Okinawa was still under US occupation and played an 
important role as a strategic frontline base in Asia against 
the Communist bloc. However, the 1951 Peace Treaty permitted 
the Japanese government to hold the so-called "remaining 
sovereignty" in Okinawa, and the legal status of Okinawa was 
kept obscure. Local autonomy in Okinawa was limited, and 
welfare support for local residents provided by the US civil 
affairs section was far from satisfactory. The Americans' 
annoying attitude of superiority as an occupying power 
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stimulated the people's desire for reversion to Japanese 
sovereignty. The United States took on the image of an 
arrogant empire just as had the Soviet Union, which kept 
ignoring the issue of the Northern Territories (Tadokoro 
1999). When Sato became the first prime minister to visit 
Okinawa in August 1965, he stated, "Japan's war will not end 
until Okinawa returns to Japan." From that time, efforts for 
the reversion of Okinawa increased (Inoki 2000). Although 
the intensified war in Vietnam, and the US demand for 
Japan's self-imposed limits on its export of textiles to the 
United States complicated the negotiations, in November 1969 
Prime Minister Sato and President Richard Nixon finally 
reached an agreement on the return of Okinawa with the 
unambiguous phrase, "return in 1972, without nuclear weapons, 
with the same treatment as the mainland" (Wakaizumi 1994). 
This meant that any nuclear weapons deployed in and around 
Okinawa should be removed, and that requirements for prior 
consultations prescribed in the Mutual Security Treaty 
should be applied in the same way as on the mainland. At the 
same time, however, they added the so-called South Korea 
Clause and Taiwan Clause that expressed the importance of 
stability of neighbors for the peace and security of Japan, 
and therefore Japan began to bear more responsibility for 
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stability in the Far East. 
 
2. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
 No other nation has demonstrated such fierce 
objection to nuclear weapons as Japan. When atomic bombs 
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Japan 
became the only country in history to suffer nuclear attack. 
Thousands of people were instantly vaporized by the 
explosions, and hundreds of thousands of others were killed 
slowly by the radiation released. Even now many are 
suffering from radiation sickness caused by the bombs. In 
March 1954 the Dai Go Fukuryumaru Incident shocked the whole 
nation. A Japanese fishing boat was exposed to deadly 
radioactive ash from a US hydrogen bomb test, and one of the 
crew died half a year later. The other 22 crew members 
survived, but they suffered from serious radiation 
aftereffects. This incident was remembered as "the third A-
bomb attack." Public anger led to a swelling mass movement 
against nuclear weapons and campaigns for nuclear 
disarmament. Popular sentiment in Japan was overwhelmingly 
against nuclear weapons, making the prospect of Japan's 
nuclear armament out of the question. The renowned "Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles," a symbol of Japan as a peaceful 
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nation, remains a popular and highly valued policy among the 
general public in Japan. 
 For the Japanese elites, however, it did not 
necessarily mean that Japan completely excluded the nuclear 
option from its future national security policy. In May 1957, 
the Kishi administration suggested a constitutional 
interpretation by which possessing nuclear would not be 
unconstitutional as long as it was judged to be necessary to 
a minimum self-defense capability. Also, the 1955 Atomic 
Energy Fundamental Law prohibited the use of nuclear energy 
for other than peaceful purposes. This limitation was based 
on the idea that Japan's nuclear armament was still 
"constitutional," but it was "illegal" in terms of the 
current legislation. Thus, the government did not have to 
amend the Constitution to legalize nuclear armament. Going 
nuclear would only require changing some laws. Nuclear 
armament is a matter of political will. 
 In April 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda avowed: "As a 
constitutional argument, I think it is widely held that if 
it [nuclear weapon] is not for offensive but for purely 
defensive purposes, this [Constitution] does not 
juristically prohibit it. But no matter how it is 
juristically considered, I am saying that we will not 
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possess nuclear weapons as a matter of policy" (Japanese 
Diet, House of Representatives 1961). 
 Unfortunately, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were 
not a product of nation-wide argument, promoted by those who 
sought ideal peace, but a result of compromise in the Diet 
to break through the deadlock on the issue of the reversion 
of Okinawa (Tanaka 1997, 224-225). The Socialist Party was 
adamant that Okinawa, as well as any other Japanese 
territories, must be demilitarized. 
 In January 1968, Prime Minister Sato declared the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles of "not producing, not 
possessing and not allowing entry of nuclear weapons into 
the country." However, Sato also asserted that the set of 
three principles was only one part of the four pillars of 
Japan's nuclear policy. The other three were: promoting 
worldwide disarmament, depending on US nuclear deterrence, 
and advancing peaceful use of nuclear energy. Concerning 
these four pillars, it was especially important to note that, 
"the Three Non-Nuclear Principles could be maintained only 
when they went hand in hand with the other three nuclear 
policies, and Japan cannot single out and promote the 
principles" (Katzenstein 1996, 128). 
 Thus Japan's non-nuclear policy was only a partial 
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one, integrated with the nuclear umbrella supplied by the 
United States. But the public and the Diet soon accepted the 
Three Non-Nuclear Principles. They have become an essential 
factor in national security policymaking, and are recognized 
as kokuze (national policy). 
 
3. The Nixon-Shocks 
 In vivid contrast to the turmoil of the 1960s, the 
1970s started rather calmly, symbolized by the automatic 
extension of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in June 
1970. The political atmosphere was not much influenced even 
by the Yodogo Incident in March 1970, in which young 
communists hijacked a Japan Airlines passenger airplane, nor 
by the Mishima Incident in November 1970, an attempted coup 
d'état ending with the suicide of the prominent novelist and 
rightist Yukio Mishima. These shocking actions by leftists 
and rightists attracted public attention, but only briefly. 
 Yasuhiro Nakasone took up the post of Director 
General of the Defense Agency in the third Sato Cabinet in 
January 1970, and tried to reform Japan's defense policy. He 
attempted to create a basis for that purpose on his own 
initiative. As his "personal view," Nakasone announced his 
Five Principles of Autonomous Self-defense: to protect the 
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Constitution and concentrate on defense; to unify defense 
with diplomacy aimed at harmony with other national 
policies; to maintain civilian control; to sustain the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles; and to supplement them with the 
Japan-US Security Treaty. He stated that Japan should 
achieve autonomous defensive capabilities in a gradual 
manner (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors, 1970). This 
guideline set the US-Japan mutual security system as 
"subordinate" and autonomous self-defense as the "main" 
component of Japan's security policy. In October 1970, the 
first white paper on the national defense of Japan was 
published, and shortly after, the Outline of New Defense 
Buildup Plan was released. The Fourth Defense Buildup 
Program, a 1972-76 five-year plan presented in the Outline 
caused serious backlash domestically and internationally, 
because its estimated budget of 5.2 trillion yen (14.4 
billion dollars at the prevailing rate of exchange) was more 
than twice that of the previous program. Nakasone's idea of 
"autonomous self-defense" was criticized for its lack of 
consideration of the United States, and, in fact, drew a 
caution from the US government. At the same time, China 
denounced it as a revival of prewar Japanese militarism. 
Nakasone stepped down from the JDA post in July 1971, 
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leaving the "Nakasone vision" frozen (Sato 2002). 
 In July 1971, Washington and Beijing agreed on 
President Nixon's visit to China in the following year, but 
without consulting Tokyo.  This action, known as the "Nixon 
Shock," shook the Japanese, since the United States improved 
relations with China "over Japan's head." Nonetheless, it 
was also true that reconciliation between the US and China 
simultaneously decreased the perception of China as a 
formidable threat. The general sense of threat from abroad, 
which had been gradually decreasing, declined even further, 
and recognition of the trend toward détente spread 
throughout the country. In August 1971 President Nixon again 
shocked Japan and the world by coming off the gold standard. 
These two Nixon Shocks evoked temporary public distrust of 
the United States, but soon trust was recovered. Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing in September 1972 and 
agreed with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on diplomatic 
normalization between Japan and the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). By this agreement Japan terminated diplomatic 
relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. When 
Tanaka and his cabinet started normalization talks with 
Beijing in early 1972, Japan was particularly concerned 
about the Chinese reaction to the US-Japan Mutual Security 
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Treaty. Surprisingly, China expressed its support for the 
Japan-US security alliance. Premier Zhou Enlai even said 
that the Mutual Security Treaty was very important for Japan 
and it was natural to firmly maintain it. As a result, the 
Socialist Party of Japan which took a pro-PRC, anti-Security 
Treaty stance found itself in an awkward position, while 
public opinion, which had been generally anti-Treaty and 
anti-US for quite some time, changed dramatically. The 
number of Japanese viewing the United States as a likable 
country steadily increased from 1973 to the latter half of 
the 1980s (Nakanishi 1999, 159-160). On one hand, domestic 
political outlook on international security shifted to 
seeking regional stability and maintaining the status quo. 
On the other hand, in the economic sphere, Japan faced the 
chaos of "run-away inflation" caused by the 1973 Oil Shock. 
As a result, concerns about national defense and security 
faded away, and few directly discussed a "vision" for 
Japan's security policy (Tanaka 1997). 
 
4. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy 
 Contrary to their hatred of nuclear weapons, the 
Japanese public has been quite tolerant of peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, and the Japanese government has intensively 
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developed peaceful nuclear programs. The Atomic Energy 
Commission was established in 1955, and became part of the 
Prime Minister's Office in the following year. Substantial 
progress began in 1961, and by 1967 it became clear that 
Japan had overcome the technical barriers to 
commercialization (Endicott 1975, 114). In the early stages, 
the Japanese government was quite optimistic and had high 
hopes for dramatic progress as its foreign counterparts did. 
But in practice it faced technical difficulties and entered 
an era of slowed progress. As of August 2004, about 50 
percent of Japan's total supply of electricity was provided 
by nuclear power plants. Fifty-two nuclear power plants are 
currently in operation, five plants are under construction, 
and six more are planned. 
 Japan's nuclear development has been based on a long-
term goal of energy independence. Japan has very few 
traditional natural resources, and is heavily dependent on 
imports to meet its needs for food, energy, and raw 
materials, such as iron ore. In Japan, 99.7 percent of oil 
is imported, with 87 percent of this coming from the Middle 
East. Overreliance on this unstable energy source is a 
critical issue for the Japanese people. This vulnerability 
was brought into focus during the chaos of the oil shocks in 
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1973 and 1979. As of 2002, owing to nation-wide endeavors to 
make industry more efficient, oil accounted for only 49.7 
percent of total energy consumption in Japan. The figure was 
77 percent before the 1973 oil crisis. Nuclear power is the 
dominant energy choice even if Japan has to depend on 
imported uranium. Proponents of nuclear power argue that 
uranium can be stored within the country for a long period 
of time, and therefore it can be regarded as a semi-domestic 
resource (Asa made Nama Terebi! 1989, 25). The main 
suppliers of uranium are Canada and Australia, which are 
politically far more stable than the oil suppliers in the 
Middle East. This point is critical in reference not only to 
energy issues but also to national security issues. Moreover, 
when reprocessing of spent fuel becomes available, plutonium 
will become a stable and semi-permanent source of energy. 
From an environmental point of view, nuclear power also has 
been seen as a clean and efficient energy resource, 
replacing the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, 
which are thought to contribute to global warming. 
 Nonetheless, there remain a number of issues in 
developing nuclear energy programs. Safety concerns have 
grown since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster terrified the world 
and posed serious questions about the safety of nuclear 
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energy. Failings that led to the Chernobyl incident have 
been scrutinized and faults and dangers of nuclear power 
plants around the world have been pointed out. It has been 
increasingly revealed that many nuclear plants in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have been 
dangerously mismanaged, and they could potentially cause 
disasters similar to Chernobyl (ABC News 1992). The 
disaster's long-term influence on area residents and soil 
are still unknown. Even in Japan, one of the most 
technologically advanced countries, a number of minor 
accidents have been reported. The 1999 accident in Tokai 
village alarmed the Japanese people and the world. Enough 
uranium in solution was mistakenly poured together to reach 
critical mass and cause a nuclear chain reaction. Three 
workers at the site died and 56 rescuers and 119 neighbors 
were exposed to radiation. It was the worst accident in the 
history of the Japanese nuclear industry. Another problem is 
the skyrocketing cost of nuclear plant construction, the 
main reason for the recent retreat of the nuclear industry. 
Those who advocate complete shutdown of the nuclear power 
industry welcome "the collapse of nuclear power in response 
to the discipline of the marketplace," because it has partly 
been a driving force behind weaponry proliferation, an 
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ineffective way to displace oil, and a still dangerous means 
to generate electricity (Lovins et al. 1980, 1138). 
 Furthermore, the issue of nuclear waste remains 
unresolved. This problem has forced many governments to give 
up their nuclear plans. In fact, nuclear industries started 
their electricity generation programs assuming future 
development of satisfactory methods of dealing with nuclear 
wastes. These have not arisen. Presently, huge amounts of 
nuclear waste have accumulated. There is no place to dispose 
of them, and with no resolution to the problem, nuclear 
wastes are piling up. Many methods, such as launching into 
space, burial in Antarctic ice or the deep sea, and 
enclosure in concrete buildings have been discussed, but all 
are questionable. South Carolina had been receiving nuclear 
wastes from all over the United States, but, in 1979, the 
governor of South Carolina rejected two trucks from Three 
Mile Island, carrying high level nuclear wastes contaminated 
in the nuclear plant accident. As long as nuclear wastes 
exist, this sort of struggle will remain internationally as 
well as domestically. 
 In 1993 it was revealed that the former Soviet Union 
had dumped its nuclear wastes, including 18 obsolete nuclear 
reactors from retired nuclear submarines, into the Barents 
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Sea, Kara Sea, and the Sea of Japan after 1966. More 
surprisingly, the Russian government announced that it would 
not stop dumping for the time being (Broad 1993). Japan has 
asked the UK and France to reprocess its nuclear wastes, and 
a significant amount of plutonium has been returned to Japan. 
However, electric power generation programs using plutonium 
with mixed oxide fuel (MOX) have had significant obstacles: 
technical uncertainties, concerns with safety, issues of 
construction, and so on. 
 Considering the size of Japan, similar to that of 
California, the density of nuclear power plants in Japan is 
astonishing, and it is remarkable that Japan continues to 
promote nuclear utilization in spite of the limited land 
area, volcanoes, earthquakes, high population density, high 
construction costs, and so forth. In addition, the aging of 
nuclear plants in Japan has become a serious problem. In 
this era of international terrorism, a possible attack on 
nuclear facilities has become a grave concern, as well. For 
all that, the Japanese government is still calling for more 
nuclear plants in spite of the worldwide retreat from 
nuclear electric production (although this is recently 
reversing). The Japanese government focuses on the need to 
compensate for the lack of domestic energy resources, and 
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its confidence is backed by Japan's economic and 
technological strength and its achievements in avoiding 
major accidents. However, the incidence of numerous minor 
accidents makes this assertion appear shaky. The Japanese 
government has strongly promoted nuclear utilization, and 
public movements against nuclear energy development have 
been fairly weak. The public has been extremely tolerant of 
peaceful nuclear development in comparison to its attitude 
toward nuclear weapons. Anti-nuclear plant movements have 
never had a major impact on Japan's nuclear policy. Although 
local opposition has often arisen at the first stage of 
nuclear power plant construction, political pressures from 
the government and its effective financial subsidization to 
local authorities (in case they accept to offer construction 
sites) have gradually lessened the heat. Feelings of 
powerlessness and passivity among people also seem to have 
weakened public movements. 
 Intensive promotion of the "peaceful" utilization of 
nuclear power seems to be consistent with the pacifist 
identity in that it asserts anti-nuclear weapon sentiments 
on the one hand and promotes the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy on the other. However, the nuclear industry could, in 
various ways, contribute to the proliferation of nuclear 
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weapons, escalate the danger of clandestine nuclear weapons 
development, expand the chances of nuclear smuggling, and 
increase the possibility of international conflicts. To 
produce nuclear weapons, three elements are necessary: 
materials, equipment, and technology. Materials include 
uranium and plutonium. Uranium can be mined in limited areas, 
such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and South 
Africa, and plutonium is a secondary product of uranium. 
Equipment and technology are closely related critical 
factors, and the types employed distinguish between weaponry 
and peaceful use of nuclear power. The enrichment of uranium 
and separation of plutonium require an extremely high level 
of technology and secure facilities. It is difficult for 
nations who do not possess nuclear weapons to obtain these 
technologies, not only because they are controlled by 
several advanced countries, but because nuclear weapons 
technologies are key factors in a state's national security. 
States possessing nuclear weapons are extremely cautious 
about leaks of information. A notable exception was when, in 
January 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely regarded as the 
founder of Pakistan's nuclear program, confessed to 
involvement in a clandestine international network spreading 
nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan. 
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 The technological gap between weaponry and peaceful 
nuclear applications still controls access to the nuclear 
club, but technology developed for peaceful use of nuclear 
power has played a significant role in the proliferation of 
nuclear weaponry. Barry Buzan suggests that technological 
development has historically been a critical factor in 
warfare, and that "any civil industrial society contains a 
latent military potential. This potential lies in its stock 
of knowledge, equipment, material, technique and capital" 
(Buzan 1987, 28). He directly points out that, "perhaps the 
clearest example of this latent potential in today's world 
is the civil nuclear power industry" (ibid., 29). Even if it 
was impossible to convert a peaceful energy resource to a 
deadly weapon yesterday, it may become possible as 
technologies develop. Frederik Willem de Klerk asserted that 
the clandestine success of South African nuclear weapons 
production was not dependent on the transfer of technology 
from other countries (Keller 1993). However, there is no 
doubt that nuclear weapons are an outcome of cumulative 
knowledge. Japan is well known as a nation that has clearly 
rejected development of nuclear arms. However, no one doubts 
the capability of Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons 
(Sorenson 1975; Endicott 1975, 127-128; McIntosh 1986, 64; 
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Reischauer 1988, 367). The rising number of fast breeder 
reactors (FBR) and the growth in plutonium use raise the 
potential for nuclear weaponry development in Japan. This 
capacity, combined with its space program-oriented 
development of sophisticated rockets that could be converted 
to nuclear-tipped ICBMs, has left neighboring states, 
including North and South Korea and China, skeptical about 
"Japan's nuclear ambitions" (Harrison 1996, 4-5). 
 
5. Reviewing the US-Japan Security System and Limiting of 
the Defense Budget within One Percent of GNP 
 
 The first half of the 1970s brought dramatic events 
in international politics: détente between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, reconciliation between the US and 
China, and the end of the Vietnam War. This reduced Japanese 
fears of getting caught up in an American war due to the 
Mutual Security Treaty. In parallel, the situation allowed 
Japan to review its security system (Nakanishi 1999). The 
first step in the review was the Defense Agency's report, 
"Limits of Peacetime Defense Capability," ordered by Prime 
Minister Tanaka. This was an attempt to reframe the Mutual 
Security Treaty, not only as a deterrent to threats, but 
also as a means to promote the détente then in progress. The 
report, renamed "Peacetime Defense Capability," was made 
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public in February 1973. However, it caused confusion in the 
Diet and was eventually withdrawn, because many Japanese 
regarded any hint of buildup in autonomous defense 
capability as a revival of prewar militarism. 
 Michita Sakata took up the post of Director General 
of the Defense Agency under Prime Minister Takeo Miki, who 
took office in December 1974. Sakata thought it was 
essential for the cabinet to receive broad public support 
for national defense policymaking. He organized the Society 
to Consider Japan's Defense, consisting of scholars and 
civilian international security specialists, and in 1976 he 
resumed publishing a white paper on national defense, which 
had been issued only once previously. Ever since, white 
papers have been published annually. In addition, he pushed 
to complete a proposal on the fundamentals of defense policy, 
which could replace the earlier Defense Buildup Programs. 
The concept for the yet unnamed proposal was called 
Fundamental Defense Capability, and focused not on preparing 
for a specific threat, but on maintaining minimum defense 
capability to protect the nation. In other words, it tried 
to reduce the risk arising from uncertainty in international 
relations by focusing Japan's defense capability 
sufficiently to independently repel a small-scale direct 
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invasion. Based on this idea, in October 1976 the government 
formulated the National Defense Program Outline, the so-
called Taiko, thus shifting the emphasis of defense policy 
from US-Japan cooperation towards autonomous defense of the 
country. 
 In 1954 when the Self Defense Forces were established, 
defense spending was less than three percent of Japan's 
gross national product (GNP). During the era of almost 
miraculous economic growth in the 1960s, the defense budget 
benefited, as well. The defense budget for the Second 
Defense Buildup Program, the five-year program of 1962-67, 
was approximately 1.16 trillion yen (3.2 billion dollars), 
but in the end, the budget exceeded 1.37 trillion yen (3.8 
billion dollars). However, the defense budget for FY1966 was 
only 1.1 percent of the GNP, far less than the previously 
estimated 1.5 percent. This tendency continued during the 
Third Defense Buildup Program. The defense expense for 
FY1971, the last year of the five-year program, was 670.9 
billion yen (1.9 billion dollars), more than half of the 
total amount of the previous five years, but only 0.8 
percent of the GNP. 
 When the Taiko was approved in Cabinet meeting, 
setting a clear-cut limit on the defense budget was 
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suggested. Responding to this, in November 1976, the Miki 
Cabinet concluded that annual defense expenses should not 
exceed one percent of GNP. The cabinet resolution read: "For 
a time, in each fiscal year the total defense expenses 
should be targeted within one percent of the amount of the 
GNP of the respective year" (Nakanishi 1999). In spite of 
restrained words such as "for a time" and "target," the 
decision was widely supported by the Japanese public, and it 
has endured as a fundamental line of Japanese defense policy 
ever since. 
 
6. Comprehensive Security 
 Having depended heavily on oil supplies from the 
Middle East, Japan was forced by the Oil Shock of 1973 to 
shift its policy drastically and to make clear its pro-
Middle East stance in order to secure oil resources. This 
experience revealed the vulnerability of the basis of 
Japan's economic power. Japan was dependent on imports, not 
only for oil, but for various natural resources and foods. 
More Japanese came to realize that losing their supply lines 
could threaten national security even in the absence of a 
military threat. In January 1977, Prime Minister Takeo 
Fukuda stated in his administrative policy speech that the 
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most important issues for Japan's national economy and for 
its people's lives were securing the supply of natural 
resources and energy and developing its science and 
technology. He concluded that these factors would influence 
the survival and prosperity of Japan and were the most 
crucial security issues for such a resource-poor country. 
 During the LDP's presidential election of November 
1978, Masayoshi Ohira offered the concept of "comprehensive 
security strategy" as one of the three pillars of Japan's 
fundamental policy. The first pillar was to firmly sustain 
the existing collective security system through the Mutual 
Security Treaty with the United States. The second was to 
maintain Japan's own high quality, moderately sized defense 
capability. Complementing the first two military pillars, 
the third pillar, comprehensive security strategy, was a 
plan "to preserve Japan's security comprehensively, by 
generally improving such domestic affairs as the economy, 
education and culture, as well as by strengthening 
diplomatic efforts, including international economic 
cooperation and cultural diplomacy" (Tanaka 1997, 276-277). 
Nonetheless, it was indeed the economy that received 
particular emphasis. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) explained in the 1980 Diplomatic Blue Paper 
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that Japanese economic aid to Pakistan, Turkey, and Thailand 
was "a means to maintain national security in a broad 
sense." In this strategy, foreign economic assistance was 
used to strengthen the western alliance and balance Japan's 
limited military expenditures, constrained to one percent of 
GNP. Here the concept of "strategic aid" was born. Strategic 
aid is provided based on national interests and goals, in 
contrast to "humanitarian aid" providing relief to victims 
of wars and natural disasters, with no conditions placed on 
the aid. Since 1980, Japan's Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) for Third World countries, mainly in the Asia-Pacific 
region, increased year-by-year, backed by an enormous trade 
surplus. Japan finally became the world's largest ODA 
supplier in 1989, surpassing the United States. 
 During the 1970s, in the international economic 
sphere, Japan moved beyond the stage of being caught between 
dependence on or independence from the United States. Japan 
became the only developed country in Asia, an established 
economic power able to play a significant role in the global 
economy. Simultaneously, the end of US military and economic 
superiority became manifest. International relations were 
shifting from "peace maintained by the United States" to 
"peace maintained by burden sharing in international 
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society" (ibid., 278). In October 1978, the Guidelines for 
Defense Cooperation between Japan and the United States, the 
so-called Gaidorain, were concluded. They consisted of three 
sets of items: 1) a system to obviate invasion by other 
states; 2) counteractions to military attacks against Japan; 
and 3) cooperation between Japan and the United States on 
Far East issues that would significantly impact Japan, but 
that emerged outside of Japan. The third point led to hot 
debate over the legitimacy of sending the SDF abroad and 
over the definition of "Far East." This guideline was 
designed to promote substantial Japan-US cooperation, and 
since then, Japan-US joint exercises, training, and research 
have been actively practiced, starting with the Rim of the 
Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 1980. In May 1979, for the 
first time, a prime minister of Japan, Ohira, called the 
United States Japan's "ally." Gradually but steadily, 
realist security policy prevailed in Japan, while it 
restricted its own military capability, thus continuing to 
take into account pacifist claims. 
 In the meantime, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan 
in December 1979, and the Cold War intensified once again. 
President Ronald Reagan came into office in January 1981 
"with a great deal of martial music about the Soviet threat 
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and the need for a military buildup" (Fitzgerald 2000, 147). 
Reagan publicly called the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and 
pushed his hostile policies against the USSR. Japan's 
perception of the "Soviet threat" heightened rapidly as well. 
 
7. Studies on Missiles in the 1960s and 70s 
 Studies on missile threats in the early 1960s were 
basically focused on defense against enemy bombers and 
cruise missiles, but as offensive ballistic missile 
technology developed after the "Sputnik Shock" of 1957, 
their scope broadened to include anti-missile missiles. In 
the United States, President John F. Kennedy's "missile gap" 
rhetoric during the 1960 election campaign opened a way to 
promote the third generation Nike system, Nike-Zeus. This 
three-staged interceptor, employing a nuclear warhead, had 
major problems dealing with decoys and multiple targets. In 
a 1962 experiment, a radar-guided Zeus missile with a dummy 
nuclear warhead was fired, and it passed within two 
kilometers of the reentry vehicle of an Atlas ballistic 
missile, "close enough to destroy it with a nuclear blast" 
(ibid., 115). By 1963 Nike-Zeus was replaced by Nike-X, 
reflecting technical advances in radar, rocket acceleration 
and data processing systems. The Nike-X system consisted of 
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two missiles: the Spartan with a range of 70-100 miles, and 
the Sprint with a 20-30 mile range (Handberg 2002, 49-50). 
This fourth generation Nike system was politically boosted 
by such international events as China's first detonation of 
an atomic bomb in October 1964 and the Soviet deployment of 
the "Galosh" antiballistic missile (ABM) systems around 
Moscow in late 1966 (Mitchell 2000, 7). 
 In the late 1960s nuclear-tipped ABMs were a matter 
of serious debate in the United States. There were a number 
of problems with them. First, even if ABMs succeeded in 
intercepting incoming hostile missiles, their debris would 
produce serious radioactive fallout and threaten the area 
they are designed to protect. Second, the nuclear blast 
would generate a massive electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 
destroying communication lines and delicate radars. Even 
though the United States might be able to defend against a 
first strike by ballistic missiles, the anti-ballistic 
missile system would then be blind and unable to deal with 
following attacks. And third, the increasing number of 
Soviet nuclear warheads was troublesome. Americans could not 
conceive of so many interceptor nuclear warheads detonating 
over their own territory. "[N]o one wanted nuclear-tipped 
ABMs going off in the atmosphere" (Fitzgerald 2000, 120). 
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The development of multiple independently-targetable reentry 
vehicle (MIRV) technology during the 1970s accelerated this 
trend, and the US government shifted its focus from nuclear 
ABM to a "hit-to-kill" type of kinetic-energy weapon (KEW) 
for its ABM interceptors. 
 Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, led the "great ABM 
debates" and the road to the 1972 ABM Treaty (Mitchell 2000). 
He was convinced that "continually enhanced offensive 
penetration aids could be deployed that were capable of 
overwhelming any possible defensive configuration" (Handberg 
2002, 51), and that "the only alternative to spending 
billions of dollars on a pointless offensive arms buildup 
was to convince the Soviets that ABM deployments were 
destabilizing, and to get them to agree to strict limits on 
defenses" (Kartchner 2001, 21). Many remember the well-known 
episode at Glassboro, New Jersey in June 1967. When 
President Lyndon B. Johnson had McNamara explain to Soviet 
Prime Minister Aleksei N. Kosygin the rationale for limiting 
ABM defenses to head off an arms race in offensive weapons, 
the infuriated Kosygin pounded the table shouting, "Defense 
is moral, offense is immoral!" But later the Soviets 
accepted the idea that building missile defenses could lead 
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to an offense-defense arms race and moved toward signing the 
ABM Treaty. While America's ABM capability continued to be 
based on existing Nike-X technology, in 1967 McNamara gave 
the system a new name, Sentinel, in order to gain control 
over the debate. The Sentinel was designed as a heavy anti-
Soviet missile defense system, but McNamara wanted it 
cancelled completely to achieve MAD. However, President 
Johnson ordered him to deploy some sort of missile defense 
system, so McNamara "was compelled to announce a limited ABM 
deployment" (Goldfischer 1993, 214). Its rationale was 
primarily to protect US cities against accidental attack or 
small-scale launch of ballistic missiles, thus "not from 
Soviet attack but from a much smaller Chinese threat" 
(Graham 2001, 7). China had already conducted six nuclear 
experiments, "including the 3-megaton thermonuclear device" 
(McMahon 1997, 38). 
 President Richard Nixon, who took office in January 
1969, on one hand pushed ahead with the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. On the other 
hand, his administration continued development of the 
ballistic missile defense system, renamed Safeguard in March 
1969. The Safeguard program was a scaled down version of 
missile defense, ostensibly aimed at providing minimal 
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defense for the American population. However, its real 
objective was to secure US strategic nuclear forces against 
a Soviet disarming first strike so as to preserve second-
strike capabilities (Mitchell 2000, 32). The Safeguard 
finally survived domestic debates, and Nixon used it as a 
bargaining chip in arms control negotiations for offensive 
nuclear force reductions with the Soviet Union. 
 In May 1972 the SALT I Agreement was signed in Moscow, 
part two of which, Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Systems, became known as the ABM Treaty. It prohibited the 
United States and the Soviet Union from deploying ABM 
systems to protect their whole territory, only allowing 
defense of two sites: the capital and one ICBM base (the 
1974 protocol limited ABM deployment to just one site). This 
was for the purpose of protecting command and control 
centers and/or securing retaliatory second-strike 
capabilities. Consequently, the nuclear superpowers 
institutionalized a situation in which they could only 
develop their offensive capabilities, leaving themselves 
vulnerable to nuclear missile attacks. An attempt to 
initiate a nuclear war with a preemptive strike would be a 
suicidal act for either state. This should, in theory, have 
restricted the superpowers from striking first, leading to 
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strategic stability in nuclear competition. The superpowers 
established a system where they "deterred" themselves from 
waging nuclear war by exclusively depending on their 
offensive nuclear capabilities. The United States built its 
permitted ABM system, Safeguard, at Grand Forks, North 
Dakota, but "it was dismantled as useless" one year later 
(Eisendrath et al. 2001, 7). 
 In the early 1960s, the Japanese public was so 
suspicious that emerging missile technology was immediately 
linked with nuclear deployment. People tended to confuse 
missiles designed to deliver a warhead with the nuclear 
weapon itself. Therefore, developing and deploying an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or intermediate 
range ballistic missile (IRBM) strongly implied possession 
of a nuclear weapon (Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 
1963). Introducing such missiles was regarded as being 
subject to "prior consultation," and the government could 
not help but negotiate with its US counterpart in such a 
case. In the meantime, it was confirmed in the Diet that 
short-range missiles were not to be considered as a means of 
delivery of nuclear warheads. 
 The Japanese government continued to study GMs, and 
as the capability of the SDF grew, the introduction of a 
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Nike system to defend the mainland against direct threats 
from hostile aircraft became realistic. Research included 
work with such weapons as surface-to-air (SAM), air-to-air 
(AAM), and anti-tank (ATM) missiles. The defense budget 
related to GMs was 286 million yen (794,000 dollars) in 
FY1963 and 419 million yen (1.16 million dollars) in FY1964. 
The total expense for studying GMs from 1956 to 1964 mounted 
to 3.11 billion yen (9.47 million dollars). While admitting 
that US missiles were capable of mounting nuclear weapons, 
the Japanese government explained that it would study them 
with a precondition that such antimissile missiles should 
not be equipped with nuclear warheads (Japanese Diet, House 
of Councilors 1962). 
 Since China had detonated its first nuclear device in 
October 1964, the Japanese were well aware of nuclear 
threats from Communist China. McNamara's statement on a 
future "thin" deployment of anti-missile missiles against 
the new threat of China's small nuclear arsenal aroused 
debates on deploying defensive missiles in Japan in June 
1966 (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 1966b). Within the 
government and political sphere, arguments for and against 
ballistic missile defense were intense and continued for 
months. Proponents claimed that Japan's missile deployment 
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would be purely defensive and avoid conflict with Japan's 
Constitution and postwar security policy. Opponents asserted 
that missile defense technology was not mature enough to 
provide secure defense against ballistic missile attack. In 
April 1968 JDA Director Kaneshichi Masuda called the US ABM 
system a nuclear weapon system and clearly denied the 
possibility of Japanese ABM deployment (Japanese Diet, House 
of Councilors 1968). In the end, the JDA found that an ABM 
system would not provide secure and meaningful defense. It 
offered several reasons for this conclusion: 1) Japan's ABM 
deployment might invite a preemptive nuclear assault; 2) it 
could lead to political tensions in East Asia; 3) it would 
bring domestic turmoil; and 4) the issue of management of 
such a system was yet to be resolved with the US government. 
 Once the US and USSR concluded the ABM Treaty, Japan 
lost interest in antiballistic missiles. ABM debate in Japan 
died out in the Diet, and did not reemerge until Reagan's 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech in 1983. 
 
C. The Second Cold War and The Strategic Defense Initiative 
(1981-1990) 
 
1. The Issue of Nuclear Weapons Presence in Japan 
 The renewed Cold War triggered by the Soviet invasion 
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of Afghanistan shook the Three Non-Nuclear Principles that 
seemed to be unanimously supported by the Japanese. Compared 
with the first two principles, non-production and non-
possession, the Japanese government has flexibly managed the 
third principle, non-transfer of nuclear weapon into Japan. 
Violating the first two principles would clash head on with 
the pacifist identity of the Japanese. However, the third 
principle was not as generally tangible or politically 
strict as the other two. In addition, Japan had control over 
the first and second principles, while the third principle 
was largely dependent on actions of the United States. 
 In 1981, Edwin O. Reischauer, former US Ambassador to 
Japan, stated that nuclear weapons had been brought into 
Japan. Although both governments denied this statement 
immediately, it created an intense controversy over whether 
nuclear weapons existed within Japan's borders. Numerous 
studies on this issue revealed that, in fact, nuclear 
weapons had been brought into Japanese territory (Niihara 
and Asami 1978; Toyoda 1983; Hara 1992). It is widely known 
that the United States was free to transfer nuclear weapons 
into Japan under the former Security Treaty, and Okinawa was 
an obvious nuclear base under the US occupation before it 
was returned to Japan in 1972. As the clause of "prior 
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consultation" was added to the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty, 
Japan and the United States agreed on the removal of all 
nuclear weapons deployed in Okinawa. However, the situation 
did not seem to change. It is an open secret that Yokosuka 
port near Tokyo, the main naval base for the US Seventh 
Fleet, has been a major base of nuclear forces. The "prior 
consultation" clause has been substantially disregarded. 
Under this clause, the US government must consult with the 
Japanese before it brings nuclear weapons into Japan, and 
the Japanese government's position is essentially one of 
trust that the United States would not transfer nuclear 
weapons into its territory without an offer of consultation. 
That is, Japan has no way of checking on American nuclear 
transfers and can only trust the US to hold to the agreement. 
Has the United States upheld the agreement? Information 
regarding this issue is also controlled by the United States. 
The United States does, in fact, have its nuclear-armed 
fleets call at port in Japan without reporting the matter 
and even brings nuclear weapons onto its bases in Japan 
(Hara 1992, 211). There is no way for the Japanese to 
recognize, discuss, or judge the matter, without such 
information. If the United States wants to bring nuclear 
weapons into this particular area of the Far East, it will 
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simply say nothing about it, because the Japanese would 
doubtless reject the idea if prior consultation were offered. 
 From a strategic viewpoint, it is natural to assume 
that the United States has nuclear weapons in Japanese 
territory as necessary parts of its "nuclear umbrella." 
During the Cold War, many believed that the US government 
would not have felt secure if their Soviet counterparts were 
convinced that there were no nuclear weapons in Japan. The 
Americans needed to make the Soviets believe there were 
nuclear weapons in Japan (Mainichi Shinbunsha Gaishinbu 
1982). One could argue that it is the US nuclear threat, not 
the location of particular weapons, that matters. However, 
it was difficult to believe that the US would allow a 
nuclear "hole" in this critical area, while stationing 
"nuclear weapons on US soil in the Pacific (on Guam) and on 
certain naval ships" (Van de Velde 1988, 20), and on the 
lands of other Asian allies such as South Korea and the 
Philippines. Peter Heiz asserts, based on historical 
evidence, that nuclear weapons had been stored permanently 
in Japan and that Japan was a center of possible nuclear 
warfare from the US strategic viewpoint (Heiz 1987, 78-88). 
 This discussion does not suggest that Japan possesses 
nuclear weapons, but does suggest that Japan provided its 
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territory to the United States as a strategic nuclear base. 
As a declared non-nuclear state, Japan has suffered from a 
deep dilemma over nuclear security. Zenko Suzuki, taking 
over the government after the unexpected death of Prime 
Minister Ohira in the midst of a general election campaign 
in April 1980, emphasized the non-military aspects of 
national security and maintained a low profile on security 
issues. After the government denied the Reischauer comment 
in 1981, an American journalist once asked Suzuki, if he 
could infer that Japan did not want the US "nuclear 
umbrella" because Suzuki would not allow the nuclear-armed 
US fleet to call at a Japanese port. Suzuki replied that the 
government has to deal with the issues realistically through 
prior consultation. Then, when a Japanese reporter asked him 
the meaning of "realistically," Suzuki said that the 
government might say "yes" or "no." But he hurriedly 
corrected his comment, stating, "The Japanese people have a 
strong 'nuclear allergy', and I wish to adhere to non-
nuclear principles. Therefore, we should come to a 
conclusion based on these facts, and we will say 'no', 
realistically" (Mainichi Shinbunsha Gaishinbu 1982, 178-180). 
Suzuki's confusion symbolized the ambiguity and dilemma of 
Japan's security policy. 
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2. The Nakasone Era and the Expanding Role of the Self 
Defense Forces 
 
 In contrast with his predecessors, Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone, after taking office in November 1982, got 
actively involved in military aspects of Japan's national 
security policy. Nakasone once insisted on Japan's 
rearmament through constitutional amendment when he was a 
member of the National Democratic Party in the early 1950s. 
Later he became known as "an advocate for constitutional 
amendment" in the LDP. However, after assuming the post of 
prime minister, he kept silent on the issue because of 
strong opposition in the Diet. 
 The "Three Principles on Arms Export" prohibit 
exporting weapons to communist countries, to countries to 
which United Nations resolutions prohibit the export of 
weapons, and to countries that are, or are likely to be, 
involved in international conflict. These principles were 
for the first time presented by the Sato Cabinet to the Diet 
in April 1967, and the Miki Cabinet proclaimed the 
principles as the unified view of the government in February 
1976. However, following strong pressure from the United 
States, in January 1983 the Nakasone Cabinet decided, in 
exception to the principles, to license Japanese weapons 
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technology to the United States. This clearly showed the 
government's prioritization of the realist US-Japan alliance 
over pacifist principles. In addition, the Nakasone 
government approved non-government level participation in 
the SDI announced by the Reagan Administration in March 1983. 
This will be analyzed in detail in the following section. 
Furthermore, Nakasone increased annual expenditure on 
defense far more than other areas in FY1984. Finally, in 
January 1987, the cabinet approved an accounting change: 
estimating the defense budget not on a year-on-year basis, 
which had been common practice, but on the calculated cost 
of the five-year Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program. 
Accordingly, in the following year the Japanese defense 
budget weighed in at 1.003 percent of GNP, the first time 
that a defense budget had exceeded the one percent limit 
that was Japanese national policy. This was taken by the 
public as an important sign of Nakasone's hawkish view on 
national security, already indicated by remarks such as, 
"Japan is an unsinkable aircraft carrier of the United 
States" and "Japan and the United States share the same 
destiny." 
 Due to the renewed Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, Japan-US military cooperation expanded, 
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and the capability as well as the role of the Self Defense 
Forces progressively increased through the 1980s. The Ground 
Self Defense Force was no longer a sub-military organization 
just for containing domestic disturbances, but a powerful 
armed force that could conduct military operations beyond 
its coastline. In 1981, then Prime Minister Suzuki promised 
the United States that Japan would defend the one-nautical-
mile sea-lane off the Japanese coast. However, there were no 
specific regulations regarding sea-lane defense, and this 
move substantively expanded operations of the SDF beyond 
Japan's territorial waters without any clear defense policy 
changes. The Air Self Defense Forces had also widened the 
concept of "self-defense" during the 1980s. Japan introduced 
and deployed F-16 fighters at Misawa Air Base in northern 
Honshu (main island), which potentially represented an 
offensive capability because their range of attack included 
eastern Russia. The Maritime Self Defense Force reinforced 
its capability as well by deploying four new Aegis warships, 
even though it had already focused heavily on antisubmarine 
warfare capabilities. Those military buildups obscured the 
clear-cut distinction between offense and defense in Japan's 
national defense policy. 
 In the late 1980s, Japan-US relations began to sour 
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while the United States and the Soviet Union came closer 
with the emergence of Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the 
Soviet Communist Party. The Toshiba Incident occurred in 
April 1987. It was revealed that some parts of a screw 
propeller, which could reduce submarine noise and help them 
go undetected by US sonar, were exported to the USSR against 
regulations of the Coordinating Committee for Export to 
Communist Areas (COCOM). This incident reinforced Japan's 
image as a selfish country that sought its own economic 
interests at the price of the security of the western 
alliance. In May 1987, Japan was requested by the United 
States to deploy its minesweepers to the Iran-Iraqi War to 
protect international shipping. This brought a controversy 
over Japan's legitimate contribution to international 
society. Faced with strong opposition, the Nakasone Cabinet 
finally refused. Instead, Japan provided expanded economic 
assistance to countries in the region and increased the 
budget for supporting US facilities in Japan (Keddell 1990, 
15). The Japanese were again shaken in the dilemma between a 
realist policy of cooperation with the United States and 
pacifist popular opposition to sending the SDF abroad. 
 As the Cold War came to an end in a series of 
upheavals such as the Tiananmen Square Incident and 
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democratization movements in East Europe in 1989, notions of 
the "Japan threat" and "containment of Japan" swirled in the 
United States, in response to the rise of Japan and economic 
friction between the two economic superpowers. Some writers 
even predicted a war with Japan in the near future (Friedman 
and Lebard 1991). The Japanese public responded 
correspondingly; for instance, the book, Japan that Can Say 
No, became a best-seller in Japan (Morita and Ishihara 1989). 
 
3. Strategic Defense Initiative 
I call upon the scientific community in this country, 
who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great 
talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to 
give us the means of rendering these weapons impotent 
and obsolete. (Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983) 
 
 On March 23, 1983, President Reagan gave his famous 
"Star Wars" speech. For the purpose of making nuclear 
weapons "impotent and obsolete," he proposed building a 
shield that could shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. 
This took US "defense experts in and out of the 
administration" by surprise (Fitzgerald 2000, 210). The SDI 
invited huge debate in and out of the country since it 
directly challenged the prevailing posture that had been a 
foundation of arms control and strategic stability for the 
past decade (Saito 1992, 23). The Japanese government 
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reacted calmly, about a month later announcing that it could 
"understand" this strategic choice of the Reagan 
Administration, as its intention was defensive and moral. 
 The SDI program, however, was not formally launched 
until Reagan entered his second term in 1985. The president 
for the first time explained his SDI plans to his Japanese 
counterpart when they met in Los Angeles in early January. 
Prime Minister Nakasone expressed his interest in SDI. He 
expressed his "understanding" of the SDI study for four 
reasons: 1) the SDI is not a nuclear weapon; 2) it is a 
defensive program; 3) it is designed to protect against 
nuclear ballistic missiles; and 4) its ultimate objective is 
the total abolition of nuclear weapons from the earth. In 
March, US Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger formally 
wrote to Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe and invited 
Japan to participate in the SDI. 
 In Japan, the opposition to nuclear weapons was such 
that whether the SDI interceptor was a nuclear weapon or not 
was a delicate and important issue, and the non-nuclear 
feature of the SDI was a crucial point in the government's 
participation. As mentioned earlier, the US government had 
already retreated from developing nuclear-tipped anti-
ballistic missiles. Nonetheless, the space based X-ray laser 
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beam of the planned interceptor would be generated as a 
result of a nuclear explosion, and this issue led to a 
debate in Japan. The US government repeatedly emphasized 
that the SDI was not a system with nuclear weapons, and the 
Nakasone Cabinet made this point clear by defining nuclear 
weapons as follows: "a nuclear weapon is a weapon that uses 
radioactive energy generated by nuclear fission or fusion 
reactions for the purpose of destruction or slaughter" 
(Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 1986b). Thus the X-
ray laser that would not directly produce a nuclear blast to 
destroy enemy missiles was not regarded as a nuclear weapon. 
 While finding moral justifications in Reagan's 
position, Nakasone offered five conditions for Japan's 
participation in the SDI, adding that Japan's participation 
must be based on thorough and prudent discussions. First, 
the United States should not pursue strategic superiority 
over the USSR. Second, the SDI should be conducive to 
strengthening overall deterrent strategy. Third, offensive 
weaponry should be substantially reduced simultaneously. 
Fourth, the SDI should be in compliance with the ABM Treaty. 
And fifth, the development and deployment of the SDI system 
should proceed in consultation with US allies and negotiated 
with the Soviet Union. The Japanese government sent research 
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groups to the United States three times, simultaneously 
monitoring the attitudes of other US allies. Following the 
UK, West Germany, Italy, France and Canada, Japan announced 
in September 1986 that the Japanese private sector would 
participate in the SDI. This decision was made based 
primarily on the political position of Japan as a member of 
the western alliance. The JDA explained that the SDI did not 
aim at offensive military buildup, and it was "congruent 
with Japan's fundamental position as a peaceful nation" 
(Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 1986a). Japan 
officially signed a memorandum with the United States in 
July 1987. The West Pacific Area Missile Defense (WESTPAC) 
program started in November 1988, and top players in the 
Japanese military industry, including Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, independently joined in. 
 Heated debates continued in the United States in 
terms of military effectiveness of the system, cost of 
development and deployment, and implications for relations 
with the Soviet Union. The concept of layered defense, which 
existed as early as the 1960s, was developed systematically 
in the 1980s, envisioning deployment of "several missile 
defense systems, each designed to intercept an attacking 
missile or warhead at a different stage of its flight 
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trajectory" (Hildreth and Pagliano 2004, 18). The SDI 
missile defense system consisted of four stages: boost phase, 
post-boost phase, mid-course, and terminal or reentry phase. 
The planned space–based, mid-course interceptor was the 
target of especially severe criticism. Proponents of the SDI, 
who believed in the US technology that had put humans on the 
moon, were optimistic about the SDI program. But the 
expected technological breakthroughs did not occur, and 
critics stressed that space-based interceptors would be 
"sitting ducks" and that the SDI was a task like "pulling 
the Titanic from the ocean floor and putting it into orbit" 
(Fitzgerald 2000, 375). The SDI consumed more than 120 
billion dollars in FY1985-88, with no idea how much eventual 
implementation of the system might cost. Another worry was 
the Soviet Union, which remained skeptical about SDI 
technology and about the intentions of the other superpower. 
 In the meantime, important political events shook the 
Reagan Administration in the latter half of the 1980s. 
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail 
Gorbachev launched his peace initiative after taking the 
post in March 1986. Focus shifted from the SDI to arms 
reduction such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 
and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The 
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popularity of the SDI in the US public had peaked in October 
1986, but gradually fell by the autumn of the next year. 
 
D. The End of the Cold War and The New Era in Japanese 
Security (1991-) 
 
1. The Gulf War and Japan's International Contribution 
 The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the following war 
in the Persian Gulf shook the foundations of Japan's 
national security policy. The end of the Cold War eliminated 
the danger of a full-scale nuclear war and the Soviet threat. 
However, ethnic conflicts surfaced all over the world, and a 
new kind of threat, terrorism, emerged. At the outbreak of 
the Gulf War, the world started seeking a new world order in 
place of the Cold War system. Initially the interruption of 
oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait did not cause much 
disruption in Japan, and the Gulf Crisis did not become a 
major security issue there. However, it was impossible for 
Japan, as the second largest economic power in the world, 
not to join in the response against Iraq. Yet, the situation 
was neither a war involving invasion upon the Japanese 
territory nor a war that could be reasonably rationalized as 
self-defense. The tangled, torturous arguments over how to 
react left Japan incapable of any timely, significant 
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involvement. After drawing harsh criticism from the 
international community, Japan provided a total of 13.5 
billion dollars in financial assistance and sent several 
non-military personnel to participate in the operation, but 
much too late. When the Kuwaiti government published an 
advertisement in an American newspaper to express its 
appreciation to the world after the war, Japan was not 
included. It gave the general impression that Japan was 
subject to ridicule and loss of esteem, appearing as a 
country that having shed neither blood nor sweats, tried to 
make up for it with money in response to criticism. During 
the Cold War, Japanese foreign policy was "labeled decidedly 
passive and reactive" (Fukushima 1999,164). Now, Japan was 
bitterly asked how it intended to be a responsible partner 
in international security efforts and was severely 
challenged as a member of international society. 
 After the war, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu 
dispatched minesweepers of the Maritime Self Defense Forces 
(MSDF) to the Persian Gulf to clear underwater mines, and 
Japan recovered some respect. It was the first time that 
Japan had sent its minesweepers to operate beyond its own 
waters since the Korean War. Debate on sending the SDF 
abroad subsequently turned hot, and the issue of Japan's 
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contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) was 
discussed as well. The Kaifu Cabinet submitted the United 
Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to the Diet in October 1990, 
but it was scrapped. At that time, more than half the 
Japanese public opposed participating in PKO, with only 20 
percent in support. The debate continued, and in June 1992 
the International Peace Cooperation Law, the so-called PKO 
Cooperation Law, was passed in the Diet. During this period, 
debate among politicians, journalists and scholars heated up, 
and public opinion changed dramatically, with those for and 
against Japan's participation in UN PKO roughly equal. 
Ichiro Ozawa, then secretary general of the LDP, claimed 
that Japan could participate in UN PKO, including military 
operations, without constitutional amendment, and he put 
forward the "normal power" argument suggesting that Japan 
should participate in common international duties just as 
the other responsible countries do. "The responsible 
practices should include military roles in the service of 
international security" (Ozawa 1993). Masayoshi Takemura, 
the leader of New Party Sakigake, stood in direct opposition 
and insisted that Japan need not make a military 
contribution in line with its economic power and should feel 
no responsibilities as a major power (Kato 2002). The 
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division in Japan's national identity over how Japan should 
place itself in international society was very serious. 
Based on the PKO Cooperation Law, the Japanese government 
sent 2,000 SDF personnel to the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) and provided logistics support. With the 
success of the Cambodia peace process, the majority of 
Japanese came to support participation of the SDF in PKO. 
 With the domestic political stalemate, the collapse 
of the economic bubble, and recurring exposure of corruption 
among bureaucrats, Japan of the 1990s was in a somewhat 
chaotic situation. The LDP was divided over political reform, 
and the 1955-system finally came to an end when the LDP lost 
power in August 1993. In the following coalition governments, 
policies regarding national security remained fuzzy because 
coalition parties took fundamentally different positions on 
security policy. Then the leader of the Socialist Party, 
Tomiichi Murayama, became prime minister of a coalition 
government in June 1994, and stunned the Japanese people by 
drastically shifting the Socialist's view on national 
security policy. He officially accepted the US-Japan 
military alliance and stated his intention to "firmly" 
maintain the Mutual Security Treaty, even recognizing the 
Self Defense Forces as constitutional. The Socialist Party, 
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which had argued for unarmed neutralism, in a sudden stroke 
tried to accommodate the actuality of the US-Japan alliance 
and the reality of international society. However, this move 
led to a loss in public support that continues to this day. 
 There were also intense journalistic debates over the 
search for Japan's national identity. On one hand, Yomiuri 
Shinbun published its original "Tentative Plan" for a 
Constitutional Amendment in November 1994. It recommended 
abolishing Section Two of Article 9 while keeping Section 
One, clarifying the existence of the SDF by stating, "Japan 
can maintain an organization for self-defense." On the other 
hand, Asahi Shinbun advocated "constitutional" diplomacy in 
an editorial in May 1995, suggesting that Japan should focus 
on non-military contributions to international society (Kato 
1998). 
 Interestingly, the economic depression of the 1990s, 
following the collapse of the economic bubble and various 
financial crises, threatened the economic basis of Japan's 
national power. But this point was hardly recognized as a 
national security issues. 
 
2. Re-Definition of the US-Japan Security System 
 In September 1995, the rape of a twelve-year-old girl 
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by three US Marines in Okinawa shocked the Japanese people. 
Residents in Okinawa were outraged, and the incident led a 
majority of Japanese to express opposition to the US-Japan 
mutual security system. Okinawa represents only one percent 
of the Japanese land area, but contains seventy-five percent 
of the total area of US military bases in Japan. This has 
led to a preponderance of crimes by US personnel being 
committed in Okinawa. Mainland Japanese at last began to 
understand that the mutual security system designed to 
defend the country could also threaten the safety of 
residents in Okinawa. The US-Japan alliance, which had been 
"drifting" since losing its principal perceived threat, the 
Soviet Union, was thrown into its greatest crisis (Funabashi 
1997). Nonetheless, both governments made every effort to 
defuse the situation, and the discussion of the alliance was 
moved from breaking it off to firmly upholding it, but with 
sufficient consideration for the people of Okinawa. As a 
result, it was agreed that the United States would relocate 
an air base and return Futenma Air Station to Japan, but 
leave the foundation of the US-Japan security system 
unchanged. 
 In contrast with former Soviet-bloc countries in 
Eastern Europe, which had achieved democratization only to 
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face a new set of ethnic conflicts, remains of the Cold War 
structure still existed in East Asia. South Korea undertook 
a diplomatic offensive including establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990, 
while North Korea lost economic aid from its patron. 
Although it maintained a stable relationship with China, 
North Korea was economically pushed into a corner and 
increasingly isolated in the international community. It 
began to focus on nuclear and missile development (Wada 
1998). North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in 
March 1993, and in May it succeeded in developing a mid-
range ballistic missile Nodong that could reach any part of 
Japan (Ozu 2002, 204). Tensions rose in the region. In the 
meantime, Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui's visit to the 
United States in June 1995 triggered renewed confrontation 
in the Taiwan Strait. China conducted a missile launch 
exercise with live ammunition, and military tension between 
Taiwan and China mounted. Obviously, Cold War-era tensions 
had changed, but had not disappeared. 
 In these circumstances, Japan and the United States 
initiated a restructuring of the Mutual Security Treaty and 
their alliance. In November 1995, Japan laid down the New 
National Defense Program Outline (New Taiko), which 
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reconfirmed the significance of the Japan-US mutual security 
system and aimed to make international contributions more 
positively and actively. In April 1996, President Bill 
Clinton visited Japan and introduced the Japan-US Joint 
Communiqué on Security with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. 
This was called a "redefinition of the Japan-US mutual 
security system." Key components of the communiqué were the 
following: First, the mutual security system should aim at 
"peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region" instead of 
facing "the threat of Soviet Union," the common enemy in the 
Cold War era. Second, it committed both sides to the 
presence of US military forces in Japan and surrounding 
areas. The communiqué was released in concert with the 
Strategic Report on East Asia issued in February 1995, which 
confirmed that the US should keep around 100,000 personnel 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, in September 1998, new 
Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (New Gaidorain) 
were established. Thus, the former Taiko of 1976 and the 
Guidelines of 1978 were both replaced for the new era of the 
Japan-US alliance.  
 The most notable feature of the redefined Japan-US 
mutual security system was the introduction of the concept, 
shuhen jitai (situations in areas surrounding Japan). This 
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concept was not geographic, but was defined as "situations 
that could gravely affect the peace and security of Japan." 
Hence the geographic aspect of the Japan-US Mutual Security 
Treaty, which for years had been limited to the "Far East," 
was now extended over the entire globe. The redefined Japan-
US cooperative relationship and the national security 
policies of Japan were quickly initiated. Bills regarding 
shuhen jitai were passed in the Diet, and air tankers and 
spy satellites were slated for development. The former 
enabled mid-air aircraft refueling, and the latter enhanced 
the area for intelligence and reconnaissance. Due to these 
moves, Japan's "offensive" capability was increased 
significantly, and the line between offense and defense was 
further blurred. 
 Japan seemed to have begun moving toward strategies 
beyond its borders on land, at sea, and in the air, backed 
by cutting edge technologies in the areas of command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). However, the legal 
basis for military actions of the Self Defense Forces 
remained unclear. There was no legal basis for the SDF to 
operate freely, even on Japanese soil and even in an 
emergency. With a watchful eye on the situation in the 
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Korean Peninsula, the government sped to establish 
emergency-related legislation. In June 2003, the Diet passed 
three bills, finally defining specific wartime actions, 
which had been considered taboo since the Mitsuya Study. 
 
3. The Constitution of Japan and the Self Defense Forces 
 After the end of World War II, as the international 
atmosphere has changed, Japan has steadily developed and 
strengthened its defense capability, symbolized by the 
establishment and development of the Self Defense Forces. 
This change was achieved not by revising the Constitution, 
but by changing its interpretation. The government's 
approach to the issue has been called a "constitutional 
transition method" or ridiculed as an "interpretive revision 
of the Constitution." The evolution of the government's 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution has 
substantially altered its original aims, and over time the 
Japanese people have come to accept these interpretations. 
The shifts in interpretation have had the effect of a 
revision of the Constitution without its actually being 
altered. This change has involved a process of refining the 
definition of the armed forces in such a way that they 
should not fall under the definition of military forces as 
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prohibited by Section Two of Article 9 (Kobayashi 1998). The 
constitutional basis of the Self Defense Forces is still 
very vulnerable, but since the end of the Cold War, the 
public view toward the Constitution and the Self Defense 
Forces has changed to a considerable degree. Lately, the 
status of the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces has 
risen steadily, and the Defense Agency was even upgraded to 
a ministry-level organization in January 2007. Emergency 
disaster relief missions of the SDF have always been highly 
regarded. In general people preferred struggles against 
nature to the killing of war. Thus the public has supported 
participation of the SDF in international rescue efforts, 
and the SDF has steadily built up its track record of 
disaster relief. The majority of Japanese people now 
recognize the SDF, and many even acknowledge it as a 
military force. From other countries' point of view, the 
Self Defense Forces are clearly a world-class military force. 
 Constitutional Research Councils were established in 
both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet in January 2000, 
and have been discussing possible constitutional amendments, 
involving Article 9. In November 2000, even the Communist 
Party recognized the Self Defense Forces. 
 
136 
4. The GPALS Program 
 Facing the end of the Cold War, George Bush, 
following President Reagan, reviewed the SDI and announced 
the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) 
program in January 1991. The GPALS shifted the focus of 
defense from massive nuclear attack in total warfare with 
the Soviet Union to accidental launch of nuclear missiles or 
limited ballistic missile assaults (up to several hundred 
warheads) by Third World countries. This change was a 
response to the Gulf War experience in which Iraq attacked 
Saudi Arabia and Israel with Soviet made Scud B ballistic 
missiles, and to the proliferation in the Third World of 
chemical weapons, which are called "the nuclear weapons of 
the poor." 
 The protection objective of the missile defense 
system was reevaluated as well. While SDI was to mainly 
protect the continental US, GPALS focused on the protection 
of US forces deployed abroad and US allies. The components 
of GPALS were: 1) Theater Missile Defense (TMD) to defend US 
troops abroad and allies and friends, 2) National Missile 
Defense (NMD) to protect the US mainland, and 3) Global 
Missile Defense (GMD) to defend against long-range ballistic 
missiles. GMD included a space-based anti-ballistic system 
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with a thousand very small, highly intelligent orbiting 
satellites with kinetic warheads. They were called 
"Brilliant Pebbles," and were an attempt to avoid problems 
with the SDI concept of large sophisticated battle stations 
and nuclear-pumped X-ray laser satellites. 
 GPALS also faced harsh criticisms. First, as with the 
SDI, the estimated 41 billion dollar cost of development and 
deployment was very large. Second, GPALS would violate the 
ABM Treaty's prohibition against deployment of anti-
ballistic missiles in space. And third, threats from Third 
World ballistic missiles were still remote. The prolonged 
debate did not quiet until Bush left office. Theater missile 
defense (TMD) and national missile defense (NMD) were 







MISSILE DEFENSE: BACKGROUND, CURRENT ISSUES, AND THE FUTURE 
 
We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both 
offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no 
longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear 
retaliation. Defense can strengthen deterrence by 
reducing the incentive for proliferation. (George W. 
Bush on May 1, 2001) 
 
 This chapter will analyze the course of events in the 
United States and Japan with regard to missile defense, 
evaluate the utility and dangers of Japan's missile defense 
program, and consider what defense policy Japan should 
choose in the future. 
 
A. Missile Defense Concepts 
 
 Before we enter the missile defense debate, we need 
to clarify concepts regarding missile defense in order to 
avoid confusion due to the varying usage of strategic terms 
over the course of history. The broad concept of "strategic 
defense" can be divided into three spheres: ground, sea and 
air defenses. Strategic missile defense belongs to air 
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defense, including defense against bombers, fighters, and so 
on. 
 Missile defense is still a broad concept. A "missile" 
is a military weapon normally carrying a warhead and 
guidance system. It is launched on land, at sea or in the 
air. There are two distinct types of missiles. Cruise 
missiles (CM), powered by jet engines, are low flying 
strategic guided missiles. They are essentially unmanned 
aircrafts, but are distinct from unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV) in that cruise missiles are used only as weapons and 
not for reconnaissance. Ballistic missiles (BM), powered by 
rocket engines, can be launched into space. Missile defense 
might be expected to include response to both CMs and BMs, 
but in practice it usually entails only defense against BMs. 
The term "missile defense" has come into official use 
relatively recently. "MD" has been used for US missile 
defense programs since the current Bush administration 
removed the distinction between national missile defense 
(NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) in May 2001. 
Ballistic missile defense (BMD), a general concept commonly 
used in the past, will be avoided in this study. This word, 
with its long history, can be confusing since the BMD 
concept was used in both President Reagan's Strategic 
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Defense Initiative (SDI) program and President Clinton's 
program in different ways. BMD in the former was a part of 
SDI combined with satellite systems, while BMD in the latter 
was a total program equivalent to SDI, consisting of NMD and 
TMD. Moreover, the fact that the Clinton Administration's 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was formerly 
called the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) 
may cause additional confusion. The BMDO was reformulated 
and promoted as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) under the 
current Bush Administration. 
 The US missile defense programs, NMD and TMD, were 
distinguished in terms of what/who is being protected and 
what range of ballistic missiles are being defended against. 
In this study, NMD is defined as a missile defense system 
that protects the continental territory and civilians of the 
United States, and TMD is defined as one that protects US 
forces stationed abroad. Distinction by range is dismissed 
since there was no agreement on the exact range that divides 
NMD and TMD. 
 The Japanese government avoided using the term TMD in 
joint missile defense development with the United States. 
The US TMD in East Asia should in large part play the role 
of national missile defense for Japan. But the Japanese 
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regarded TMD as a specific US program, which would defend US 
forces stationed not only within Japan's borders but also 
outside Japanese territory. On this line of argument Japan's 
participation in the US TMD could have been considered a 
stepping out of the constitutional self-defense mandate that 
prohibits collective defense. Therefore the Japanese 
government has called the joint study program BMD. This may 
add even more confusion. In May 1996, the Japanese 
government made clear that TMD is defined as a specific 
system of the United States designed to defend US troops, 
not only in Japan but also around the world, as well as US 
allies and friends. In order to avoid confusion, this study 
will use the term JMD to describe Japan's own missile 
defense program, apart from TMD. 
 In sum, missile defense terms printed in lower case, 
such as "missile defense," are used to describe general 
concepts. Those in upper case represent specific missile 
defense programs of the day, such as SDI of the Reagan 
Administration, GPALS of the Bush Administration, NMD and 
TMD of the Clinton Administration, MD of the George W. Bush 




B. Missile Defense Development in the United States 
 
 As reviewed in the previous chapter, the issue of 
missile defense has been debated in the United States since 
the 1950s, however, such programs as SDI and GPALS remained 
merely an unrealized vision. In terms of an actual missile 
defense system in the post-Cold War environment, the debate 
did not become animated until the presidential campaign of 
2000. Debate on missile defense intensified between the 
Republicans, who actively supported the program, and the 
Democrats, who were less enthusiastic. President Clinton's 
missile defense program was composed of TMD and NMD. TMD was 
a combination of upper tier system (Army Theater High 
Altitude Area Defense [THAAD], Navy Theater Wide Defense 
[NTWD], and Airborne laser [ABL] of the Air Force) and lower 
tier system (Army Patriot Advanced Capability 3 [PAC-3], 
Navy Area Defense [NAD]). The Medium Extended Air Defense 
System (MEADS) was developed in cooperation with Germany and 
Italy, and the Arrow System developed with Israel is also a 
lower tier system. NMD was to defend the continental 
territory of the United States from a limited ballistic 
missile attack, succeeding the GPALS program. NMD consisted 
of land-based interceptors, radar and space-based sensor 
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systems. The Clinton administration prioritized TMD, because 
the United States perceived more imminent threats to its 
foreign military bases from Iraqi Scud and North Korean 
Nodong missiles, and because NMD faced the political 
obstacle of violating the ABM treaty. 
 After taking office, President George W. Bush 
declared his stance on the promotion of missile defense. He 
announced in his speech at the National Defense University 
in May: "We need a new framework that allows us to build 
missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's 
world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 
30-year-old ABM Treaty" (Bush 2001). President Bush's 
calling for major deployment of missile defense systems and 
removal of the distinction between the NMD and TMD programs 
indicated that the United States would promote its MD in a 
comprehensive manner under one administrative umbrella, 
despite technical and conceptual distinctions between NMD 
and TMD, and despite vigorous criticism of these programs 
(the criticisms are analyzed in detail in the next chapter). 
A new stage was set for debate on missile defense. Initially, 
the Bush administration did not make clear its plans for 
integration of the two programs or what specific kind of 
system it intended to pursue. It did not identify "an 
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architecture that it [would] seek to deploy nor [establish] 
a schedule for the development and deployment of any 
particular system or element, but, a clear underlying 
objective [was] the early deployment of a defense against 
missiles aimed at U.S. territory" (Hildreth and Woolf 2004, 
5). Later it suggested that it had been taking a "spiral 
approach," adopting a flexible and incremental course of 
development dictated by technological advances, instead of 
employing rigid, long-term planning. This approach has also 
been called "strategic ambiguity." 
 The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 
immediately shifted the focus of US national security policy 
to anti-terrorism campaigns, but it did not eliminate debate 
on the US MD program. Given the impact of the 9-11 terrorist 
attacks, two separate paths could have been followed: the 
United States could pursue an active MD shield program, 
taking into consideration possible future terrorist assaults 
with ballistic missiles (Funabashi 2001, Spring 2003), or it 
could reconsider the program and prioritize other counter-
terrorist options, some of which are currently under way 
(Dowd 2001, Klare 2003, Wright 2003). In the end, President 
Bush was preoccupied by ballistic missile threats from Iraq, 
Iran and North Korea, and the Bush Administration "seemed as 
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determined as ever to move ahead with a national defense 
system" (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2001). Attention 
was distracted from missile defense issues for a while, but 
President Bush firmly decided to pursue a missile shield for 
the country. US MD plans have significant strategic 
implications not only for security policies of the United 
States and its allies, but for future world security. 
 
C. Japan's Missile Defense: the Program 
 
 In 1993 the US government officially proposed that 
Japan join its TMD program. This coincided with North 
Korea's declaration of its withdrawal from the NPT and its 
first launch of a Nodong short-range ballistic missile. At 
the Japan-US Defense Summit in September 1993, it was agreed 
that a forum for policy study on ballistic missile defense 
would be established under the Security Sub-Committee (SSC). 
Following this agreement, the TMD Working Group (TMD-WG) was 
established in December 1993. Since then, TMD-WG meetings 
have been a forum for exchange of information at the 
administrative level, including opportunities for the US 
government to further explain its TMD programs. As mentioned 
earlier, the Japanese government has avoided using the term 
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TMD for its own missile defense program, and called it BMD 
(relabeled JMD for purposes of this study). 
 In September 1994, it was agreed that a Japan-US 
bilateral study would be undertaken to allow Japan to obtain 
the information on TMD necessary for its policy decisions. 
JDA established the Office of Ballistic Missile Defense 
Research (BMDR) in April 1995 (Venable 2001, 80). Since 
January 1995, experts from both nations have been studying 
the characteristics of ballistic missiles, the technological 
feasibility of missile defense systems, and so on. A white 
paper on defense claimed, "it is necessary to investigate 
various issues of BMD thoroughly from comprehensive 
perspectives in order to make decisions on Japan's future 
attitude" (Japan Defense Agency 1999). Based on this 
recognition, the JDA has been conducting a study, entitled 
Comprehensive Research on Japan's Future Air Defense System, 
with cooperation from the United States. Costing 560 million 
yen (4.7 million dollars) from FY1995–98, the study focused 
on TMD weapon systems, sensors, and Battlefield Management 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Intelligence (BMC4I) systems. Continued cooperation in these 
studies on missile defense was assured by the Japan US Joint 
Declaration on Security in April 1996, signed by then 
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President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto. 
 In August 1998, North Korea's test launch of a three-
stage rocket, possibly an intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) Taepodong 1, spurred the argument for JMD. The rocket 
flew over Japanese territory, and the Japanese people were 
stunned and deeply humiliated by the intimidating test of a 
missile "over their heads." At the Security Consultative 
Committee (SCC or "2 plus 2") meeting on September 20, 1998, 
the Director of Japan's Defense Agency and the US Secretary 
of Defense expressed a commitment to proceed with further 
work in the direction of conducting cooperative research on 
missile defense. In October the Security Council of Japan 
convened, and the JDA announced that it would begin internal 
coordination in the Cabinet with an additional budget 
request. In December, prior to the compilation of the 
government's budget for the fiscal year 1999, relevant 
ministers met in an attempt to reach consensus on the 
importance of JMD. Subsequently, on December 25, the 
Security Council of Japan was convened, and it approved the 
initiation of Japan-US cooperative technological research on 
Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD). This was later reorganized 
as the Sea-based Midcourse Defense (SMD) system. 
Simultaneously, the government announced its views in the 
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"Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary Regarding Japan-US 
Cooperative Technological Research on Ballistic Missile 
Defense." 
 Through its research to date, JDA has reached the 
basic conclusion that cutting-edge technology, including 
Japan's own, has reached a level where JMD systems are 
feasible, if not today, at least in the foreseeable future. 
By 1997 JDA concluded that the NTWD system "would be the TMD 
system most amenable to bilateral cooperation and capable of 
defending Japan most effectively" (Takeda 2005, 67). At the 
Japan-US Defense Summit in December 1998, it was announced 
that JDA was going to begin domestic development, with 
coordination on technical matters where such cooperation was 
possible. JDA appropriated 26.2 billion yen (218.3 million 
dollars) over the 1999-2005 periods for joint efforts with 
the United States on Requirement Analysis and Design (RA&D) 
for the following four components of NTWD (The RA&D included 
risk reduction activities concerning elements of the 
infrared seeker). 
1) Nosecone: to protect the infrared seeker from heat 
while in flight 
2) Kinetic warhead: warhead that directly hits the 
incoming ballistic missile and destroys it 
with kinetic energy 
3) Infrared seeker: seeker that uses infrared rays to 
detect and follow targets 
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4) Second-stage rocket motor: second-stage rocket of 
a three-stage missile 
 
In December 2003, the Security Committee and the 
Cabinet Meeting of the Japanese government approved the 
introduction of JMD into Japan's defense posture. Japan has 
officially shifted its position from the stage of joint 
study to that of development and deployment. These decisions 
regarding JMD did not attract much public attention nor 
received major media coverage. However, it signified that 
Japan had taken a step toward a major shift in its strategic 
thinking with regard to security policy. The decisions show 
the Japanese government's willingness to defend Japan with 
its own missile defense shield, and could represent a 
substantial shift in defense strategy from dependence on US 
deterrent forces to its own active defense. 
 
D. Japan's Missile Defense: the Debate 
 
 The Japanese government has put forward the following 
rationale for establishing its own missile defense system: 
First, the significant proliferation of ballistic missiles 
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represent an emerging 
threat. Forty-six or more states possess ballistic missiles 
as of 2005, and the threat of those weapons has increased 
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substantially (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005a). 
Second, Japan has no system that can defend its territory 
and people in case of actual ballistic missile attack, and 
there is no viable alternative to missile shields like JMD 
(Ishiba 2005). Third, Japan's missile defense shield is 
purely defensive, and will not pose any threat to other 
states. Japan deploys neither ballistic missiles nor WMD, 
and building a JMD system is not likely to destabilize 
strategic relations with neighboring states. The government 
has been especially conscientious about JMD's defensive 
posture in line with its national sen-shu boei (exclusively 
defense-oriented) policy. 
 Missile defense issues have been brought up in the 
Diet more often since 1995, particularly after North Korea 
launched its three-stage missile over Japanese territory on 
August 31, 1998. However, they have been overshadowed by 
other sensitive and more immediate security issues such as 
the rape incident in Okinawa in 1995, the debates in 1997 
and 1999 on the Japan-US Security Treaty's "guideline," and 
the collision of the US submarine, Greenville, with the 
Japanese fishing trawler, Ehimemaru, in February 2001. For 
some time following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, there 
appeared to be little interest in Japan in discussing JMD. 
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Although MD issues had been in the forefront since President 
Bush took office and announced his strong commitment to 
"deploy missile defenses to strengthen global security and 
stability" (Bush 2001), these issues disappeared both from 
the Japanese Diet and the media after September 11. The 
primary issue then was whether and how Japan should dispatch 
the SDF to support retaliatory US attacks on the al Qaeda 
terrorist network and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, and 
subsequently in the Iraq War. Nonetheless, cooperation with 
the United States on missile defense did not slow down and 
has been steadily maintained. Joint study on NTWD was 
succeeded by SMD midcourse defense research, and it has 
remained intact in President Bush's current MD program. The 
debate on MD issues in Japan was revitalized after the 
government decided to move toward development and deployment 
of JMD in December 2003. 
 In the Japanese Diet, debate on JMD issues has pitted 
proponents--the government, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), and other conservative parties (such as the 
Democratic Party, Conservative Party and the Liberal Party) 
against critics--the Social Democratic Party and the 
Communist Party. Nevertheless, as the Social Democratic 
Party has been losing seats in the Diet since 2000, critical 
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voices have been progressively muted. Generally, these 
debates have been tedious and unproductive, due to repeated 
assertions by ministers and government officials that the 
missile defense issues are still under investigation 
(Namatame 2003). Missile defense can be regarded as a 
specific military posture on a strategic level, so it is 
essentially a matter of choice for the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) and SDF, not for politicians or general public. 
However, it will have a tremendous impact on broader 
Japanese security and strategic policy. 
 The most remarkable feature of the domestic debate 
regarding JMD since 1993 is the long-term consistency of the 
government's policy toward JMD. This consistency has been 
maintained despite the frequent regime transitions following 
the demise of the 1955-system in which the LDP dominated the 
Diet. These include the post-LDP coalitions--Hosokawa and 
Hata administrations (August 1993-June 1994); the LDP 
coalition with the Socialist Party--Murayama and Hashimoto 
administrations (June 1994-July 1998); the LDP coalitions 
without Socialists--Obuchi, Mori, Koizumi, Abe, and Fukuda 
administrations (July 1998-September 2008). This may be 
attributed to Japan's security policymaking process, in 
which bureaucrats in MOFA and MOD take leadership in making 
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concrete decisions and crafting bills. It is also a 
manifestation of the stable relationship between Japan and 
the United States, despite the occasional political tensions 
and the "drifting" alliance during this period (Funabashi 
1997). 
 The following section reviews the debates in terms of 
five specific points of contention. These aspects are: 1) 
nature of the threat; 2) technological feasibility; 3) costs 
and other economic factors; 4) international political 
relations, especially with Russia and China, including the 
international legal dimension of the 1972 ABM Treaty; 5) 
domestic Japanese issues regarding missile defense; and 6) 
moral considerations. The first four points coincide with 
conditions the Clinton administration considered in deciding 
whether it would pursue deployment of NMD, or whether it 
would pass along that decision to the following 
administration. Arguments peculiar to either NMD or TMD will 
be discussed within the appropriate section. The fifth 
section deals with issues unique to Japanese domestic 
politics. And the final section examines the moral aspects 




1. Threat Assessment 
 During the Cold War, the primary threat to the United 
States and its allies were Soviet strategic nuclear forces 
and the danger of annihilation in case of an all-out nuclear 
war between the superpowers. However, with the demise of the 
Soviet Union such a danger has become remote. In the post-
Cold War era, new threats have arisen, including ethnic and 
religious conflicts, international terrorism, and 
proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles. 
 For US proponents of MD, the ballistic missile threat 
is "real and persistent" (Pena 1998) and "growing" (O'Hanlon 
1999). In July 1998 the Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States issued a famous report. 
The so-called Rumsfeld Report, named after chairman, Donald 
Rumsfeld, who was Secretary of Defense in the Reagan and 
Bush Administrations, warned that ballistic missiles are 
"not a distant threat." The Rumsfeld report also criticized 
a report by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
published in 1995, which stated that there would be no 
threat in the next 15 years (Garwin 1998). It is also 
reported that 46 or more nations now possess ballistic 
missiles, and further proliferation of missile technology is 
looming ahead (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005). 
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 There are three sources of ballistic missile threat. 
The first is from so-called "rogue states," such as North 
Korea and Iran, representing the transfer of ballistic 
missile technology to Third World states. Although Libya, 
named "rogue" by President Bush, announced the abandonment 
of its nuclear program, the "rogue" threat has continued to 
grow. The Iraq War broke out in March 2003. The United 
States called it a preventive attack against Iraq and part 
of "a war against terrorism," despite the opposition of 
major states in the UN Security Council. They believed that 
the Saddam Hussein regime could develop nuclear weapons and 
had a strong connection to Osama bin Laden and the al Quaeda 
terrorist network. However, they have proved neither of 
these "facts," even after demolishing the Saddam regime. 
 Seven of the "tyrannical states" identified by Bush 
in his new national security strategy announced in March 
2006--North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe--remain with regimes intact. In particular, North 
Korea has become a serious threat with nuclear weapons and 
missile development, along with a number of troubles 
emerging in the last several years: suspicious boats, spy 
ships, abductions, and so on. In particular, state-sponsored 
kidnapping of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s has 
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antagonized the Japanese people. At the end of August 1998, 
North Korea launched a three-stage rocket over Japan's 
territory. It was believed to be a long-range Taepodong 1 
ballistic missile. The Japanese people were infuriated and 
at the same time realized the imminent presence of missile 
threats from a neighboring country (Nakatomi 2005). Although 
another missile, the Nodong, first tested in 1993, can also 
reach all of Japan, the psychological impact of Taepodong on 
the minds of the Japanese people was enormous. Furthermore, 
North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles on July 5, 
2006. North Korea not only "fields the largest ballistic 
missile force in the Third World," reportedly two hundred or 
more, but it is also "the world's greatest proliferator of 
ballistic missile systems, technologies, and components" 
(Bermudez 1999). Basically, however accurate they are, 
ballistic missiles with conventional warheads are not 
militarily effective, and hence not themselves a threat. 
They become a real threat only when they are combined with 
WMD, and the problem is that the "rogues" concurrently 
pursue possession of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. 
Missile defense proponents fear that leaders of those states, 
who may not behave rationally in a crisis situation, will 
not be deterred by threat of reprisal (Spring and Anderson 
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2000). If they possess nuclear weapons, they might become 
even more aggressive in their regions out of confidence that 
the United States would not go to war against them. In fact, 
North Korea declared that it tested nuclear device on 
October 9, 2006, posing even more serious threat worldwide. 
 Secondly, it has been pointed out that the threat 
after the Cold War has shifted from direct confrontations 
between nation states to "asymmetric" threats from lesser 
actors such as terrorist groups, religious cults and 
individuals. International terrorists such as Osama Bin 
Laden and the al Quaeda terrorist network regard the United 
States and its allies and friends as inveterate enemies and 
have waged war against them with terror attacks. Possession 
of WMD by such actors is one of the newest and worst fears 
confronting world society. 
 The third source of threat, though of less concern, 
arises from the established nuclear powers, notably Russia 
and China. The United States has been concerned with 
economic problems and political instability in Russia. A 
conservative US think tank, the Heritage Foundation, pointed 
out that Russia's fragile political situation could lead 
either to a breakdown in the chain of command controlling 
its arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs or to a renewal of 
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hostile relations with the United States (The Heritage 
Foundation 1999). The current Putin regime has been stable, 
and it was once cooperative with the United States. But 
concern still exists, especially since revelation of the 
confrontation between Russia and the United States over the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline from the Caspian to the 
Mediterranean Sea. Responding to the Bush administration's 
announcement in June 2007 that it would deploy its missile 
defense system in Europe, President Putin expressed strong 
opposition and even threatened countermeasures. Putin has 
repeatedly mentioned Russia's possible withdrawal from the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, and 
in December 2007, Russia dropped compliance with the Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which 
restricts deployment of non-nuclear arsenals. In 2008 the 
Bush administration initiated a plan to deploy its MD in 
Poland and the Czech Republic, which has aggravated its 
relation with Russia. 
 Meanwhile, although the US government and its allies 
have avoided directly referring to China, national security 
experts and scholars have been quite explicit about their 
concerns (Japanese Diet 2006, House of Councilors). They 
point to China's gradual military modernization, especially 
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the development of ballistic missiles, which is transforming 
military geography and making US bases there vulnerable. 
China also substantially improved the accuracy of its 
missiles over an eight-month period, a feat that took the 
United States and the Soviet Union 25 years to accomplish 
(Bracken 1998). Despite the facts that no one knows the 
actual size of China's strategic forces (estimates vary from 
seven to twenty ICBMs and from 225 to 1,000 nuclear 
warheads) and that Beijing appears to be focusing on its 
economic development, "the very uncertainty of China's 
future is a cause of concern" (The Heritage Foundation 1999). 
Besides, China is regarded as a major supplier of missile-
related materials (Ogawa 2000). China has reportedly been 
increasing its military spending more than 10 percent 
annually, and the uncertain nature of the expenditure has 
itself been a matter of grave concern. 
 Critics of missile defense argue that such threats 
are overstated. One critic argues that the threat 
confronting the United States from ballistic missiles was 
much greater in the mid-1980s than in the post Cold War 
environment (Cirincione 2000). The Rumsfeld Report was 
criticized for assessing what ballistic missile threats were 
"possible," not what threats were "likely" (Gronlund and 
160 
Wright 1998). Critics supported the 1995 NIE and 1996 
government intelligence assessments that progressing from 
short to medium range missiles would require a major leap in 
technology, and an immediate threat to the United States 
would not emerge in the next 15 years (Cirincione 1997; 
2000). They also argue that North Korea is not in a position 
to constitute a threat to either the United States or even 
neighboring states, since it has no economic base to support 
the development of its missile programs (Wang 2000). As of 
the fall 2008, thirteen years after the NIE warning, it 
seems that the ballistic missile threat has spread around 
the globe, but is not yet critically imminent. 
 There is debate on this point, however. Perception of 
threat is a matter of judgment, and depends on politics as 
much or more than technology. The emerging threat of 
ballistic missiles to international security is still 
debatable, although  
 
2. Technological Feasibility 
 Behind the recent missile defense debate, there is 
recognition that technological development has finally made 
"shooting a bullet with a bullet" possible. One MD advocate 
simply declared, "the technology is ready" (Spring 2000). 
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The feasibility of "hit-to-kill" missile technology "was 
proven in a series of successful intercept tests in 1999" 
(Spring and Anderson 2000). Following the reportedly 
successful first intercept test on 15 July 2001, the Bush 
administration has conducted missile defense experiments in 
an incremental manner. Nonetheless, MD proponents' 
optimistic pronouncements remain to be proved. The two 
intercept tests prior to the first success were miserable 
failures. This undercut confidence in the system's 
feasibility, leading President Clinton to postpone the 
program. Even the seemingly successful interception in 
October 1999 was in doubt, due to indications that an object 
other than the target momentarily distracted the interceptor 
(prior to this test, the success rate of interception had 
been just two hits in sixteen attempts). Opponents of MD 
contended that it was a "rush to failure" to decide on 
deployment of such systems without enough testing 
(Cirincione 1998). Moreover, they argued that even the 
widely deployed short-range missile defense system, the 
Patriot system, had a remarkably low success rate in the 
Gulf War despite the fact that it had a perfect test record 
(17 hits in 17 tests) before the war (Lewis, Postol and Pike 
1999). Indeed, it was pointed out that ballistic missile 
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defense would be far more difficult than shooting down a 
bullet with a bullet. The speed of a typical bullet is about 
Mach 2.5 while "an incoming warhead moves at Mach 6 and 
more" (Hermetz 2001, 363), though a warhead is far larger 
than a bullet. 
 Other than the feasibility problem, there are a 
number of technological issues. With regard to the terminal 
phase, the upgraded Patriot surface-to-air missile (PAC-3) 
is nearly an entire system redesign, intended to intercept 
tactical ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. As of 
March 2005, it was reported that ten out of twelve tests had 
been successful, and the Japanese government regarded the 
reliability of the PAC-3 system as sufficient to announce 
that Japan would begin deployment in 2006. However, the 
utility of the PAC-3 terminal phase system against high-
speed Nodong missiles is unknown. The issue of wreckage 
remains to be discussed as well. 
 As for the midcourse defense system that Japan aims 
to introduce, the Aegis-launched SMD system succeeded in six 
out of seven tests. Some critics, however, pointed out that 
these should not be counted as successful tests since they 
were merely checking out the radar system, confirming the 
separation of kinetic interceptor from the rocket, and 
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guiding and controlling the interceptor in space. They were 
not tests for actual intercepts but a kind of pre-test for 
intercept tests. This was compared to taking swinging 
practice and hitting tossed balls before beginning actual 
batting practice (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005b). 
The sixth test was legitimate and successful in destroying a 
target, but the successful interception was conducted at an 
altitude of 137 kilometers. Some discounted the result, 
since the Nodong ballistic missile would actually be engaged 
as high as 300 kilometers above the ground. 
 Plans for interception during the midcourse phase 
have attracted the most technological criticism, emphasizing 
the availability of countermeasures. Critics argue that even 
if MD were now technically feasible on the test range, the 
attacker "would be able to take straightforward steps to 
defeat this system" (Lewis, Gronlund and Wright 2000). A 
number of authors have pointed to a variety of possible 
countermeasures: submunitions, decoys, cooled shrouds, 
chaffs, aerosols, and so on (Cirincione 2000; Lewis, Postol 
and Pike 1999; Garwin 1999; Mendelsohn 1999; Lewis and 
Postol 1997).  
Furthermore, some opponents of MD also argue that 
emphasizing MD systems is meaningless because "rogue" actors 
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would likely deliver WMD by means other than ballistic 
missiles, such as suitcases, vans, trucks, small civilian 
airplanes, container ships, cruise missiles, subway cars, 
and so forth (Cirincione 2000; Mendelsohn 1999; Gronlund and 
Wright 1998). Such means are less expensive, and easier to 
covertly develop and deploy (possibly enabling attackers to 
evade retaliation), more reliable, accurate, and effective 
than ICBMs (Krepon 2003, 80). In fact, the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks were conducted by way of the nearly 
unthinkable but well prepared hijacking of four commercial 
airplanes full of fuel. The actual weapons of the terrorists 
were said to be box cutters. 
 As for the countermeasure argument, MD supporters 
respond that a properly designed system "should be able to 
anticipate and neutralize potential countermeasures" (Spring 
and Anderson 2000). However, MD critics refer to the cost 
effectiveness of countermeasures, arguing that, "it is far 
easier and cheaper to deploy simple and effective 
countermeasures against defenses than it is for the defenses 
to respond" (Cirincione 1997). Therefore, "each move drives 
up the defender's costs much further than it does the 
attacker's" (Bracken 1998). As for other means of delivery, 
MD advocates object to "putting all defense eggs in one 
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basket." That is, it is not right to just give up "simply 
because missile defense is not a panacea" and to leave 
people utterly vulnerable to this particular type of attack 
(O'Hanlon 1999). They condemned the Clinton Administration's 
reluctance to support MD deployment, contending that the 
danger of ballistic missile stems not only from the spread 
of these destructive weapons but also from the policy of 
purposeful vulnerability to these weapons. "Long-range 
ballistic missiles are the only weapons against which the 
Clinton Administration has decided, as a matter of policy, 
not to field any defense" (Spring and Anderson 2000). This 
remark is relevant and closely related to the moral aspect 
of the debate, which will be mentioned later. 
 While some MD advocates support a total missile 
defense shield (boost phase, mid-course phase and terminal 
phase) (The Heritage Foundation 1999; Canavan 1999), others 
support boost phase defense for technology-oriented reasons 
(Postol 2000; Garwin 2000; Green 1997). Boost phase defense 
is designed to intercept ballistic missiles while their 
rocket engines are still burning, and "their target size for 
radar is largest before the separation of booster rockets" 
(Hughes 2004, 184). Still in the midst of acceleration, they 
are slow and emit high heat, so they are easily detected. 
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Moreover, the intercept occurs within the enemy's territory, 
and there is no worrying about debris fallout. Another merit 
of boost-phase defense is that it can be carried out before 
enemy missiles launch decoys and other countermeasures. 
Supporters of this system argue that a boost phase 
interceptor system involves mainly proven technology, unlike 
the mid-course intercept system formerly proposed by the 
Pentagon, with its susceptibility to countermeasures. 
Ballistic missiles are said to be perfect weapons for a 
surprise attack (Nose 2007. 82). A serious problem with 
boost phase systems, as well as with mid-course interception, 
is that operational time-constraints become acute; for 
instance, a Nodong missile would reach Japan in ten to 
fifteen minutes after launch. Therefore detection and 
communication technologies are crucial. Also, a boost phase 
system would require deployment of Aegis warships in the Sea 
of Japan, but the decision to intercept would have to be 
made within minutes of detecting a launch. In March 2007, 
the Japanese government decided to authorize an onsite 
commander to launch intercept missiles at his own judgment 
in case of a missile attack. 
 Meanwhile, the Bush administration has pursued a 
comprehensive MD system after all, following a "spiral 
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approach" of incremental development as dictated by 
technological advances. Flight tests have been steadily 
conducted, showing significant development in intercepting 
ballistic missiles. The PAC-3 tested on July 2007 
successfully intercepted a subscale aircraft target that had 
electronic countermeasures. Also, on December 2007 Japanese 
Kongo Aegis destroyer launched a Standard Missile (SM)-3, 
which are to be employed in the SMD system, and successfully 
intercepted a ballistic missile target. This was "the first 
time a non-US ship fitted out with the Aegis BMD system was 
able to intercept a ballistic missile target" (Center for 
Defense Information 2008). 
 
3. Cost Analysis 
 In the United States the merits of NMD were 
vigorously debated during various periods (from 1967 until 
1972, in the early 1980s, and since 2001). On the contrary, 
the costs of TMD were little discussed, mainly because TMD 
development was only at the early stage of assessing 
specific technologies. NMD had far greater strategic 
importance from the US perspective, while TMD was not 
clearly defined; for instance, whether it should protect 
only US forces deployed abroad, or allies and friends also. 
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The cost would depend on the definition (Morimoto and 
Takahashi 2002, 306). 
 The United States has spent well over 100 billion 
dollars on missile defense since the mid-1950s. A large 
portion of the money (44 billion dollars) went to SDI from 
1983 to 1993. Since 1993, around 3.5 billion dollars has 
been devoted to NMD annually (O'Hanlon 1999; Cirincione 
1997). A wide variety of estimates for MD implementation 
have been presented: from two to three billion dollars by 
upgrading Aegis destroyers and cruisers with antimissile 
interceptors, to 60 billion dollars for the deployment of an 
NMD system, to 116 billion dollars over 20 years to deploy, 
support and operate MD systems (Cirincione 1997). 
 As a matter of fact, missile defense advocates tend 
to favor lower estimates, while critics are inclined to 
employ analyses based on much higher costs. The Heritage 
Foundation study argued that an affordable and effective 
system would be possible in four years for eight billion 
dollars or less (The Heritage Foundation 1999), while 
critics pointed out that there were no official cost 
estimates for a long-term comprehensive MD system (Lewis, 
Gronlund and Wright 2000). Moreover, defining a system as 
expensive or not depends on subjective judgments. For 
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example, the average annual expenditure of 3.5 billion 
dollars on NMD elicited varying responses. It appears cheap 
when compared with the 1999 national defense budget of the 
United States (only 1.2 percent of 292.1 billion dollars). 
But it appears very expensive at more than the half the 6.8 
billion dollar budget for the 2005 Head Start program, which 
provides comprehensive education, health, nutrition, and 
parental involvement services to more than 905,000 low-
income children and their families (Administration of 
Children and Families 2006). It seems inexpensive when 
compared to the annual cost of the US air traffic control 
system (6 billion dollars), but not so cheap when compared 
to US foreign military financing program (3.5 billion 
dollars). In any event, now that the current Bush 
administration has adopted a "spiral approach" and 
"strategic ambiguity" with no published plan for specific MD 
systems, it is difficult to debate the real costs. 
 Missile defense costs and budgets have also been the 
subjects of debate in Japan. However, since the government 
maintained that it was only at an early stage of studying 
specific technologies, estimated costs were not presented, 
and discussion on MD costs did not develop to any extent. 
The Japanese government appropriated modest annual expenses 
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for investigation, spending 15.6 billion yen (141.8 million 
dollars) from 1999 to 2003 for the joint study with the 
United States on TMD technologies. After the decision in 
December 2003 to develop JMD, the government has provided an 
estimated 800 billion to 1 trillion yen (7.3 to 9.1 billion 
dollars) for the development and deployment of Aegis SMD and 
PAC-3 ground-based terminal missile defense systems by 2011. 
 
4. International Political Environment 
 A missile defense protecting a state's own territory 
and people from hostile ballistic missiles, possibly 
carrying WMD, is purely defensive in theory. What sort of 
defensive measures the state should take is also a domestic 
matter. No other country should interfere in this, as long 
as the principles of equality of state sovereignty and 
nonintervention in internal affairs hold from an 
international legal perspective. Nevertheless, deployment of 
MD systems by the United States will have a grave impact on 
existing arms control regimes, and therefore, it is of 
serious concern for other states. By the same token, JMD 
will affect the complex international political situation in 
East Asia. This region is "one of the most dynamic and 
potentially unstable ... in the world today, yet the 
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security institutions that are available to manage tensions 
are scattered, weak or non-existent" (Ikenberry and 
Tsuchiyama 2002, 69). 
 The largest obstacle to deployment of US MD systems 
was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which 
prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from 
building nation-wide missile defense systems. The signatory 
powers to the treaty were redefined in the 1997 New York 
Agreements, and four former Soviet republics formally 
replaced the USSR (McCarty 2003). Since the other three 
republics transferred their nuclear weapons to Russia and 
became NPT signatories as non-nuclear states, Russia in 
effect became the sole successor to the Soviet Union for 
purposes of the ABM Treaty. Some MD advocates contended that 
the treaty was no longer valid because the Soviet Union had 
ceased to exist (Spring 2000). In addition, they justified 
withdrawal from the treaty by pointing to a number of Soviet 
and Russian violations of the treaty in the past (The 
Heritage Foundation 1999). Other MD supporters recommended a 
partial amendment of the treaty, considering the importance 
of cooperation with Russia (Garwin 2000). 
 The US government has asserted that its MD is purely 
defensive against ballistic missiles and poses no threat to 
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other countries, and therefore it does not affect the 
strategic balance with other nuclear powers. In theory, US 
MD can be consistent with a mutual defense emphasis (MDE). 
However, the international political reality is not in favor 
of such a unilateral assumption. In practice, US deployment 
of its missile defense is just beginning and its posture 
remains offense dominant. In addition, there is nothing 
mutual about the initiative, since the other major nuclear 
powers lack missile defense systems. MDE and international 
stability can only be realized if all the major states agree 
and recognize the United States MD program as purely 
defensive. However, Russia and China have explicitly and 
repeatedly opposed it and warned that they could build up 
their offensive nuclear forces to overcome such an MD shield. 
Even US allies in Europe have not been cooperative. The 
Australian government has supported US MD, but is hesitant 
to allow US forces use of its territory for MD. In February 
2005 the Prime Minister of Canada, Paul Martin, announced 
that it would withdraw from the MD program. The current 
Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, has been cautious about the 
decision, but the Canadian people in general have opposed 
participation. These two states had been expected to host MD 
radar sites, and their decisions will have a significant 
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impact on US MD. Only friends of the United States in East 
Asia, notably Japan and Taiwan, have shown positive support 
for the US plan. Above all, the crucial actors are Russia 
and China, nuclear powers positioned outside the US alliance. 
 Although Russia showed flexible but inconsistent 
reactions to the US proposal to review the ABM Treaty 
(Russia has even indicated its interest in joint defense 
with the United States), it basically opposes the US MD 
plans. Russia worries about long-term consequences of the 
program, which is limited at present but could be expanded 
in the future, possibly even nullifying Russian strategic 
nuclear forces at some point. Russia's Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Igor Ivanov, questioned the rationale of NMD, which 
risks "serious deterioration in Russia-US relations, global 
strategic stability, and, ultimately, US security" (Ivanov 
2000). 
 The Bush administration claimed that the ABM treaty 
did not fit the post Cold War environment in which the 
United States must face the new and imminent threat of 
ballistic missiles from "rogue" states and terrorists. 
Despite the opposition of many countries, the United States 
declared its withdrawal from the ABM treaty in November 2001. 
President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, then in need of Bush's 
174 
cooperation in dealing with his own problems with Chechen 
terrorists, reacted softly to the US decision, but he called 
it a "mistake" that could destabilize the strategic balance. 
As mentioned earlier, Putin has been skeptical toward Bush's 
intention in deploying MD in Europe. 
 MD critics believed that any amendment of the treaty 
would cause fundamental changes compromising the security 
benefits the treaty provided (Lewis, Gronlund and Wright 
2000; Gronlund and Lewis 1999). That is, a revision allowing 
even a limited MD shield would undermine the assumption of 
MAD. Russia might perceive that MD could provide the United 
States a capability to initiate a first strike with its 
enormous offensive nuclear forces and also to absorb a 
retaliatory nuclear attack from Russia, which would have 
already been weakened by a massive and accurate US first 
strike. Logically, this scenario is destabilizing. This 
would lead Russia to build up offensive nuclear forces to 
overcome the US missile shields. 
 Though not a party to the ABM Treaty, China has been 
consistently and adamantly opposed to amending the treaty as 
well as to the US MD program. The US MD plan would have a 
direct impact on Chinese nuclear forces. Even a limited MD 
system would become a serious problem for China, since it 
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has only a limited number of strategic nuclear missiles 
deployed (Van Ness 2000). This would undermine China's 
current nuclear deterrence strategy (Wang 2000; Yan 1999). 
Many Chinese suspect that the US MD plan is intended to 
counter China's strategic forces. "Despite its well-
established ballistic missile program, China is apparently 
less confident in its ability to overcome future defenses" 
(McMahon 1997, 79). In fact, though no government has 
clearly mentioned the "China threat," some scholars have 
been explicit about the efficacy of MD against the threat 
from Chinese ballistic missiles (Ogawa 2000; Green 1997). 
"Viewed from Beijing, an East Asian TMD looks like a new 
multilateral security alliance against China" (Van Ness 2002, 
145). China is particularly sensitive to the issue of TMD in 
the East Asia region because of the possible involvement of 
Taiwan, which may give an illusion of safety and provide a 
strong incentive for the Taiwanese to pursue independence. 
China will not tolerate this, since Taiwan is of supreme 
national interest to China, and it would be too costly and 
dangerous for the United States and its allies to encourage 
the Taiwanese and provoke the Mainland Chinese (Christensen 
2000; Wang 2000). Consequently, MD critics, especially 
Chinese scholars, believe that US MD would upset the 
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regional military balance and undermine existing arms 
control regimes (Gu 2000; Zhang 1999; Hong 1998). It is 
reported that China has already been preparing 
countermeasures such as electronic jamming equipment and 
decoys for its ballistic missiles (Kaneda et al. 2006, 62). 
 Some MD proponents argue that a defense-oriented 
military posture with MD systems, rather than an offense-
oriented one, will contribute to global and regional 
stability (Canavan 1999; Ding 1999; Krepon 1999). 
Nevertheless, with all the assurances that the US MD plan is 
not aimed at Russia or China, both states are deeply 
skeptical about the intentions of the United States. In such 
circumstances, a decision by the United States to pursue a 
missile defense system, especially when made unilaterally, 
could destabilize the strategic relationship with Russia and 
China and trigger renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and a ballistic missile arms race (Mendelsohn 1999; Lewis 
and Postol 1997). 
 Critics of JMD have criticized Japanese participation 
in the US MD plan, maintaining that JMD will destabilize 
strategic relations in the East Asia region. First, they 
believe that a defense shield will make Japan more confident 
and more militarily ambitious (Hong 1998). Second, they 
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suggest that TMD can be both defensive and offensive. The 
essential elements of ballistic missiles and most TMD 
systems are similar, and the differences between them are 
only in their warheads (Yan 1999). The point is that the 
difference between defense and offense depends on the 
intension of the Japanese. Third, because Japan and the 
United States are close allies, it would not be ridiculous 
for MD critics to connect JMD with US offensive capability. 
The forces combined could constitute a significant war-
fighting capability in the region. The Chinese government 
has repeatedly objected to the JMD program, as well as US MD, 
which it regards as a sign of the revival of Japanese 
militarism and as part of the strategic enlargement of US 
forces in the East Asia region. As detailed in Chapter Two, 
this requires careful distinctions between offense and 
defense and analysis of the relationships between them. 
 
5. Japanese Domestic Issues 
 The Japanese government takes the position that the 
missile defense issue is an operational level matter in the 
MOD and SDF, and thus claims that it is not necessary to 
consult the Diet and ask for approval. However, JMD has led 
to various debates on Japanese domestic issues: the issue of 
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exercising the right of collective self-defense, the 
conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Export, the 
balance with the parliamentary resolution on the peaceful 
use of space, and so on. 
 First, as reviewed in Chapter Three, the Japanese 
government has interpreted the Constitution as not 
inhibiting Japan from possessing the Self Defense Forces, 
which it regards as totally defense-oriented. However, the 
Constitution does prohibit participation in collective self-
defense, the most obvious example of which would be to 
participate in US military operations abroad as an ally. The 
position publicized by the government is that, "the exercise 
of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article 9 
of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary 
level for the defense of the country. The government 
believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-
defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, 
permissible under the Constitution" (Japan Defense Agency 
2005). Especially after President Bush announced the 
unification of NMD and TMD in favor of integrated boost, 
midcourse and terminal defense segments, Japan's cooperation 
with US efforts to shoot down ballistic missiles might be 
regarded as a "use of collective self-defense" (Sakaue 2004, 
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156). Furthermore, some argue that on a regional level the 
actual operation or even deployment of a missile defense 
system may make cooperation with not only the United States 
but also South Korea or Taiwan inevitable. The Japanese 
government has countered the criticisms, contending that 
defending its own territory does not conflict with 
collective self-defense and that JMD systems will be applied 
within the independent right of self-defense. Meanwhile, the 
recent argument for boost-phase defense was more problematic, 
because it is very difficult to judge, within minutes of 
detection, whether the launched ballistic missile is aimed 
at Japan or another country. And that is exactly the reason 
why the Japanese government has excluded a boost-phase 
defense from JMD options. 
 Second, the possibility that Japan's TMD technology 
could be transferred to South Korea or Taiwan would violate 
the Three Principles on Arms Export, which prohibits the 
export of weapons. The Three Principles, declared in April 
1967, stated that Japan is not allowed to export weapons to: 
(1) communist countries; (2) countries to which exporting 
weapons is prohibited by United Nations resolutions; and (3) 
countries that actually are, or are likely to be, involved 
in international conflict. In February 1976, the Japanese 
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government announced its unified view on this issue, which 
stated that in addition to the three exclusions above, Japan 
would abstain from exporting weapons to "any other" country. 
However, in January 1983, following ardent requests from the 
United States, Japan decided to open the way for the 
transfer of its military technology to the United States as 
an exception to the Three Principles. As of 2001, Japan had 
decided to transfer to the United States twelve types of 
military-related technology.1 Therefore, it is considered 
that the joint study of MD with the United States does not 
legally violate the principles, and that this issue would 
arise only if a project involved a third country. The 
Japanese government has argued that the transfer of a 
missile defense system is only a future possibility, which 
cannot be discussed right now. This had been the basic 
position of the Japanese government before it decided to 
move forward with development in December 2004. The 
                     
1 Such technology includes: technologies related to portable 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), technology for the 
construction of US naval vessels, technology for remodeling 
US naval vessels, technology related to support fighters (F-
2), technology related to the digital flight control system 
(DFCS) to be installed on the P-3C, technology related to 
joint research on a "ducted rocket engine," technology 
related to joint research in "advanced steel technology," 
technology related to cooperative modification of the 
"ACESII ejection seat," "advanced hybrid propulsion 
technology," and technology related to cooperative research 
for the F-2 system (Japan Defense Agency 1998 and 2001).   
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government has been quite clear on the distinction between 
the stages of 'study', 'development' and 'deployment' of a 
JMD system, and it has cautiously avoided any argument 
regarding future stages. 
 Third, the deployment of SMD, the formerly planned 
upper-tier TMD system, may violate the 1969 Diet resolution 
that called for peaceful use of outer space. In May 1969, a 
plenary session of the House of Representatives declared 
that development and use of any objects and rockets launched 
into space are to be limited to peaceful use. Following this 
resolution, Japan pledged that it would not deploy offensive 
weapons in outer space, although Japan has reserved the 
possibility of developing a spy satellite to collect and 
transmit information for the purpose of national security. 
After the "Taepodong shock" of 1998, Japan introduced 
"information satellites," but their operations are under the 
control of the cabinet, not JDA, to support the claim that 
they are not "spy satellites" that can be used militarily. 
Also, their visual resolution was intentionally restricted 
to one square meter, instead of a militarily effective level 
of some square centimeters. The "peaceful use of outer 
space" pledge has been included in Japan's basic national 
defense policy. Here the term "space" is defined as the area 
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above the atmosphere, and the Diet resolution would 
contradict the joint study of SMD technology that aims at 
mid-course intercept of incoming ballistic missile above the 
atmosphere. The Japanese government has responded to the 
criticisms, maintaining that the 1969 Diet resolution should 
be revised to permit purely defensive activities including 
the planned SMD, because of recent technological 
developments and emerging threats. 
 Outside the Diet, JMD supporters have found several 
other merits in Japan's missile defense program. First, JMD 
supplements the US extended nuclear deterrence strategy in 
coping with threats from rogue states, and therefore Japan 
need not possess its own nuclear force to counter them 
(Green 1997). This argument has to be assessed carefully. 
The expected deterrence effect of JMD is "deterrence by 
denial," which is quite different from "deterrence by 
punishment," which has been supplied by the US "nuclear 
umbrella." If JMD is positioned as a supplement to the 
umbrella, the combined forces will represent a significant 
war-fighting capability for Japan and the United States. 
 Second, JMD may help the Japanese defense industry, 
which can also have a positive spin-off effect for the 
general Japanese economy (Morimoto et al. 1998). This 
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argument is not a major one. However, not only JMD 
proponents but also those Japanese who have benefited from 
the development of military technology believe that various 
technologies developed from missile defense programs can be 
applied by the private sector in civilian fields, and should 
contribute to Japan's technological and economic development. 
For instance, in the latter half of the 1950s Japan was 
licensed to produce Lockheed F-104 fighters. Production 
essentially relied on Lockheed's capabilities, but the 
Japanese learned many things in the process. For example, 
techniques for converting and molding aluminum allowed 
innovations in disc brakes for bullet trains. 
 Third, a number of arguments, including those from 
the MOD itself, point out that Japan's decision would help 
improve its relationship with the United States (Japan 
Defense Agency 1999). A major reason why Japan favored TMD 
was that "if such a system were to be put in place, 
participation would strategically link Japan even more 
tightly with the United States" (Van Ness 2002, 144). In 
fact, there exists very little discrepancy between the two 
governments in the recognition of imminent ballistic missile 
threat and of the necessity to build a defensive system 
against it. The cooperative relations of the two have been 
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quite consistent and deliberately maintained. The current 
joint study, development and deployment of MD systems may 
contribute to strengthening the alliance, which has been 
occasionally shaken by incidents mentioned earlier. 
 Japanese who advocate JMD from this viewpoint have 
tended to fear "abandonment" by the United States that might 
injure the alliance, and the possibility that United States 
might look to other powers in the region, such as China. On 
the contrary, critics of JMD fear that Japan could be 
"entrapped" by the alliance with the United States and 
dragged into military conflicts elsewhere (The Stanley 
Foundation 1999). In any case, JMD will be, in essence, "a 
weapons system that cannot function without the active 
cooperation of the United States" (Hughes 2004, 187). 
Nevertheless, it seems that the argument for prioritizing 
the alliance with the United States misses the point. A more 
logical approach would begin with the premise that the 
alliance must be a part of a grand strategy to promote the 
national interest, so one should first seek to identify the 
national interest. The issue of maintaining the alliance 




6. Moral Considerations 
 Other than the five dimensions focused on above, it 
should be noted that an underlying element in the debate on 
missile defense belongs to the philosophical or moral 
spheres. An important rationale for the development and 
deployment of MD systems was the recognition that Americans 
could no longer tolerate leaving their people vulnerable to 
ballistic missile-based WMD that have significantly 
proliferated in the Third World. The "Star Wars" program, 
started in 1983, included recognition of this danger, and 
post-Cold War argument for MD gave emphasis to Third World 
threats (Fitzgerald 2000). The moral argument holds that, if 
the technology is ready, it is wrong to maintain current 
policy, which depends on a MAD policy based on Cold War 
politics and technology. For MD advocates, the threat is 
real enough that even if technology cannot provide a perfect 
defense, if expected costs of development are high, or if 
other states argue against it, "No Americans should be left 
defenseless in the event of missile attack" (Spring and 
Anderson 2000). From this perspective, differences over 
threat assessment, technological feasibility, cost, 
international political environment, and domestic politics, 
should be weighed in light of the moral imperative of 
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protecting the American people. 
 The Japanese public is divided over the issue of JMD. 
While most major Japanese newspapers have recommended that 
the US take a cautious approach in its pursuit of national 
missile shields, particularly taking into account its 
relations with Russia, their responses to the issue of 
Japan's own missile defense have been more sharply divided. 
Yomiuri Shinbun, a rather conservative newspaper with the 
largest circulation in Japan, expressed immediate support 
for Japan's participation in the US MD program (Yomiuri 
Shinbun 2003). Sankei Shinbun, known as a particularly 
conservative publication, also argues for JMD. Their 
specific emphases are on the emerging threats of ballistic 
missiles and the advantage of basing deterrence (deterrence 
by denial) on MD systems (Sankei Shinbun 2003). On the 
contrary, Asahi Shinbun, a relatively liberal newspaper with 
the second largest circulation, has argued strongly against 
Japan's missile program. Asahi has raised concerns about 
technological feasibility, costs, and a possible regional 





E. Japan's Missile Defense: the Future 
 
 International conflict resolution can take one of two 
courses: a war cycle or a peaceful settlement cycle. This 
dichotomy coincides with the dual Japanese identities and 
the theoretical concepts categorized and analyzed in this 
work. 
 On the one hand, realists see international relations 
in terms of conflicting values and goals. Methods to be used 
are selected primarily according to considerations of 
national interest and effectiveness; and their approaches 
tend to be unilateral. Interests are often competitive and 
zero-sum, making threats and coercion a regular part of the 
process of interaction, and when other methods of pursuing 
self-interest fail, force is the ultimate arbiter. 
Accordingly, when an international security issue comes up, 
realist reactions can lead to armed confrontation. 
Heightened tension may result in a stable balance of power 
or war. Given that worldview, realists may regard JMD as a 
part of military strategy in which JMD becomes an actual 
shield against ballistic missile attacks in war. 
 On the other hand, pacifists see the realist 
preoccupation with competition and conflict as a cause of 
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unnecessary danger. From this perspective, an emphasis is 
placed on the importance of maintaining mutual trust and 
confidence in relationships with others. Their approaches 
are therefore multilateral. They view interests as often 
competitive but still compatible and non-zero-sum, so that 
maximizing their own interests may allow others to maximize 
theirs as well. They regard threats and coercion as 
inappropriate. Underlying norms should govern interaction of 
states, and the ultimate goal is mutual agreement serving 
all parties. Hence when an international security issue 
arises, pacifist approaches emphasize negotiation rather 
than coercion. This leads to the pursuit of arms control 
(MAD, emphasizing offense and deterrence by punishment, or 
MDE, emphasizing defense and deterrence by denial) and 
disarmament. Peaceful settlement can be facilitated through 
implementation and establishment of legitimate international 
regimes. From a pacifist perspective, if Japan puts a 
pronounced emphasis on defense and builds a JMD system, JMD 
will not play a role in war with other states but instead 
become a shield against extraordinary incidents such as the 
accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles. 
Limited defenses against such threats can provide a chance 
to establish "a cooperative defensive transition as an 
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ultimate arms control objective" (Goldfischer 1992, 171). 
 The realist approach to international security can 
trap Japan into unacceptable risk and danger. The pacifist 
approach may be a favorable option.  Then, within the 
peaceful settlement cycle, one wonders whether the Japanese 
should choose offense (MAD) or defense (MDE). Here, the 
distinction between offensive realism and defensive realism 
is useful. As mentioned in Chapter II, offensive realists 
are prone to adopt unilateral strategy and an offensive 
posture for the state. Defensive realists see the state as 
seeking its survival and security, not necessarily 
territorial expansion. An emphasis on defense and reduction 
of offensive weapons will serve the national interest of the 
state, and lead to a status quo of stability in 
international society. Defensive realist approaches and MDE 
can be useful. 
 If we choose to live in the MAD world, there will be 
no need for missile defense. However, people have been 
losing faith in MAD since the end of the Cold War. The 
assumption of human rationality has become shaky with the 
emergence of apparently irrational leaders of "rogue" states 
and international terrorists. President George W. Bush is an 
example of a leader with little faith in rational behavior 
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by other countries, and that was the exact reason he 
strongly promoted MD, along with withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty in December 2001. 
 MAD has a long history of debate. It has been 
severely criticized in terms of its logical bases, lack of 
evidence for its effect, questionable morality, and so on. 
The purpose of the nuclear forces the superpowers 
established at vast cost was not to use them. According to 
the Japanese scholar, Iwata (1996, 41), "We must not attempt 
to survive nuclear war, and we must be prepared to die once 
it breaks out, then we do not have to die. This is an insane 
logic." Political scientists Samuel Huntington and Stanley 
Hoffmann put it in different way, stating that the 
significant element for maintaining deterrence is "fear" 
that deterrence may not work in case of a crisis (Carnesale 
et al. 1983, quoted in Iwata 1996, 42). MAD advocates have 
at times claimed that nuclear weapons have been a major 
contributor to avoiding a global war. But crucial problems 
are, as Jervis pointed out, "the lack of search for 
supporting evidence" and the fact that "deterrence theory is 
largely deductive" (Jervis 1979, 301). Keith Payne also 
argued that the chances for testing nuclear deterrence 
policies had been too few and unpredictable, and information 
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about the enemy's decision-making too limited to understand 
whether nuclear deterrence in fact has prevented war. "The 
penalty for failure was too high to engage in a conscious 
testing scheme" (Payne 1996, 7). John Vasquez attacked 
Waltz's deterrence theory, pointing out that it was based on 
a faulty causal inference. Following the example of the 
story of a boy in Brooklyn, Vasquez suggested that 
deterrence theorists instigated the build-up of nuclear 
weapons (running down the street waving his arms wildly 
every day) in order to keep the invisible nuclear war (the 
elephants) away, and that they (the boy) declare, "See, it 
works!" (Vasquez 1991). As he asserted, the point is that we 
do not know, and it is not easy to find out because we try 
to explain what did not happen. In other words, "For every 
case of a 'deterrence success', the possibility will thus 
remain that no deterrence was needed, and that no effect was 
achieved, that no test was passed" (Quester 1989, 62). 
 Deterrence theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz and John 
Mearsheimer, argued in favor of a well-managed proliferation 
of nuclear weapons as the preferable route to world 
stability (Mearsheimer 1990; Sagan and Waltz 1995). This 
position is problematic not only because it promotes 
proliferation of nuclear weapons but also because it 
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increases chances of nuclear war. The fundamental assumption 
that has sustained deterrence theory is the rationality of 
the state, but this has been seriously questioned from 
psychological, organizational, and moral perspectives. 
Jervis contends that deterrence theorists "have ignored 
decision makers' emotions, perceptions, and calculations and 
have instead relied on deductive logic based on the premise 
that people are highly rational" (Jervis et al. 1985, 1). 
Scott Sagan maintains that nuclear deterrence will likely 
fail, because organizational culture can be disturbed by 
self-serving organizational objectives, because 
organizational priorities are conflicting, and because 
organizational learning with hazardous technologies can be 
difficult due to strong disincentives against exposing 
serious failures. "Nuclear weapons may well have made 
deliberate war less likely, but, the complex and tightly 
coupled nuclear arsenal we have constructed has 
simultaneously made accidental war more likely" (Sagan 1993, 
264; original emphasis). And finally, "The notion of MAD has 
been frequently attacked not only as militarily unacceptable 
but also as immoral since it holds the entire civilian 
populations of both countries as hostages" (Keeney and 
Panofsky 1982, 298). This moral argument has been a major 
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motivation behind missile defense promotion since the 1983 
speech of President Reagan. 
 Consequently, defense (MDE) should be emphasized. It 
would be recommended that Japan should build JMD on this 
line of argument. From the pacifist point of view, 
disarmament should be the ultimate goal, but that goal must 
also be recognized as difficult to achieve in this realist 
world. Defensive realist and MDE approaches would be a 
realistic alternative in the current security environment 
and an effective middle ground toward the pacifist goal of 
peace. Arms control stressing defense should be the safe and 
steady policy as a transition process toward disarmament. 
Nevertheless, pacifist approaches and MDE are not risk-free. 
It may be all too easy to disturb the peaceful settlement 
cycle and bring back the realist war cycle through violence, 
including preventive or preemptive attacks and terrorism. It 
will be extremely difficult to pursue a peaceful process in 
the face of bloody violence that causes pain and death and 
provokes anger and sorrow which can lead to vengeance. The 
peaceful settlement cycle is a long, patient, and rugged 
process, while the war cycle is a rushed, thoughtless, and 
simple one. The world in which we live may well, in fact, be 
a realist world. In this international environment with no 
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authority above national sovereignty, states have acted as 
they have wanted. This history of war and conflict may be 
rooted in a fundamentally violent human nature. Ideal peace 
and nonviolence may be an illusion, since violence easily 
invites violent reactions. The peace cycle may well be 
pulled back to the war cycle with a single act of terror. 
The power of physical violence is enormous, and therefore 
people may well believe in the realist's concept of peace 
through stability and balance of power in international 
relations. And, indeed, most people have been realists 
behaving as if realist assumptions were true. 
 Nevertheless, from a constructivist point of view, 
this is a matter of identity (Namatame 2004). If we treat a 
state as an enemy, it will become an enemy. More 
specifically, as Joseph Nye points out, "If the United 
States treated China as an enemy, it was likely to guarantee 
itself an enemy, particularly given that nationalism has 
been rapidly replacing Communism as the dominant ideology 
among the Chinese people" (Nye 2001, 97). If states believe 
it is a realist world, it will become a realist world for 
them. In the words of Alexander Wendt, "whether or not a 
state's system is anarchic will be determined by the entity 
with which member states identify with respect to the 
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performance of their functions, especially security. If 
states identify only with themselves, so to speak, the 
system will be anarchic" (Wendt 1996, 47; original emphasis). 
And they will continue to live in a realist world. Such a 
world will be created and re-created by realists, based on a 
"reality" that they themselves create. Realism is what 
Robert Cox characterizes as "a problem-solving form of 
knowledge" for dealing with the challenges of preserving 
one's position in the existing realist order (Cox 1986; 2001, 
106). 
 If one imagines a different world from a realist 
"reality," there may be a possibility of opening a peaceful 
settlement cycle. The realist worldview can pose extreme 
danger in the contemporary world, in which military 
technology has produced tremendous destructive power. Even a 
small-scale nuclear war, once begun, would result in 
enormous death and destruction. Peaceful conflict resolution 
through the peaceful settlement cycle is necessary. 
 In the final analysis, Japan may well pursue its own 
missile system, but it must be cautious and prudent in doing 
so. JMD faces significant obstacles. First, threat 
assessment is a matter of perception, and the threat Japan 
faces at present from the North Korean dictatorship regime 
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appears real. The China threat, about which some JMD 
proponents warn, seems remote and quite possibly exaggerated. 
It is occasionally pointed out that the Cold War bipolar 
structure was much more stable and less dangerous than 
today's situation. However, such judgment is only made in 
retrospect, and in the midst of the Cold War the threat of 
total nuclear warfare between the United States and the 
Soviet Union and subsequent nuclear holocaust was real, and 
even imminent, at various moments. Second, the technological 
feasibility of JMD is still debatable, though the Japanese 
government seems quite confident. Technological developments 
may at some time lead to breakthroughs and overcome current 
difficulties, but the potential performance of the PAC-3 
terminal defense against ballistic missiles is still unknown, 
and the issue of countermeasures overshadows the Aegis SMD 
midcourse defense. Third, costs must be considered, but thus 
far, the cost to develop and deploy JMD, which is estimated 
to be 800 billion to one trillion yen (7.3 to 9.1 billion 
dollars), has not disturbed the momentum toward establishing 
JMD systems. As the detailed components of the system are 
specified, the cost of JMD will become an important issue. 
Unless struck by a serious economic decline in the near 
future, Japan will go forward with missile shields against 
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current and future threats, for moral considerations hold 
that the government cannot leave the people vulnerable to 
nuclear missile attack. Fourth, domestic constraints, such 
as the Three Principles on Arms Export, may not hold back 
JMD for long, and they may well be removed by political 
decisions following development and deployment. As the 
government has repeatedly stated, in theory, JMD is a purely 
defensive weapon that should not threaten any other state. 
Nonetheless, in practice, it is again a matter of perception, 
and if other states, such as China, see JMD in combination 
with offensive capabilities of Japan or the United States, 
they may perceive a strong threat. Japan can restrict its 
offensive capability, which might favorably affect Chinese 
perceptions, and the US could also move toward offensive 
nuclear disarmament and even MDE arms control involving 
China, Russia and Europe, which could also greatly help 
resolve "security dilemma" thinking. But, so far, the 
Chinese and Russians have been highly skeptical toward the 
intentions of the Japanese and Americans. Consequently, the 
author finally emphasizes the remaining point, the 
importance of the international political environment. 
 The United States under President George W. Bush has 
vigorously promoted a unilateral and coercive security 
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policy, including missile defense programs. And the Bush 
administration's pursuit of missile shields has invited much 
criticism due to its unilateral character. In fact, it seems 
that the United States intends to pursue a narrow 
interpretation of its national interest no matter what other 
states would argue. US unilateralism became apparent in its 
abandonment of the ABM Treaty, as well as its intention to 
withdraw from international regimes such as the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Kyoto Protocol. 
Such a "strategic" policy is contrary to the "arms control" 
approach, which requires bilateral or multilateral 
collaboration. 
 The Bush administration has often linked its call for 
MD to its intention to reduce US offensive nuclear forces. 
This may well lead to strategic stability on a global scale, 
if the spirit of arms control and MDE drives it. However, it 
has not at all convinced the other states concerned. So far, 
statements by the US government appear only rhetorical 
because they have been unilateral declarations. Unilateral 
reduction can be easily turned to unilateral buildup, if the 
United States deems it necessary, because there exists no 
restraining mechanism to enforce, verify, or monitor the 
disarmament effort. Also, the United States has been storing 
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its nuclear warheads instead of destroying them. It would be 
quite difficult for unilateral efforts by the United States 
to be fully trusted by states other than its close allies. 
The United States needs to shift its approach from missile 
defense "strategy" to "arms control" and "MDE" in order to 
maintain stable strategic relationships, especially with 
suspicious nuclear powers like Russia and China. The 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
on September 11, 2001 made it necessary for the United 
States to collaborate with these states and create a 
coalition against terrorism. This could have changed the 
future course of MD debates, but it did not. The United 
States rushed to "wars against terrorism," often ignoring 
prudent advice from the international community. The Bush 
administration gained support for its war against the 
Taliban regime of Afghanistan, but the war against Iraq in 
2003 invited severe criticisms internationally. The United 
States in fact defeated the Saddam Hussein's regime, but it 
failed to prove connections with the al Qaeda terrorist 
network or to find WMD in Iraq--the two most important 
rationales for going to the war. Terrorist attacks against 
US forces have not ceased, and the political and social 
situations have been far from secure and stable for the 
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people of Iraq. 
 Japan's decision to pursue JMD could represent a 
substantial shift in defense and security policy. From a 
viewpoint of "strategy," Japan may have shifted its 
strategic focus from dependence on US deterrent forces to 
its own active defense; and in an extreme sense, from 
prevention of war to preparation for war. Japan may have 
shifted from one kind of deterrence policy to the other. Or, 
Japan may be pursuing both defense and deterrence at the 
same time. A succession of JDA Directors has repeatedly 
claimed that the planned MD would be "independently applied" 
within the right of self-defense, emphasizing that it would 
not be applied to defend any other state. However, JMD could 
also be regarded as a unilateral military buildup from a 
strategic point of view. 
 JDA officials have claimed that JMD is purely 
defensive and poses no threat to neighboring countries, but 
such a claim is a one-sided assertion and therefore 
unilateral. It was reported that the Japanese government 
began to explore the introduction from the United States of 
Tomahawk Missiles with a range of 1,700 kilometers, which 
were used for pinpoint attacks in Iraq War. The government 
has explained that in the case of an enemy's obvious intent 
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to carry out an imminent missile attack, it was within the 
limits of self-defense to conduct preemptive attacks against 
the enemy's missile bases at the a missile launch stage (Ozu 
2002, 209). In July 2006, after provocative ballistic 
missile tests by North Korea, leading politicians, including 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, explicitly argued for a 
preemptive attack on North Korean missile sites. The view 
that justifies preemptive attack for defensive purposes has 
been official since the 1950s, but the introduction of long-
range offensive missiles like the Tomahawk will clearly 
exceed Japan's national pledge of "exclusively defense-
oriented" policy, and other states may even regard it as a 
nominal cover-up of Japanese militarism. 
 A strategic shift to include counterforce would end 
any effort to affirm a purely defensive posture of the 
Japanese security policy. A Japanese missile shield could be 
regarded as offensive even though Japan does not possess 
obviously offensive weapons, particularly if one considers 
its connection with the offensive capability of the United 
States. Japan's closest ally has the largest and most 
sophisticated offensive forces in the world, including a 
massive nuclear weapon stockpile. The combined force of US 
offensive forces and Japan's missile defense systems could 
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constitute a significant war-fighting capability and 
destabilize strategic relationships in the region. For other 
states, this capability would increase the prospect of a 
preemptive and preventive attack, for after the United 
States launches a massive first strike against an enemy in 
the region, JMD could absorb the opponent's retaliatory 
ballistic missile attacks, already depleted by the first 
strike. 
 This strategy would not serve Japan's national 
interest. It is clear that most of the criticisms toward 
missile defense mentioned earlier are related to views 
against "strategy" (Krieger 2002). An arms control 
orientation and MDE should be the answer to these criticisms. 
If Japan pursues JMD, its arms control orientation must be 
shared with other states in the region, including China and 
in a sense even North Korea, so that they would not perceive 
a threat and that regional stability would be maintained. 
The current international political environment is not in 
favor of JMD. For the time being, it will be difficult for 
Japan to achieve national security by deployment of a JMD 
system.  
 The Japanese government should make clear that its 
intention is MDE. It is not enough just to declare 
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unilaterally that JMD is defensive; there are a number of 
measures that Japan can actively take both bilaterally and 
multilaterally. Japan should encourage other states to 
believe in its defensive orientation through negotiation and 
diplomacy. The Japanese government should begin to seek 
discussions with China, Russia, Britain, France and the 
United States about a shift from offense to MDE. It should 
utilize communication channels such as confidence building 
measures (CBMs), play an active role in peaceful conflict 
resolution through international organizations such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the United Nations, and 
promote international security regimes, including inviting 
and bringing in the reluctant Americans. 
 In 2001 Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka showed her 
interest in President Bush's willingness to reduce US 
offensive nuclear forces while pursuing MD, and this can be 
a good starting point for the discussion. She stated: "The 
most important thing in President Bush's announcement is 
that a major premise for US missile defense is further 
reduction of [offensive] nuclear weapons" (Japanese Diet, 
House of Representatives 2001). Unfortunately, Japan's 
leaders have not adopted this point, and related discussions 
have been blocked by the government's refusal to answer 
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important questions. With the government advancing toward 
development and deployment of JMD, it does not appear that 
Japan has been considering JMD from arms control and MDE 
perspectives. Japan is, in fact, in a strong position to 
pursue MDE since it unmistakably has little offensive 
capability. Japan possesses no WMD, ICBMs, long-range 
strategic bombers, or offensive aircraft carriers. Japan has 
the famous peace constitution, along with many other 
peaceful constraints, which prohibit Japan from becoming a 
military power. These constraints include the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles, the long-standing pledge that Japan's 
defense expenses in the annual budget will not exceed one 
percent of GNP, the Three Principles on Arms Export, 
exclusively defense-oriented policy, participation in a 
number of international arms control regimes, and so forth. 
Japan should use its position as leverage for offensive arms 
reduction in the region, especially in negotiation with 
China, the regional nuclear power that possesses ICBMs and 
has reportedly been building up its offensive capability in 
a dramatic fashion. In addition, Japan should encourage the 
United States, whose reduction of offensive forces within a 
multilateral framework would be a key element in helping 
persuade China and also Russia to join the circle of arms 
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control and take a step toward MDE. These actions would 
substantially contribute to regional stability. 
 The current situation leads to the pessimistic view 
that realization of MDE is hardly possible in the 
foreseeable future, seeing that China has adopted policies 
based on strictly "strategic" thinking (Johnston 1996). 
China has calmly observed, and in a way made use of, the 
unilateral behavior of the Bush administration, which has 
accelerated its realist strategic security policy on a 
global scale. Nevertheless, within realist dominated world 
politics, the United States seems to understand that the 
regional situation in East Asia is unlike other regions. 
Identifying North Korea as one of the "rogue" states, the 
Bush administration has adopted a more cautious and 
multilateral approach to the Kim Jong Il regime than to 
others, such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq. 
 On balance, Japan has taken cautious steps toward 
both JMD and US MD. While Japan shifted gears toward 
development and deployment of JMD recently, the government 
has not accepted the US unilateral MD initiatives entirely, 
although it has repeated its "understanding" of the US push 
for national missile shields. Still, seeing that its 
alliance partner has been quite ardent to develop and deploy 
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its missile defense system, Japan's "wait-and-see approach" 
(Urayama 2001) will not allow Japan to escape from the 
fundamental question for long. Japan should show its 
willingness to pursue MDE, making its position clear and 
starting dialogue with the states concerned. This will be a 
most difficult task, since all the actors must eventually 
understand and agree on the concept in order to realize MDE. 
It would be a historic moment in the nuclear age. The shift 
from MAD to MDE would require a drastic change in existing 
strategic thinking, not only because the emphasis would be 
on defense instead of offense, but also because pursuing MDE 
in the Asia-Pacific region could even mean joint development 
of missile defense shields by all the major states in the 
region: the United States, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and 
China (but not Taiwan for the time being, due to the issue 
of the Chinese sovereignty). Above all, MDE will be the 
inevitable choice if we wish to escape from the MAD world 
and promote arms control while the new threat of ballistic 
missiles and WMD is emerging. 
 If the Japanese government is not willing to make 
efforts to achieve MDE, it should stop pursuing missile 
defense. Unilateral, or even collateral with the United 
States, development and deployment of a missile defense 
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system will only invite regional instability and possibly a 
spiral of offensive and defensive arms race. A unilateral 
JMD system will provoke antagonism in North Korea, and 
possible acceleration of its nuclear weapon and missile 
programs. Skepticism will also grow in South Korea, which 
may lead to a somehow corresponding counteraction with the 
North to confront Japan. China will regard it as a revival 
of Japanese militarism and overtly criticize Japan, 
justifying its own military buildup. This scenario 
contradicts the national interests of both Japan and the 
United States. JMD must be part of the path toward a more 
stabilized and peaceful international society (Cronin et al. 
182). "Indeed, the era of passive Japanese foreign policy 
has come to an end. Japan is now expected to play a 
substantial, if not leadership role, in helping to create 
post-Cold War international order and institutions" 







 This study has explored and analyzed the Japanese 
missile defense program, and explained the development of 
strategic thinking on ballistic missile threats in Japan's 
defense and security policy. Nevertheless, it is still 
unclear if the intention of the Japanese government is to 
shift its security policy from passive "deterrence" to 
positive "defense" in a war-fighting strategy, or from MAD 
"deterrence by punishment" to MDE "deterrence by denial" in 
the context of arms control. It is also questionable if the 
embrace of JMD has resulted from thorough review and 
articulation of national security strategy by Japanese 
defense policymakers. The author concludes that Japan's 
"defensive realism" and MDE approach would be a good 
compromise between the Japanese realist and pacifist 
identities. 
 Against the background of suspected nuclear weapons 
development and possible reckless use by North Korea, the 
possibility that Japan might go nuclear has been the subject 
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of considerable conjecture, both domestically and 
internationally. In October 1999, an undersecretary of the 
Japanese Defense Agency argued for nuclear armament as soon 
as he took office, and he was immediately replaced. In June 
2002 a senior government official remarked that the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles should be revised. After North Korea 
launched seven ballistic missiles in July 2006, US Senator 
Sam Nunn, an expert on nuclear issues, revealed in an 
interview on Cable News Network (CNN) that Japanese 
officials had told him that Japan would have to develop 
nuclear weapons if the United States did not step up to 
protect them. 
 A process that could not be imagined in the past is 
under way. More clearly, the Japanese are breaking taboos 
and weakening the brakes on militarization. Neighboring 
states have repeatedly warned against Japan's ambitious 
nuclear policy (Kim 1996). Nonetheless, the prediction by 
some realist scholars that Japan would move toward nuclear 
armament has so far been proven wrong. There is no doubt 
about Japan's capability to develop nuclear weapons, but 
there is still no sign of actual nuclear armament. In spite 
of serious causes for concern, such as its plutonium 
stockpile, Japan has confounded what realist theory 
210 
predicted. As for the military capabilities of Japan, 
despite its having the world's second largest defense budget, 
and cutting-edge equipment and technologies, Japan's threat 
to South Korea cannot be compared with the threat posed by 
North Korea, whose 2000 defense budget was only three 
percent of Japan's. Even with the ability to develop nuclear 
weapons, few Japanese look upon nuclear armament as a 
desirable symbol of international status. The majority still 
considers nuclear weapons and a strong military force not as 
sources of wealth and power but as potential sources of 
enormous danger through the tragic calamity of war. 
 Japanese postwar defense and security policy has been 
a product of struggles between the pacifist and realist 
national identities. Identity is an ideational factor and it 
cannot by itself thoroughly explain defense and security 
policy or diplomatic policy. Identity is sometimes overcome 
by the structural power of international politics and 
sometimes works itself as a powerful driving force in 
policymaking. This ideational factor is built and rebuilt, 
intertwining with other ideational factors and with 
structural, material ones. The national identity is closely 
linked to changes in international situations. Compared with 
the fact that individual perceptions of threat are affected 
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largely by conflicts or regime changes in neighboring 
countries, the national identity as a whole--that is, "who 
and what we the Japanese are" and "what we should do as 
Japanese"--seems to change to a far lesser degree. At the 
same time, it is very hard to pull back a mega trend once 
the national identity shifts in a particular direction, just 
like movements deep in the earth's crust. Facing the 
upheavals of post-World War II international politics and 
confronting a series of threats, the Japanese public's view 
of national security and security policy have gradually 
changed. 
 In Japan, people rarely reach an agreement through 
debate, and views swing only slightly within a limited range 
until the situation changes drastically through some major 
event. Looking back on the postwar era, Japanese domestic 
political currents have shown a distinctive development 
though internal dynamics, at the same time largely defined 
by international circumstances. Political leaders--cabinet 
members, party leaders, and bureaucrats--shifted in the 
early stage of the postwar era towards realist policies 
because of the escalation of the Cold War. However, the 
general public, including individual citizens, peace 
organizations and journalists, became attached to pacifist 
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ideals. Thus, the government has prioritized realist 
policies in the name of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, 
while the people have resisted this. For most people, the 
military buildup and repeated constitutional re-
interpretations by the government are seen as a gradual 
movement toward rearmament. In spite of the domination of 
the realist LDP in the Diet after World War II, political 
leaders have not been able to ignore the opposing voice of 
the pacifist public. 
 Nevertheless, the pacifist identity has not 
outstripped the realist identity. After the war, Japan 
started over under the world's preeminent pacifist 
constitution, but there has been no country to follow its 
footsteps, and the international political environment has 
not led to promotion of its ideals. International efforts 
towards nuclear disarmament and arms control have not made 
much progress, and the United Nations has been the stage of 
realist confrontation between great powers. Global-scale 
anti-war and anti-nuclear movements have gradually fallen 
apart. Looking back upon the time right after the war, the 
confrontation between pacifism and realism in Japanese 
security policy was centered on issues such as the existence 
of the right of self-defense and the choice of unarmed 
213 
neutralism, and nobody imagined that Japan would send its 
troops abroad in the future. In contrast, today's debate 
features discussion on contributing internationally, 
including military options, and this way of using the Self 
Defense Forces is already recognized by the public. That is 
to say, the counterview has shifted from pacifism towards 
realism in the last 60 years. Lately, even preemptive 
attacks and nuclear armament are publicly argued for. It can 
be said that the Japanese political current has departed 
from the pacifist identity and listed heavily to the realist 
identity. In other words, "Japan's transition from a norms-
based to interest-based defense strategy" (Kliman 2006, 88), 
bringing "growing realism, frayed idealism" (Green 2001, 6). 
Hereafter, the national identity of Japan may gradually 
change like a landscape exposed to the wind and rain of the 
international security environment, or it may radically 
change, shaken by the shifts in the crust or giant 
earthquakes of wars in the neighborhood. As realist scholars 
have indicated, Japan may someday become a military 
superpower and, even, eventually a nuclear power. 
 The warning to the United States from a former 
Australian Ambassador to the UN, Richard Butler, holds true 
for JMD: 
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Research on defense against ballistic missiles could 
continue ... But a unilateral decision to deploy such 
a system should not be made unless it becomes clear 
that others will not join the United States in 
dealing directly with the threat of nuclear weapons. 
If the United States does find a reliable way to 
defeat the threat of ballistic missiles, it should 
examine the question of how this technology could 
best serve global safety and stability - by solely 
national deployment or by deployment shared with 
others (Butler 2001, 16) 
 
 JMD can be a tool of either realist military strategy 
or pacifist arms control. The author concludes that Japan 
should choose defensive realism and MDE arms control as a 
middle way, which may eventually open a pacifist route to 
disarmament. Japan possesses the world's most sophisticated 
technology and a tradition of pacifist identity, and because 
of this, Japan is in a unique and advantageous position. The 
"wars against terrorism" of the Bush Administration have 
painted the globe black and white, where rogue states and 
international terrorists are challenging democracy and 
freedom. Thus far, few states have completely rejected the 
United States' claims, no matter how skeptical and reluctant. 
There is a great opportunity to promote arms control and 
MDE: building missile shields against rogue and terrorist 
missile attacks or accidental or unauthorized launches, 
while advancing offensive arms reduction among major states. 
Japan can and must become a leader in such a shift toward a 
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 For some years, Japan has pursued its own missile 
defense system in cooperation with the United States. The 
Japanese government claims that the missile defense (JMD) 
program is purely defensive and will not pose a threat to 
other countries. JMD may seem justified by North Korea's 
development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. 
However, neighboring states regarded it as a sign of 
military ambition and revival of Japan's prewar militarism. 
The development and deployment of JMD could have grave 
implications for regional and global security. This 
dissertation focuses on these implications, domestic and 
international political considerations and the future 
direction of Japan's defense and security policy. 
After the Cold War, when the superpowers maintained 
strategic stability with massive offensive nuclear arsenals 
(mutual assured destruction—MAD), new threats from rogue 
 states and terrorists have forced us to rethink the 
credibility of MAD. But attempts to build shields against 
nuclear ballistic missiles could trigger a new phase of the 
arms race pitting offensive vs. defensive capabilities. The 
author argues that defense must be emphasized in order to 
achieve stability and security (mutual defense emphasis—MDE). 
Characterization of JMD as truly defensive or not depends on 
theoretical and strategic viewpoints. The key is the 
distinction between defense and offense, and whether Japan 
will emphasize defense, and convince other states that its 
strategic intentions are really defensive. 
For the Japanese, with their dual realist and 
pacifist identities, JMD can be a tool of either realist 
military strategy or pacifist arms control. Japan should 
choose defensive realism, including MDE arms control, as a 
middle way that may eventually open a pacifist route to 
disarmament. With the world's most sophisticated technology 
and a tradition of pacifism, Japan is in a unique and 
advantageous position to promote arms control. 
In pursuit of JMD, the Japanese government should not 
only promote arms control and MDE—building missile shields 
against rogue and terrorist missile attacks or accidental or 
unauthorized launches, but also advance offensive arms 
 reduction among major states. Japan can and must become a 
leader in such a shift toward a less dangerous world. 
 
